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Abstract
The Coinage Bill of 1816 was a turning point in monetary history, establishing
Britain on the gold standard and making provision for a major recoinage and
exchange of silver. The intention in this thesis has been to examine why the reform
happened when it did, what its legacy was for the nineteenth century and what the
surviving records, particularly of the exchange, reveal about the nature of the
circulating medium.
In Chapters 1 and 2 the eighteenth-century background is explored in order to
clarify why government chose to allow the condition of the silver coinage to
decline. The argument is advanced that economic stability for many years lessened
the necessity for reform and the importance of gold in the economy made ministers
wary of damaging its position through change. An investigation into the wear of
silver coins has also been conducted which demonstrates that by the 1780s they
were likely to have lost virtually all trace of design details. The reasons why
reform was enacted in 1816 are discussed in Chapter 3, the explanation offered
being the importance of war with France having ended and the Bank of England's
needing to prepare for the resumption of redeeming its notes in gold. In Chapter 4
the political reputation of William Wellesley Pole is assessed together with his
contribution to the recoinage, while in Chapters 5 and 6 the administration of the
reform is described and analysed in detail. The traditional view of its being a
success is confirmed by new research. The accounts from exchange stations set up
to effect the change-over, listed in Appendices 3 and 4, and discussed in Chapter 6,
reveal that although there were trading centres and manufacturing areas in which
the old silver currency was concentrated, it was nevertheless fairly well distributed
across Britain. I have attempted throughout to link the silver coinage to the other
elements of the money supply. This approach is particularly evident in Chapter 7 in
which the impact of the political and economic forces pressing for a resumption of
cash payments are seen to shape the survival of the settlement of 1816-17.
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Preface
My original purpose in writing this thesis was to study Class 11 of the Mint
records at the Public Record Office which consists of a detailed collection of
papers exclusively relating to the silver recoinage and exchange of 1816-17.
Not until the late 1960s, when Mint records were listed and transferred to the
Public Record Office, were these documents made readily accessible as a
coherent collection. There have been accounts written of the recoinage in, for
example, Sir John Craig's The Mint as well as in A New History of the Royal
Mint edited by Christopher Challis. Monetary histories such as Sir Albert
Feavearyear's The Pound Sterling have dealt with the theoretical and economic
background, but in the context of covering over 1,000 years of history, these
works have all necessarily summarised the events of 1816-17.
A purely administrative history of the recoinage and exchange might hope to
explain how a government, with relatively limited resources, effected the
national distribution of a coinage, but such an approach would be unlikely to
discover why the recoinage became necessary, why it happened when it did,
what it revealed about the relationship between money and an economy
beginning to come to grips with industrialisation, and having been enacted, what
the legacy of reform was for the nineteenth century. My secondary purpose was
to explore these themes. As well as describing how the change-over to a new
coinage was accomplished in 1816-17 and analysing the nature of the
distribution throughout Britain of the old silver that was withdrawn, this study
has therefore attempted to embrace broader monetary policy concerns of the
period and to see the reform in relation to the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century economy, especially its monetary aspects, in order to provide a narrative
that addresses the 130-year misadventure of the silver coinage from the 1690s to
the foundation in 1825 of the British imperial currency.
Where relevant, the gold and copper currencies together with developments
in the banking sector and trends in economic thought have been included. A
vi
detailed numismatic study has not been attempted because the balance of the
thesis would have been stretched in what seemed to be a contrary direction. But
where appropriate, numismatic research has been employed in support of
arguments. The use of money, as opposed to the conditions that determine its
supply centrally, has been touched on briefly with respect to how
compensations were made for a shortage of silver currency in the eighteenth
century. Throughout the thesis the behaviour and ideas of the politicians and
economists who shaped the course of events have been discussed. The intention
overall has been to provide a rounded view of a hitherto neglected corner of
monetary history in the hope that the social and political implications of the
currency reform can be revealed alongside its economic significance.
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CHAPTER 1
JOHN LOCKE AND MONETARY REFORM
Introduction
During the eighteenth century gold was unofficially adopted as the means of
regulating the value of the currency, but the favoured status that was
consequently afforded the gold coinage marginalised the place of silver in the
circulating medium. Very few silver coins were produced and the ones that
remained in use became worn to the point of being completely smooth discs of
metal. The government shirked its responsibility to provide the legislative
framework that would enable the issue of adequate quantities of silver coin and
not until the Coinage Bill of 1816 was passed by Parliament was the imbalance in
the system corrected; gold was confirmed as the standard of value for the
currency but provision was also made for a new coinage of silver, manufactured
to a lower weight standard that was intended to prevent any conflict between the
coinages of gold and silver. As part of the reforms of 1816-17 the old worn
silver pieces were to be withdrawn and exchanged for the new, the plan being to
regenerate completely this element of the currency. The answer to why change
took place in 1816 and not decades earlier, as had been the plea of many writers
on economic affairs, why tensions in the currency system were allowed to
emerge at all and why the position in the money supply especially of silver was
allowed to degenerate lies in an exposition of Britain's monetary policy during
the eighteenth century. The foundations upon which this policy was based were
the currency debates that surrounded the Great Recoinage and specifically the
exchange of views that took place between the philosopher John Locke and
Secretary to the Treasury, William Lowndes.
1
Locke versus Lowndes
In the interests of clarity the terms employed to describe monetary changes
should be defined. A debasement of the coinage refers to a reduction in the
fineness of the metal used in the manufacture of coins. A deterioration means
the loss of weight coins suffer in circulation compared to the weight standard to
which they are struck. A depreciation refers to a fall in the purchasing power of
coins. A devaluation is a reduction in the standard weights of coins introduced
by government, or an official reduction in the face value ascribed to a coin.'
Prior to 1662 most coins produced in England had been manufactured by
striking a blank piece of metal with a hammer between a set of coinage dies.
After 1662 English coins were struck using a screw press, giving their
appearance a more regular outline and designs set in higher relief The hammer-
struck coins produced before this date, however, remained in circulation for
more than thirty years alongside the machine-struck pieces, until, that is, the
Great Recoinage of 1696-99. The circumstances that guided the course of
monetary reform in the 1690s stemmed from rapid increases in the prices of
silver and gold combined with the deteriorating condition of the silver coinage,
which was the result of the common practice of clipping or filing silver from the
edges of coins. Since 1601 the Mint had coined from an ounce of silver 5s 2d,
the equivalent of 62s to the troy pound. Through most of the seventeenth
century the price of silver on the bullion market had fluctuated between 5s 2d
and 5s 4d an ounce, but towards the end of 1694 it began to rise, advancing
during 1695 to a peak in September of 6s 5d. Over this same period in the
1690s the value at which the gold coinage, in the shape of the guinea, changed
hands increased at an even faster pace; from having fluctuated for many years as
a coin that would pass at between 21s 2d and 21s 10d it rose in February 1695
to 25s and by the beginning of June to 30s. As far as clipping was concerned,
this had always been a difficulty for hammered coins, but the problem became
I J. K. Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments, 1650-1710 (London, 1960), p. 24.
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more noticeably acute during the late 1680s and especially severe from 1694
because of the currency inflation. According to one estimate, silver coins in
circulation had by 1695 lost just under 50 per cent of their original weight.2
The traditional way of coping with increases in the price of precious metals,
and the one adopted when the silver coinage was last altered in 1601, was to
mint coins to a lighter standard; inflation in the price of silver could be
compensated for by reducing the amount of silver in a coin that retained the
same face value. In 1601 this resulted in a change in the weight of the shilling
from 96gr to 92.9gr. Over the course of 400 years, from the reign of Edward I
in the thirteenth century, resort to this expedient had been thought desirable on
several occasions, as is evident from the amount of standard silver coined from a
pound weight in 1279 being 20s 3d. 3 The same end could be achieved by re-
denominating coins at a higher value while maintaining the existing weight
standard. To address the problems that troubled the currency in the 1690s the
latter approach was suggested by William Lowndes in a report that he was
commissioned to write by the Privy Council. He proposed a devaluation of 20
per cent which would have meant enhancing the value of the crown from a 5s
piece to 6s 3d, and the other denominations in proportion. Having gone through
the indentures of the Mint he concluded that the policy in former years was 'to
Raise the Value of the Coin in its Extrinsick Denomination, from time to time, as
any Exigence or Occasion required; and more especially to Encourage the
bringing of Bullion into the Realm to be Coined'.4
Given the weight of historical precedent in his favour, Lowndes should have
encountered few difficulties in having his proposals accepted, but he was not his
2 C. E. Challis, 'Appendix 2. Mint Contracts, 1279-1817', NHIVVI, p. 737; C. E. Challis,
'Lord Hastings to the Great Silver Recoinage, 1464-1699', NHRM, pp. 380-82. A. E.
Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling. A History of English Money, 2nd edition, E. V. Morgan,
(Oxford, 1963), pp. 129-31.
3 Challis, 'Mint Contracts', NHRM, p. 736; N. J. Mayhew, 'From Regional to Central
Minting, 1158-1464', NHRM, p. 119.
4 W. Lowndes, A Report Containing an Essay for the Amendment of the Silver Coins
(London, 1695), pp. 3, 56, 61-62.
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own best advocate. The raised value of coins, he wrote, may be Lowered again
by the Wisdom and Authority of Parliament, when the wealth of the Nation
should (by Gods Blessing) be Re-establishe. The implication was the threat of
currency instability, a threat to property and money incomes that was made all
the more worrying by the extent of the devaluation that Lowndes was
suggesting. When the silver coinage was last altered in 1601 the weight of the
reduction was a little over 3 per cent. To support such a policy might have
involved signing up to a perpetual cycle of currency devaluation and
revaluation.' Those who opposed Lowndes argued that prices would be raised,
especially of imported goods, lenders and rentiers would suffer and wages as
well as the King's revenue would be hit.
Having digested his report, the government in 1695 consulted a number of
other people, including the architect Christopher Wren, the former Governor of
the East India Company Josiah Child, John Locke and the foremost scientist of
the age Isaac Newton. Of this group, a majority favoured maintaining the
existing currency standard over devaluation, but the debate extended beyond
official advisers and beyond Parliament, capturing the attention of interested
parties, of financiers, merchants and economic theorists of varying degrees of
competence. The resulting flourish of economic publications stretched to
hundreds of titles.6
The argument employed by Locke was not new. It was a restatement of the
political economist William Petty's position on monetary policy, that to raise the
denominative value of coins or to lower the quantity of precious metal in
individual pieces was both futile and damaging. The accusation of futility
5 Lowndes, Essay for the Amendment of the Silver Coins, pp. 87-88. J. Locke, Some
Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of
Money. In a Letter sent to a Member of Parliament, 2nd edition corrected, (London, 1696),
pp. 144-45. J. Locke, Further Considerations concerning Raising the Value of Money, etc,
2nd edition corrected, (London, 1696), pp. 69-70.
6 Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments, pp. 51-52. Horsefield's Bibliography provides
an extensive listing of the printed and manuscript titles of the 1690s. For Josiah Child see
DNB. J. 0. Appleby, 'Locke, Liberalism and the Natural Law of Money', Past and Present,
71 (1976), p. 48.
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stemmed from the idea that the amount of silver was the determinant of the
exchange value of coins, so that if new shillings were three-quarters of their
former weight, they would only purchase three-quarters as much; the level of
trade that such money could conduct would not therefore be raised. The status
of the silver coinage as a medium of exchange, he believed, was founded
exclusively on the intrinsic value of the metal out of which it was made, an idea
that denied money could have an extrinsic value determined by the hand of
legislators. The denomination or stamp under which a coin circulated could have
no influence on the value of the coin unless, he maintained, it could add to one
quantity of silver qualities which another quantity of silver lacked.' Locke
compared devaluation to the boy who 'cut his Leather into five Quarters (as he
called them) to cover his Ball, when cut into four Quarters it fell short: But after
all his pains, as much of his Ball lay bare as before'. In a similar vein he
compared raising the face value of coins to measuring a standard yard one fifth
shorter in an effort to make a quantity of cloth cover a greater area. The
damaging aspects of devaluation had implications for private property, because a
government, in reducing the weight of coins, would have effectively taken away
a proportion of men's goods or creditors' money.'
The starting points for Locke and Lowndes in their approaches to the nature
of money were diametrically opposed. On the one hand was the belief that the
monetary standard should always be the same fixed weight of silver, and on the
other, that the standard should be allowed to fluctuate in relation to the wear of
coins or the price of bullion. The contrast between the two perspectives can
further be seen in the views of the merchant and writer Sir William hodges who
observed that bad as it was the old money did serve the needs of trade and that
even if it were made of leather it would perform the same function. Conversely,
7 W. Petty, Ouantulumcunque Concerning Money (London, 1682), pp. 6-7. Locke, Some
Con,siclerations, pp. 134-35, 137.
8 Petty, Quantulumcunque Concerning Money, p. 7. Locke, Further Considerations, pp. 64-
65. Locke, Some Considerations, pp. 142-43. For earlier examples of opposition to
altering the currency see E. Roll, A History of Economic Thought (London, 1938), pp. 53-
54, 63, 82.
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Locke wrote that 'the Standard once thus settled, should be Inviolably and
Immutably kept to perpetuity' . 9 The debate was not new. Knowingly or not,
Hodges was echoing the views of the Knight in the sixteenth-century work, A
Discourse of the Commonweal of This Realm of England. In response to the
opinion that all manner of troubles were attendant on debasing the coinage the
Knight responded that the coin was but a token to go from man to man, 'and
since it is stricken with the King's seal to be current, what makes it the matter
what metal it be of, yea, though it were but leather or paper?'.'°
Locke's perspective on money was an integral element of his political
philosophy. It was a view he had developed in his Two Treatises on
Government, written more than a decade before the currency debates of the
1690s, and it represented a crucial element in his explanation of how property
rights, a fundamental aspect of the formation of societies, were a part of a
natural law which operated beyond civil jurisdiction. Locke's approach to the
reform of silver was an argument that saw the market system as being directed
by objective economic forces that were ingrained in the nature of man.
Interfering in the free rein to such forces by effecting a devaluation of silver
could therefore be interpreted as an act that would frustrate the operation of the
natural economic order." Against Lowndes' presentation of historical
precedents for currency devaluation of the past, Locke therefore argued that
money and the rate of interest had a natural value which as such could not be
changed. The importance of this idea for him is evident from the sheer number
of times he refers in his writings to the natural rate of interest or the natural
value of the currency. In the context in which he used them, natural laws might
be defined as human propensities that operate at a level beyond personal choice
9 Appleby, 'Locke', Past and Present, 71 (1976), p. 54. Locke, Some Considerations, p. 171.
Locke, Further Considerations, p. 9.
10 M. Dewar (ed.), [Sir Thomas Smith], A Discourse of the Commonweal of This Realm of
England (Charlottesville, 1969), pp. 69-70.
11 Locke, Further Considerations, pp. 3-5. Locke, Some Considerations, p. 1. Appleby,
'Locke', Past and Present, 71 (1976), pp. 43-45, 63-64. P. Laslett, John Locke, Two
Treatises on Government: A Critical Edition with an Introduction and Apparatus Criticus
(Cambridge, 1963), pp. 310-12, 318-19. Q. Skinner, The foundations of modern political
thought (Cambridge, 1978), II, 153, 174, 328.
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or the reach of regulations devised by society. The view that such laws
governed economics grew in favour during the eighteenth century and the
debates over the recoinage of the 1690s were a turning point in the advance of
this perspective.12
The detail of Locke's theory of money can be questioned in terms of his
deficient understanding of the significance of alterations in the value of the
currency over hundreds of years, but more than this, the soundness of his
reasoning was flawed. Despite repeatedly claiming that a coin obtained its value
from the amount of silver it contained, Locke nevertheless conceded in his work
on money and interest that clipped coin could be accepted at the same rate as
heavier pieces. He wrote, 'clip 'd and unclip 'd Money will always buy an equal
quantity of anything else, as long as they will without scruple change for one
another', and he went on to observe 'but whilst clip 'd and weighty Money will
equally change for one another, it is all one to him [a foreign merchant] whether
he receives his Money in clip'd Money or not, so be it but current'. In
explanation of this seeming contradiction of his basic theory he argued that the
acceptance of clipped money, at its full face value, was quite a different matter
from setting out purposely with the intention of altering the weight of the
standard coin. Moreover, he believed that there was a degree of weight loss that
would be reached beyond which clipped coins would no longer be accepted at
their face value.°
The use of clipped coin was not necessarily a straightforward matter.
Disagreements arose constantly in transactions, but this type of money did
change hands at face value, while full weight pieces were culled from the
circulation. His explanation does not prevent the solidity of his reasoning from
being undermined because he departs from the principles that underpinned his
arguments about the nature of the value of money. Although his initial work on
12 Locke, Some Considerations, pp. 3, 8-9. Appleby, 'Locke', Past and Present, 71 (1976),
pp. 43, 48.
13 Locke, Some Considerations, pp. 156-58.
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money and interest was first published in 1692, it was written in 1668. The
extent of clipping in the late 1660s had not reached the severe proportions
witnessed twenty-five years later and the nature of his views may have been a
reflection of the condition of the coins. In his published response to Lowndes'
report in 1695 he took a firmer position against the idea that clipped money
could circulate at face value, maintaining that its continued use had only been by
the intrinsic value of the silver it contained, which had consequently inflated the
price of bullion. He could not understand that Lowndes referred to clipped coin
as legitimate money. 'We have now', he argued, 'no lawful Silver Money
current among us: And therefore cannot talk nor judge right, by our present
uncertain clip'd Money, of the value and price of things, in reference to our
lawful regular Coin, adjusted and kept to the unvarying Standard of the Mint'.14
If the debate had been a matter of presenting a case based on sound
reasoning and impressive evidence taken from a detailed knowledge of currency
history, Lowndes and his supporters would have won. The debate, however,
was not just a question of alternative monetary policies, it embraced discussion
of a philosophy that justified the freedom of the market over the regulatory
power of government. If the state had the right to change the currency
arrangements, logically it would have the right to take from a man his property.
Having an uncertain grasp of the details of monetary circumstances was not,
therefore, a deciding factor. Locke was inconsistent in his approach to the issue
of whether at the end of the seventeenth century people exchanged goods for the
specific amounts of precious metal coins contained and being overly theoretical
in his approach he ignored the ample precedent of monetary reform, employing
instead circular arguments to sustain his reasoning. 15
 How, in such
circumstances, could his position have possibly won through?
14 Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling, p. 156. G. Parry, John Locke (London, 1978), p. 6.
Locke, Further Considerations, pp. 31, 33, 36. Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments,
p. 26.
15 Locke, Some Considerations, pp. 135-39. Appleby, 'Locke', Past and Present, 71 (1976),
pp. 43, 49.
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Locke's political philosophy of popular sovereignty and the right of
revolution was the one that had triumphed with the overthrow of James II and
the revolution of 1688. He was a respected figure and in the arena of currency
reform he presented a forceful case for a connection between economic and
political freedom that appealed to parliamentary leaders. Rather than seeing their
power to influence monetary matters circumscribed, some politicians saw in
Locke's ideas a defence of their property rights and a clear demarcation of
government's authority over a defining aspect of their ability to create wealth.
The political magnates felt that they had too much to lose materially by
devaluing. 16
There are other ways of looking at the resolution of monetary policy in the
mid 1690s. The economic historian J. K. Horsefield has argued that the coinage
standard of 62s to the pound was maintained because 'in the end it was the fear
of change, the instinct of conservatism, which won the day for Restoration'.17
This is itself, however, too conservative a view. Towards the end of 1695 the
government won a hotly contested debate in Parliament to maintain the standard;
it was confronted and persuaded by the advice of eminent men who largely came
out against devaluation, and although it could not have imagined that the costs
of the recoinage would spiral upwards as they did, in taking the decision to
recoin and maintain the standard it did choose the more expensive option - at
least in the short term." The decision may have been founded on a fear of an
ever-depreciating currency, but Locke's solution, although on paper offering the
prospect of stability, was not guaranteed to be effective. Indeed, as Lowndes
demonstrated, Locke's ideas flew in the face of a centuries-old tradition of
devaluation. The tried and tested method of responding to changes in the value
of precious metals was set aside in favour of something new - the idea, that is, of
the Mint weight standard having about it an air of sanctity. Rather than being
16 Appleby, 'Locke', Past and Present, 71 (1976), pp. 55-56. Skinner, Modern political
thought, II, 348.
17 Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments, pp. 60, 68.
Challis, 'Lord Hastings', NHRM, p. 397.
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conservative, ministers were working against tradition and into the eighteenth
century successive administrations, while not always following Locke's theory,
were nonetheless reluctant to alter the standard of the silver coinage. 19
Monetary policy in the eighteenth centuty
Throughout the eighteenth century homage was paid to Locke's legacy in the
area of monetary theory and his views on the necessity of keeping inviolable the
standard of value were rehearsed on many occasions. Joseph Massie, a writer on
trade and finance, speculated 'whether any one Man hath differed from him
[Locke] concerning Money, without being thought the worst of for it', and the
suggestion was made that there seemed to be an almost universally adopted
opinion that altering the standard would be dangerous because Mr Locke
believed it to be wrong - superstitiously, faith was placed in his opinions. One
anonymous author wrote 'a Prince is no more justifiable in corrupting the purity
of his coin, than in poisoning the public Aquaduct...nor is it more allowable for
him to diminish, or raise his Money, than to commit any other act of fraud or
violence against his peop ley()
The debate, however, had not run its course. With the realisation that the
balance between gold and silver was preventing silver from being minted there
were calls for either a lowering of gold or a raising of silver. The merchant and
19 In Lowndes, Essay for the Amendment of the Silver Coins, pp. 33-58, details are given of
the Mint indentures covering the alterations to the coinage from Edward I's reign.
Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling, p. 148.
20 J. Massie, Observations relating to the Coin of Great Britain, etc (London, 1760), p. 20.
For examples of views in support of Locke's ideas see also [S. Clement], Re/narks upon a
late Ingenious Pamphlet [by D. Clayton] entitled, A Short but thorough Search into what
may be the real Cause of the present Scarcity of our Silver Coin, etc' (London, 1718),
pp. 11-12; P. Vallavine, Observations on the Present condition of the Current coin of this
Kingdom (London, 1742), pp. 30-31; J. Harris, An Essay upon Money and Coins (London,
1757), pt I, 95; [P. Murray], Thoughts on Money, Circulation and Paper Currency
(Edinburgh, 1758), p. 10; For the view that men have superstitiously adhered to Locke's
views see [Beldam], Considerations on money, bullion and foreign exchanges; being an
enquiry into the present state of the British Coinage: particularly with regard to the
scarcity of silver money, etc (London, 1772), pp. 154-55.
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Lord Mayor of London Sir John Barnard considered that the fineness of silver
should be reduced from 11oz 2dwts to 10oz. A letter to the London Magazine
contained the argument that diminishing silver in this way would correct the
imbalance between the two metals because gold coins contained a higher
proportion of alloy. The standard of sterling silver equated to 925 parts per
thousand, while that of gold at 22 carats equated to 916 parts per thousand.
Debasing the fineness of silver was directed at achieving the same end as the
proposal of Customs Commissioner Corbyn Morris who suggested diminishing
the weight of silver coins. A reduction to the shilling of 1/30 part - the near
equivalent of 64s to the pound troy - Morris maintained was necessary, while
Samuel Garbett, a Birmingham businessman who was commissioned by
government in 1782 to write a report on the management of the Mint, thought a
new rate of 76s would be required. 21 Added to this were the views of the Bank
of England who made representations to ministers in April and again in July
1797 in support of devaluation. By the end of the century a significant weight of
opinion had built up in favour of this course of action.22
What also stands against the impression of Locke's influence being all-
pervasive is the reality of daily exchange. Even when Locke was writing there
was evidence that the truth of his ideas on the monetary standard, that the
quantity of silver was the measure of value of commodities rather than an
assigned denominative value being attached to a coin, could be readily
challenged. On the basis of experiments referred to by Lowndes, the silver coins
circulating prior to the recoinage of the 1690s had lost, through clipping, in the
order of 50 per cent of their original weight and so, according to Locke's
formulation, an equivalent rise in prices should have taken place. This did not
21 Sir John Barnard, Some Thoughts on the scarcity of silver coin: with a proposal for remedy
thereof (London, 1759), p. 2. London Magazine, August 1762, P. 438-39. C. Morris, A
Letter balancing the causes of the present Scarcity of our Silver Coin and the Means of
immediate Remedy (London, 1757), p. 11. G. P. Dyer and P. P. Gaspar, 'Reform, the New
Technology and Tower Hill, 1700-1966', NHRM, pp. 441, 444.
22 BE. G8/8, 25 April 1797, pp. 46-47; BE. G4/27, 20 July 1797, p. 265.
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happen - something which economic essayists at the time did not grasp. 23 In the
eighteenth century a similar pattern was evident: as silver coin was melted down,
exported or diminished in weight, prices up to 1750 entered a trough (Figure 1
Tables 1 and 2). This dissonance might be seen as reflecting the more important
role that gold assumed in the economy, but it also indicates that the actual
experience of exchange was of worn silver coins passing at their full face values
and therefore demonstrates the importance of the extrinsic over the intrinsic
value of money. Locke's ideas on the natural law of money triumphed in 1696
but in the hands of retailers the deteriorated silver coinage of the mid to late
eighteenth century took its value from a trust in the denomination, from, that is,
the man-made over the natural, and in this may be seen the acceptance of the
notion of fiat money.
There was, though, a limit to the extent to which the fiduciary element of the
coinage could be taken. Discussion of solutions to the currency problems was
not couched in terms of adopting a copper coinage that would carry the
denominations of shilling, sixpence and half-crown. A psychological attachment
to an intrinsic value precious metal coinage was still apparent and continued
throughout the nineteenth century; to an extent, though, this attachment had
been overtaken by events.
The unofficially acknowledged devaluation was effectively given legal
backing in 1774. In response to the appearance of considerable quantities of
silver coins well below the standard Mint weight, that were believed to have
been imported into Britain, an act was passed limiting the legal tender status of
silver. Specifically, no payment of money in silver coin of sums exceeding £25
would be allowed as legitimate for more than its value by weight at the rate of 5s
2d an ounce. The implication of this measure was that tenders below the value
of £25 would be legal without reference to weight and since the deterioration of
23
• Locke, Further Considerations, p. 2. Ming-Hsun Li, The Great Recoinage of 1696 to 1699
(London, 1963), p. 9.
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silver was widely reported and generally accepted, a tacit devaluation had
thereby been enacted. 24 The extent of the devaluation that had been recognised
can be gauged from the percentage figures for weight loss quoted in Table 2.
Writing in 1762 George Whatley judged that shillings had lost 11.42 per cent of
their original weight, while twenty-five years later the Mint determined a 20.61
per cent deterioration.
The primacy of Locke in guiding monetary policy was further challenged in
the eighteenth century by the operation of a bimetallic standard. He had
advocated a single metal silver standard and believed gold should be allowed to
find its own level, there being no necessity, to his mind, that it should have a
fixed value set by public authority. In 1717, on the recommendation of Isaac
Newton, who was at the time Master of the Mint, a maximum rate for the guinea
was established at 21s and throughout the rest of the century the position of gold
in a bimetallic system was defended ahead of silver. Admittedly, in advising that
the guinea be lowered to 21s, Newton was recommending a policy that he
expected would bring about a recovery in the position of the silver coinage by
providing less of an incentive for it to be exported.25
During the reign of Queen Anne, measures were also taken to encourage the
coining of silver by paying a premium of 2 1/2d an ounce on silver plate or foreign
coin imported into the Mint. But the prompt action taken to recoin gold in the
1770s when its position became threatened by export and wear, a position which
had afflicted silver for the preceding seventy years, is compelling evidence of the
importance of gold. 26 In the 1790s, when the price of silver fell below the Mint
price for two or three years and when a committee of the Privy Council was
reconvened under the active leadership of the statesman Lord Liverpool, the
prospect of a recoinage of silver seemed close at hand, but the fear that the new
24 R. Ruding, Annals of the Coinage of Great Britain and its Dependencies, etc, 3rd edition,
(London, 1840), II, 85. Parliamentary History, XVII, cols 1327-28 (10 May 1774).
25 Locke, Some Considerations, p. 169. Journal of the House of Commons, XVIII, cols 664-
66 (21 December 1717).
26 Ruding, Annals of the Coinage, II, 63. Dyer and Gaspar, 'Tower Hill', NHRItl, pp. 439-41.
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coins might simply be exported proved a strong incentive for more fence-sitting
on the question of the silver coinage. 27 The favouring of one metal over that of
another was not something to which Locke subscribed but it was apparent in the
way the British currency was managed in the eighteenth century.
Although Locke's influence did cast a shadow over monetary policy, there
was also pragmatism in evidence. The drift towards gold as the chief element of
the metallic currencies was not resisted and certainly not on the basis of a
doctrinaire allegiance to the political philosopher. His thinking, moreover,
cannot be employed to address some significant subsequent developments in
monetary affairs. The opposition he expressed to the practice of paper being
employed as money in transactions circumscribes fairly well the relevance of
some of his ideas. 28 An indication of how far government departed from his
views is provided by the debates during 1810 and 1811 surrounding the report of
the Bullion Committee on the high price of gold, when ministers, under the
exigencies of financing the war against France, were happy to see the
continuation of an irredeemable note circulation (Chapter 3, p. 53).
The political philosophy that lay behind the origins of modern liberal
democracies and constitutional government cannot be considered without
looking back to Locke, and similarly the 150 years of currency history from the
end of the seventeenth century cannot be considered without acknowledging his
influence. A strong aversion to abandoning an intrinsic value coinage was his
legacy to debates over the currency, but during the eighteenth century a shift was
taking place from silver to gold, and from metal to paper that altered the
character of monetary policy beyond the scope of the debates of the 1690s.
27 G. P. Dyer and P. P. Gaspar, 'The Dorrien & Magens Shilling of 1798', BNJ, 52
(1982), 201.
28 Locke, Some Considerations, p. 29.
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CHAPTER 2
SCARCITY OF SILVER COIN IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY
The impact of the Great Recoinage
The withdrawal of English hammered silver coins and their replacement by
machine-struck pieces was a major undertaking, but the success of the operation
was almost immediately marred by large quantities of the newly minted silver
being taken out of circulation and melted down for profit. The debate over
whether or not to devalue the currency, the outcome of which was the
acceptance of Locke's theory of money, seemed to have been productive of a
flawed system in which there was advantage in exporting silver abroad rather
than importing it into the Mint to be coined. From the beginning of the
eighteenth century rather than the sound foundation of a regenerated circulating
medium, there existed the problems of an insufficient quantity of silver being
produced and a consequent deterioration in the quality of the currency that
remained in use.
The size of the silver circulation at the end of 1695, on the eve of the Great
Recoinage, has been estimated at £11 million. The vast majority, in the region of
10 million, of the old currency was withdrawn over the course of several years
and what remained unaccounted for was in any case demonetised in January
1698. 1 In the three years of the recoinage /6.8 million was produced to replace
the hammered money, which meant that the resulting silver circulation was
reduced by 38 per cent. The impact of this sizeable fall was almost certainly
exacerbated by the deflationary influence of the new coins being minted at the
For the estimate of £11 million see Craig, The Mint, p. 193. In Horsefield, British
Monetary Experiments, pp. 14, 258, a slightly higher estimate of £12 million has been
calculated. A more conservative estimate is given in R. E. Cameron, Banking in the Early
Stages of Industrialisation. A Study in Comparative Economic History (New York, 1967),
p. 42.
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established standard of 62s to the pound troy - a full 50 per cent appreciation
over the ardently clipped hammer-struck pieces that were withdrawn.2
As the eighteenth century progressed production of silver did not
compensate for this decline. During the seventeenth century £22.5 million of
silver coin was issued by the Mint, while in the eighteenth century the figure was
less than £1 million (Table 3). What would have constituted an adequate supply
of silver currency at any particular time is not easily determined. If, however,
the assumption is made that a reduction in the size of the circulation of almost 40
per cent cannot have failed to generate difficulties, then a supply deficiency of
some magnitude must have arisen in light of the large amounts of coin that were
melted down and exported over the course of the subsequent fifty years.
The terms of the silver trade in which the East India Company was engaged
during the eighteenth century were lucrative because of the relatively high price
that silver attracted in the East. Between 1699 and 1717 the guinea was rated at
21s 6d, which with the Mint price of silver reaffirmed by the recoinage
settlement at 62s to the pound resulted in a silver/gold ratio of 15.4 to 1. Isaac
Newton made clear in his report to the Treasury of 1717 that this compared with
ratios in China and Japan of 9 or 10 to 1, in India of about 12 to 1 and in several
European countries, including France, Denmark, Holland and Germany, of
roughly 14 to 1. 3 Silver's value was, therefore, closer to that of gold in many
other parts of the world and the price it fetched being consequently higher meant
that there was a profit to be made on exporting silver from Britain and importing
gold. There were legal restraints on the trade in bullion in the shape of the
requirement to swear an oath that silver for export had not been derived from
melting down coin of the realm. The law was widely ignored and easily
circumvented and inevitably, therefore, large amounts of the newly-minted silver
disappeared. During the first half of the century the trade in silver varied
markedly. In 1705 £193,000 was shipped overseas, while in 1717 the scale had
increased to £1,151,000 and the following year to £1,894,000. Between the
2 Challis, 'Lord Hastings', NHR11/1, p. 386. Lowndes, Amendment of the Silver Coins, p. 107.
3 Journal of the House of Commons, XVIII, cols 664-66 (21 December 1717).
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years 1701 and 1760 the East India Company exported an annual average of
1,631,922 ounces of silver - the equivalent of over £400,000 of silver coin.4
A fairly drastic realignment of the weights of coins would have been
necessary to avert the business instincts of merchants from the potential gain
particularly in relation to India and the Far East. The solution would have been
to adjust the rates at which coins were struck so that the silver/gold ratio in
Britain would fall from over 15 to 1 to a rate closer to 14 to 1 and thereby
approximate more closely to the rest of Europe. The face value of existing gold
coins could have been lowered, new coins with the same face value but an
increased weight might have been released or the purity of the gold alloy used to
strike coins could have been enhanced. Any of these methods would have
narrowed the gap between the rate at which silver and gold were minted.
Alternatively, keeping gold at the same standard, the adjustment could have been
made to the silver coins (Chapter 1, p.3). Newton's recommendation, and the
one adopted in 1717, was to operate on the face value of gold coins and reduce
the guinea from 21s 6d to 21s. From being rated at £47 17s to the pound, gold
was as a consequence of this change rated at 146 14s 6d, a shift in the silver/gold
ratio from 15.4 to 1 to just over 15 to 1. He acknowledged that further changes
in the same direction would be necessary in order to save the silver coinage from
the further ravages of the melter and the exporter. When writers on economics
in the eighteenth century referred to the Mint price of silver having been set too
low, the intention in mind was to establish a silver/gold ratio in Britain more in
keeping with other parts of the world.5
Britain's being relieved of its new silver coins was an unwelcome
development and the quantities that were lost to Europe and the East failed to be
matched by a comparable scale of production. Even if a compensation in output
levels had not been required to accommodate the bullion trade, silver was still
not minted during any decade in the eighteenth century on a par with what had
4 Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments, pp. 77-78. T. S. Ashton, An Economic History
of England: The 18th Century (London, 1955), p. 170. K. N. Chaudhuri, The Trading
World ofAsia and the English East India Company, 1660-1760 (Cambridge, 1978), p. 177.
5 Journal of the House of Commons, XVIII, cols 664-66 (21 December 1717).
17
come to be expected during most of the last two hundred years (Table 3).
Commentators at the time referred to the silver coinage being prodigiously
exhausted and there being an absolute necessity for a speedy supply. A cursory
glance suggests the paradoxical situation of there being insufficient silver in
circulation that was yet continually being withdrawn as if in response to a
surplus.6
In the standard works on the British coinage as well as in economic histories,
the tendency for the market price of silver in the eighteenth century to be above
the Mint price has been well documented. However willing people may have
been to maintain a healthy money supply they were not about to sustain
voluntarily a loss on importing silver into the Mint.' Writing in 1730 John
Conduitt, successor as Master of the Mint to Isaac Newton, remarked that the
only silver coined at the Mint since 1701 had been forced there. Amongst other
supplies he was referring to the proportion of the treasure seized at Vigo in
Spain that was brought to the Mint in 1703.8
The difference between the market price and the Mint price of silver, as is
apparent from Appendix 1, was not always large, but added to this difference
were costs that an importer of silver to the Mint would have to bear, such as the
loss of interest during the time taken to coin bullion, as well as fees to certain
Mint officers. A relatively small margin would therefore be increased by the
extent of practical minting costs. The higher market price was maintained
because of the outlet provided by the flow of silver to the East. Rather than
continuing its decline in value against gold, which had been taking place
gradually from the thirteenth century and more rapidly during the seventeenth
century, silver began to appreciate. In every decade of the first sixty years of the
eighteenth century the international silver/gold ratio moved in favour of silver
6 [D. Clayton], A short but thorough Search into what may be the real Cause of the present
Scarcity of our Silver Coin, etc (London, 1717), p. 21.
Ruding, Annals of the Coinage, II, 67. Oman, The Coinage of England, p. 356.
Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling, p. 158. Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments, p. 83.
8 Conduitt, Observations upon our Gold and Silver Coins, in Shaw, Select Tracts, pp. 216-
17.
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and, while gold regained some ground in the 1760s, silver did not suffer a
marked fall until the last decade of the century.9
The reason why silver was not being minted was intimately connected with
the international bullion trade, through which Britain dealt in large quantities of
precious metals. The country was better placed than some other European
nations to acquire regular supplies of both gold and silver through its close
trading links with Portugal and Brazil. The large amounts of silver flowing
through British ports meant that in an important sense there was no shortage of
silver. Indeed a major reason why Britain was able to mint over £12 million
worth of gold coin in the first thirty years of the eighteenth century lay in this
relationship and in the constant trading surplus with Portugal and Brazil in
favour of Britain during this period. By the settlement of balance of trade
surpluses newly discovered Brazilian gold found its way to the Mint.°
The changing relationship between trading links and the money supply was
not lost on contemporaries. Thomas Prior, one of the founders of the Dublin
Society for the Promotion of Agriculture, Manufactures, Arts and Sciences,
remarked that the late discoveries of gold mines in Brazil were bringing in large
amounts of gold yearly and that as a result the ratio of gold to silver had dropped
slightly. Reflecting on the plight of silver Simon Clement, a London merchant,
observed that 'the solid Wealth of the Kingdom is sinking into the Indian Seas'.
The Gentleman's Magazine in 1754 remarked that most crowns and half-crowns
were thought to have been melted down or conveyed abroad and that many
shillings and most sixpences were greatly defective in weight. 11
 Trading
networks provided the flow of precious metals both in and out of Britain, while
9 Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling, pp. 150-51. Lord Farrer, Studies in Currency, 1898; or
Inquiries into certain modern problems connected with the standard of value and the media
of exchange (London, 1898), Appendix II on the relative value of gold and silver since the
beginning of the sixteenth century.
10 P. Vilar, A History of Gold and Money, 1450-1920, Trans. J. White, (London, 1976),
p. 230.
11 [Prior], Observations on coin in general, pp. 12-13. [Clement], Remarks upon a late
Ingenious Pamphlet, p. 19. For Thomas Prior see DNB; for Simon Clement see
R. H. I. Palgrave, Dictionary of Political Economy, (London, 1894-99). H. E. Manville,
Numismatic Guide to British and Irish Periodicals ( London, 1993), II, pt I, 16.
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the silver/gold ratio played an important part in determining whether guineas or
shillings were minted.
The establishment of the currency balance that emerged from the reforms of
the 1690s combined with structural trading arrangements to generate a
preference for minting gold over silver, but this trend was, in addition, spurred
on by the greater utility that a gold coinage acquired towards the end of the
seventeenth century. Guineas had during the reign of Charles II taken on an
increasingly visible role in commerce and industry, and as well as bankers
choosing to base their reserves to a considerable extent on guineas, tax
collectors came to prefer them to the flagging substance of the silver coinage.12
Gold had become firmly entrenched as the chief metal of the circulating medium,
as can be seen from the concern that greeted the reduction of the guinea in 1717
to 21s. Such was the reaction that a resolution had to be passed declaring that
the value of the gold coin would not be altered again•°
Deterioration of silver coins
In the absence of a large enough supply continuing to permeate the existing
stock, the silver coinage became exposed to longer bouts of active circulation.
With reference to Ireland Thomas Prior argued that because silver was in short
supply it passed swiftly and consequently wore at a faster rate. By the 1720s
complaints were aired regarding coins having lost worryingly high proportions of
their original weight. Some argued that part of the blame for this must rest with
the melting of heavy pieces and illegal diminution as well as with the legitimate
conditions of wear.14
The daily reality of poor quality money being experienced over several
12 Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling, p. 156.
13 Parliamentary History, VII, col. 530 (13 January 1718); Journal of the House of Lords,
XX, col. 586 (27 January 1718).
14 [Prior], Observations on coin in general, p. 2. Conduitt, Observations upon our Gold and
Silver Coins, in Shaw, Select Tracts, p. 237.
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decades led the plight of the silver coinage to become part of the language of
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literature. In A Sentimental Journey
Laurence Sterne wrote, 'I had a few king William's shillings as smooth as glass
in my pocket... See, Monsieur le Count, said I, rising up, and laying them before
him upon the table - by jingling and ribbing one against another for seventy years
together in one body's pocket or another's, they are become so much alike you
can scarcely distinguish one shilling from another.' Covering the period 1788 to
1794 in the Memoirs of Joseph Grimaldi, Charles Dickens related the story of
two young men who paid a landlord for refreshments with a piece of tin: 'and
they hurried on, disputing all the way whether it was really a sixpence or not; a
discovery which could not be made at that time, when the currency was defaced
and worn nearly plain, with the ease with which it could be made at present'.15
During the second half of the eighteenth century the silver coinage had come
to the unhappy pass of having suffered rates of wear of over 20 per cent
(Table 2). At least two hoards back up the contemporary claims relating to the
condition of silver. A hoard published in the Proceedings of the Somersetshire
Archaeological & Natural History Society in 1908 contained a total of sixty-
three cut shillings and sixpences, as well as four complete shillings, all of which
were worn to the point of illegibility. About half a mile north of Moorhouse,
near Carlisle, a hoard was discovered which included shillings and sixpences of
William III and George II. The account of the find published in the Proceedings
of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, 1915-16, described twenty of the coins
as being worn smooth.16
Laboratory experiments into the wear of coins cannot accurately replicate
and therefore predict what weight loss will be experienced by coins in daily
circulation.° By gathering together worn examples of seventeenth- and
15 L. Sterne, A Sentimental Journey Through France & Italy by Mr Yorick (London, 1768), II,
86-87. C. Dickens, Memoirs of Joseph Grimaldi (London, 1838), pp. 29-30. For a
reference to the scarcity of money see 0. Goldsmith, The Vicar of Wakefield: A Tale.
Supposed to he written by Himself(Salisbury, 1766), I, 140.
16 I am grateful to Stephen Minnitt of the Somerset County Museums Service for providing
me with details of the Somerset hoard. Manville, Numismatic Guide, II, pt I, 370.
RM. Library. P. Hatherley, 'Wear Testing of Coins', Paper presented to the XVIIth Mint
Directors' Conference, 1992.
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eighteenth-century silver that remain in museum collections and in the less
glamorous parts of coin dealers' holdings an indication of the likely appearance
of worn coins can, however, be determined. Figure 2 illustrates eight coins at
varying stages of deterioration. Sir John Craig believed that a loss of 10 per cent
of the original bulk of a coin would be enough to remove all trace of design, but
this figure is almost certainly an underestimate." A coin that has lost up to 20
per cent of its standard weight, although having virtually no relief at all may still
show some evidence of the outline of a design (Figure 2 no. 5). Beyond this
level, virtually all remnants of design details will tend to have been lost and the
coins, such as Figure 2 no. 8, which approximates to the size of a sixpence and
on that basis has been diminished by 42.73 per cent, will be essentially blank
discs of metal.
According to contemporary observations and experiments conducted by the
Mint and presented in Table 2, shillings and sixpences might have approached
the stage of being worn smooth by the 1780s. An alternative way of arriving at
an estimate of likely deterioration is to make use of the aggregate figure for wear
of 26 per cent derived from the 12.6 million of old silver coin withdrawn from
circulation in 1817 (Chapter 6, p. 145). An annual rate of wear can be calculated
by using a compound interest formula covering a certain number of years. The
advantage of using the figure of 26 per cent is that all the coins withdrawn in
1817 had to be weighed and assayed prior to their being melted and the silver
being put back into production. It therefore represents a definite figure for the
extent of wear and is based on the largest sample of coins on which such weight
tests during this period were carried out. One of the main reservations,
however, is that in order to arrive at an annual rate of wear an assumption has to
made about how long the coins that were withdrawn in 1817 had been in
circulation. Implicit also in such a calculation is the assumption that weight loss
would be uniform both by year and by denomination, a claim that can definitely
be doubted.
18 Craig, The Mint, p. xvi.
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In spite of these drawbacks the advantages suggest that there is a case for
determining the annual rate of wear and in taking 1700 as the initial date, the
justification being that a much larger number of silver coins was released at the
end of the seventeenth century than was issued during the subsequent 117 years.
During the Great Recoinage £6,840,719 was produced, while between 1699 and
1817 only a further £1,321,040 was minted, a figure which includes the £320,372
struck during the silver recoinage between 1707 and 1709 at Edinburgh. Almost
84 per cent, therefore, of the total stock of silver coins that relates to the period
was issued prior to 1700. The assumption that the recoinage issues of William
III probably accounted for a majority of the silver still in use in 1817 and that the
figure of 26 per cent should be taken to extend back as far as the beginning of the
eighteenth century is probably not unreasonable. Calculated over this time-scale
the annual rate of wear would be 0.257 per cent, and at that rate by the last
twenty-five years of the eighteenth century shillings and sixpences could have lost
over 20 per cent of their weight - enough, that is, to obliterate most design
details (Figures 3 and'!). The percentage rates of wear quoted in Table 2 would
therefore appear to be confirmed. 19 Such obviously generalised observations
nevertheless offer an impression of the likely condition of the currency during the
course of over a century of use.
As is apparent from Table 4, a crown wears at a much slower pace compared
with a shilling or a sixpence. The disparity is less obvious in the early stages of
initial wear but there is a marked distinction over time. Partly this can be
explained by the anticipated higher velocity of circulation of smaller
denominations, but it is also the result of shillings and sixpences having a larger
surface area in relation to their weight than is the case with crowns and half-
crowns. Even a comparison between shillings and sixpences (Figures 3 and 4)
reveals that sixpences wear more rapidly than the slightly bulkier shillings.
19 Challis, 'Lord Hastings', NHRM, p. 386. Ruding, Annals of the Coinage, II, 62-63.
M. Folkes, A Table of English Silver Coins (London, 1745), pp. 131, 154-55.
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The decline in the quality of the silver coinage in the eighteenth century was
certainly more gradual than in the years immediately preceding the Great
Recoinage. Silver falling, however gently, into its parlous condition cannot have
escaped the attention of ministers, but what might have required them to take
action, a crisis of confidence in the currency such as that of 1695 when the price
of gold coins in terms of silver rose by 35 per cent in six months, did not happen.
Despite the shortage of silver and the extent of wear, despite what may be
considered obligations to sustain a healthy supply of coin, the appearance was of
a government not inclined to act unless confronted by a financial panic.
Economic stability
Legislative enactments relating to the silver coinage in the eighteenth century
were few in number. While contemporary economic literature contains
clamorous expressions of dismay regarding the condition of the currency and the
havoc its scarcity was meting out to businesses, the thorough debate in
Parliament that should have been stimulated by the worn surfaces of silver coins
simply did not happen. Following the discussions that accompanied the
reduction of the guinea in 1717 and 1718 to 21s, there was no substantive
motion in Parliament relating to reform of the silver coinage until the act of 1774
to limit the legal tender status of silver to £25, a silence that in itself reveals the
perception there was in government of monetary stability.20
Support for such a perception can be drawn from price trends during the mid
eighteenth century. A level as high as that at which prices had been from 1696
to 1699 was not seen again for a hundred years (Table 1 and Figure 1), and if
the market price of silver had varied somewhat in the century after the Great
Recoinage within a band of between 4s lid and 5s 111/2d (Appendix 1), the
market price of gold was yet fairly uniform (Appendix 2). From the beginning to
the end of the century the prices of wheat, malt and wool did advance but within
the variations there was evident no sustained escalation until the fourth quarter.
20 Parliamentary History, volumes VII to =WI cover the years 1714 to 1803.
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Between 1700 and 1799 a bushel of malt increased from 3s 6d to 5s 5d, but in
1747 the price quoted was lower than it had stood some forty years earlier.21
Wage rates during the first sixty years of the century similarly revealed no
signs of creating a destabilising pressure on the economy. The wages of
labourers in London were largely set on a gradual upward trend, but in the
period from 1710 to 1730 they remained reasonably static and through the
inching up of prices during the third quarter of the century they showed an even
stronger inclination to stability. Movements in wage rates in different parts of
the country varied, as a comparison of London and Lancashire reveals (Table 5
and Figure 5). In the north of England generally there was more upward
movement and to a decisive extent from the mid 1760s, but during the previous
thirty years wage levels stirred hardly at all. Adjusting the index of wage rates to
take into account increases in the cost of living offers a more accurate indication
of when there might have been placed on the money supply an added burden.
Including these revisions, however, reveals no trends that would have generated
serious alarm. In periods, for example, when money wages were increasing, as
in Lancashire from the mid 1760s, the advance was not matched by higher real
incomes. Moreover, at a time when real wages did outstrip money wages, as in
the twenty-five years from 1730, prices were subdued, thereby helping to
maintain conditions of stability.22
The pattern of economic growth in the eighteenth century was one of short
cycles of depression followed by prosperity. The financial crisis of 1720, for
example, centring on the collapse in the fortunes of the South Sea Company,
caused a contraction in many industries and in several areas of trading activity;
by contrast, in the three years from 1722 there was evidence of an expansion in
building activity and of a growth in exports especially between 1724 and 1725.
Increases in commodity prices and high rates of imports of cotton in 1761, as
well as exports reaching record levels in the previous two years, point to
21 T. S. Ashton, Economic Fluctuations in England, 1700-1800 (Oxford, 1959), pp. 181-82,
190.
22 E. W. Gilboy, Wages in Eighteenth Century England (Cambridge, [Massachusetts], 1934),
pp. 219-20, 222-23.
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flourishing conditions, which were followed, between 1764 and 1768, by poor
harvests and depression, a situation compounded by a slump in British export
markets in north America. The fluctuating pattern of growth in the economy,
therefore, exerted varying degrees of pressure on the supply of money. There is,
however, some reason to believe that added tension was brought to bear at the
end rather than the beginning of the century. In absolute terms a number of
economic indicators reveal marked advances: the total value of a range of
imported goods including corn, coffee and textiles increased over fourfold from
1700 to 1799, and exports exhibited a similar rise, with iron and steel
manufactures rising dramatically during the 1790s. The annual average
production of copper in Cornwall in 1730 was 7,500 tons, in the 1790s the figure
was 48,000 tons. The development of the textile industry was even more
pronounced with the number of pieces of broad cloth milled in Yorkshire
between 1731 and 1800 increasing by a factor of over six.23
Public revenue, including land and assessed taxes, customs and excise duties,
increased gradually up to the end of the 1770s, thereafter the total over the next
twenty years exceeded that for the previous forty years. The pattern of public
expenditure was more volatile. The totals for net public expenditure for the two
decades after 1720 fell and major fluctuations continued into the 1760s and
1780s, but spending from 1776 tended to be well above rates encountered earlier
in the century. 24 Changes in population will have impacted on the demand for
coins, but for many years demographic shifts exerted no significant stress on
monetary conditions. Although not all the measures of population for the period
reveal the same pattern of development, evidence of a decline during the first
half of the century, notably after 1720, is confirmed by a number of separate
studies. 25
23 Ashton, Economic Fluctuations, pp. 143-44, 149-50, 152-54. Ashton, An Econonzic
History of England, p. 124. P. Mathias, The First Industrial Nation: An Economic History
of Britain, 2nd edition, (London, 1983), pp. 431-32.
24 Mitchell and Deane, British Historical Statistics, pp. 386-91.
25 Mitchell and Deane, British Historical Statistics, p. 5. A. J. Little, Deceleration in the
Eighteenth-Century British Economy (London, 1976), pp. 53-54.
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Taking these circumstances as a whole, there may have been a margin for the
overall stock of cash to grow very little in the years up to 1760 without marked
shortages being apparent, but as output from the Mint unfolded, the large
mintages of gold up to 1750 more than compensated for a decline in the
production of silver. Sharp economic shifts caused short-term peaks in demand
for money, but for many years official policy towards the silver coinage was
probably justifiable, if not on the grounds of offering the necessary range of
denominations, then probably in terms of the total money supply operating in
conditions free of especial duress.
The marked increases in prices, and in wages in some areas of Britain,
towards the end of the century were forces with which the monetary policy of
the previous ninety years had not been confronted. During this period, the
fourth quarter of the century, serious difficulties with the money supply began to
emerge. The tendency towards inflationary pressures was especially apparent in
the north of England, but throughout the country there was a more rapid pace of
advance. Economic change built up a momentum that helped to reshape the
circumstances in which money had to operate. By themselves, however, the
circumstances did not generate a crisis, the motive force for that lay rather in the
outbreak of war between Britain and France in the 1790s. In the changed
economic environment of the late eighteenth century there was much less
justification for the condition of silver to have been left in abeyance, and yet at
this time the flow of silver from the Mint slowed to an intermittent drip.
In the language of contemporary literature, of great obstructions being
caused to all sorts of businesses because of the want of small change,
compensation should be made for a certain amount of hyperbole. The periods of
prosperity enjoyed from 1781 to 1783, from 1789 to 1792 and on two other
occasions before the end of the century suggest that the economy could do well
enough without a plentiful amount of silver. The large mintages, however,
during the recoinage of 1816-17 and the sustained healthy levels of output in the
nineteenth century indicate that the population of Britain still required money in
relatively small denominations; while people coped in the eighteenth century
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without abundant numbers of shillings and sixpences, these coins remained useful
elements of the money supply. The number of transactions undertaken for
modest sums did not decline, if anything it will have increased especially in the
context of the shift to money wages in developing industrial areas. Some of the
burden had to be shifted to other forms of currency. In looking for an
explanation behind why the minting of silver was allowed to decline, as well as
macroeconomic forces the existence of efficient alternative means of exchange
may provide part of the answer, the smaller supply of silver being in such
circumstances an inconvenience rather than a crisis.26
Paper money
A number of writers in the eighteenth century referred to the advantages of the
note issues of various kinds and how they could help to bear the burden once
carried by a more extensive silver coinage. Some argued that but for the advent
of this type of credit rates of wear would have been much higher. The financier
and businessman John Law went further, seeing in paper money all the qualities
of conventional money, but without some of the disadvantages that beset metal
currencies, such as a liability to uncertain value at the hands of legislators. As far
as Scotland was concerned he thought the notable scarcity of silver made the
prospect of notes an attractive option. 27 Notes for small amounts found their
way into circulation but in England and Wales in the early eighteenth century this
did not mean for values as low as £1. The millions of pounds sterling that the
Bank of England issued for circulation (Table 6) tended to be employed in
substantial transactions, and the use of paper currency for daily retail purchases
was not evident.28
26 Ashton, Economic Fluctuations, pp. 164-68, 173.
27 Anon., Observations on the state of the gold and silver in Great Britain, both coin and
bullion ([London], 1730), p. 1. J. Law, Money and Trade considered, with a proposal for
supplying the nation with money (Edinburgh, 1705), pp. 76, 78, 93, 97. For John Law see
DNB.
28 Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling, p. 160. J. H. Clapham, The Bank of England. A Histoly
(Cambridge, 1944), I, 293-98.
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During the second half of the eighteenth century provincial banks began to
open for business, discounting bills of exchange, offering loans, taking deposits
and gradually coming to assume a range of banking functions, one of the most
important of which was the provision of money for tradesmen and farmers.
Estimates of the number of country banks before the first decade of the
nineteenth century are not reliable, but 150 are thought to have been in business
in England by 1776, and in the early 1790s something in the order of 280. By
1804 there were 596 throughout Great Britain: 473 in England and Wales, sixty-
nine in London and fifty-four in Scotland. 29 Not every bank issued its own notes
and especially in the north of England the practice was not common. Of those
that did, accurate figures are sketchy, which is partly a reflection of often
precarious business conditions. The Chairman of the Board of Stamps estimated
the value of country banknotes annually in circulation over the six-year period
from 1812 to 1817 to be just under £.16 million. He was reluctant to offer any
indication of the size of this form of currency prior to 1804 because the Stamp
Office records did not distinguish between banknotes and notes used in the
course of commercial dealing" The economic historian Sir John Clapham
judged that 'Englishmen of the rank and file - wage-earners and small traders -
knew little of paper money, and in the early years of the suspension [of cash
payments 1797-1821] they had learnt of its use only gradually'. Although the
Whig politician Sir George Savile, when introducing a bill in 1775 forbidding
English bankers from issuing notes for less than £1, made reference to paper
money circulating in Yorkshire for as low as a shilling, such instances were
probably not widespread.31
The experience that the population had of paper money included banknotes
being employed by factory owners to pay their workers, and in some instances
notes were actually being issued under the authority of the industrialists
29 Clapham, The Bank of England, I, 160-63. T. S. Ashton, 'The Bill of Exchange and
Private Banks in Lancashire, 1790-1830', in T. S. Ashton and R. S. Sayers (eds), Papers in
English Monetary History (Oxford, 1953), P. 40.
30 Report of the House of Lords on the affairs of the Bank and the resumption of cash
payments. Parliamentary Papers, 1819 (291), Appendix F. 4, pp. 404-05.
31 Clapham, The Bank of England, I, 162; II, 2-3. Parliamentary History, XVIII, cols 574-75
(27 March 1775).
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themselves. Entrusting an employer with the creation of the currency with which
he paid his own employees was a system open to abuse and the acts restricting
the issue of promissory notes to sums over £1 in 1775 and over £5 in 1777 can
be viewed as attempts to prevent such practices. When the ban was lifted in
1797, small value notes soon found their way into circulation. The iron magnate
John Wilkinson printed cards for is 6d and even 3d, and paid them out in wages.
In March of the same year in a letter to the Birmingham industrialist Matthew
Boulton he wrote, 'good notes will cure the evil of base metal better and more
effectually than the gallows'. 32 However much such arrangements may have
benefited a specific locality they were not of general application. More
importantly, the arrival of country banking, combined with the note issues of the
Bank of England, was not an answer to the shortage of silver in England and
Wales even by the end of the eighteenth century.33
In Scotland, however, the question of paper money was viewed somewhat
differently. From the end of the seventeenth century a preference had emerged
in Scotland for the use of notes over coins. Partly this can be attributed to a loss
of trust in the coinage that was the legacy of a scandal involving the Scottish
Mint in 1682. Together with a series of other abuses, senior Mint officials were
prosecuted on charges of corruption arising out of debasing the silver coinage.
The Mint was as a consequence closed down for several years during the 1680s.
In addition, temporary shortages of coin could often result from fluctuations in
the rates of exchange between England and Scotland, an economic reality that
continued to present difficulties well into the eighteenth century. The exchanges,
for example, moved against Scotland in the early 1760s, which in practical terms
meant that a bill sent from Edinburgh to London would realise less than one
which was remitted in the other direction. In these circumstances transferring
funds to England in coin - specifically gold coin - held out advantages to
merchants, and as a consequence there was a major drain of gold south. In 1771
the author Tobias Smollett wrote 'for you will find that the exchange between
the two kingdoms [England and Scotland] is always against Scotland; and that
32 Ashton, An Economic History of England, p. 187 note 4.
33 Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling, pp. 158-62.
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she retains neither gold nor silver sufficient for her own circulation'. 34 The
Royal Bank of Scotland sought to address the problem of the severe shortages of
silver in the 1740s by transporting considerable amounts of coin from London.
Notes, in contrast to coins, did not periodically leave the country in large
numbers with the result that more confidence arose in their long-term use. Once
an acceptable alternative was found, the sense was that gold was seldom to be
seen in use and silver likewise was not as readily encountered as in England."
The banking system in Scotland was founded on a more stable footing than
that in England because there were not the same restrictions on the size of firms.
The provisions of an act of 1708 limiting to six the number of partners of banks
that issued notes, did not apply in Scotland. Joint-stock banking was therefore
allowed to develop north of the border and a system more resilient to the
operation of the economic cycle emerged. The note issues of Scottish banks
were part of a financial system in which greater faith could be placed." The
system also accommodated the use of notes for small values from a much earlier
date than in England. The Bank of Scotland started its issues of .£1 notes in
1704, and the Royal Bank of Scotland followed suit soon after its establishment
in 1727. Abuses were inflicted on the paper circulation especially in the 1750s
and 1760s when notes for 10s and even is were released by tradesmen as a
means of dealing with the shortage of silver. The spate of these issues was not
serious enough to be a major disruption to the system and paper continued to
play an extensive role in the circulating medium, displacing at the same time the
position of gold and silver.37
Looked at from the point of view of government ministers, however, the
financial changes at the end of the seventeenth century, the establishment of the
Bank of England in 1694, the advent at the same time of the national debt, the
34 R. Saville, Bank of Scotland: A History, 1695-1995 (Edinburgh, 1996), pp. 71-72, 140-42.
J. D. Bateson, Coinage in Scotland (London, 1997), pp. 149-50. T. G. Smollett, The
Expeditions of Humphrey Clinker (Dublin, 1771), II, 140.
35 S. G. Checkland, Scottish Banking: A History, 1695-1973 (Glasgow and London, 1975),
p. 65.
36 Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling, pp. 167-68.
37 Saville, Bank of Scotland, p. 48. Checkland, Scottish Banking, pp. 59, 104-06. Manville,
Numismatic Guide, II, pt I, 24, 141.
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emergence of large numbers of securities bearing fixed rates of interest -
including Exchequer Bills and Navy Bills - assisted in the creation of money.
Being able to discharge more of its obligations through the use of paper currency
than it ever could before freed government in the management of monetary
policy from being overly reliant on the metallic currencies. For ministers to sit
back and witness the decline of silver into a less than acceptable condition,
especially bearing in mind the stronger position gold had come to occupy within
the circulating medium and in the area of settling overseas debts, was not the
problem it would formerly have been. The transaction of business requiring
small payments suffered, but the total size of the money supply did not fall, and if
Bank of England as well as country banknote issues are included it may be
shown to have substantially increased (Tables 6 and 7, and Figure 6). A similar
process of the English economy weathering dramatic changes in the production
of gold or silver and yet being sustained by an overall healthy money supply was
apparent in the seventeenth century. From 1608 to 1621 while output of gold
coin remained strong that of silver collapsed, recovering somewhat in the mid
1620s but only regaining a consistently high proportion of total Mint production
in the 1630s after a further brief decline.38
The difference in the eighteenth century, however, was centred on a collapse
of much longer duration, and help in sustaining the economy through this
extended period of bimetallic imbalance between gold and silver came in the
form of a burgeoning paper credit system. After the controversy of the debate
surrounding the recoinage of the 1690s the attention of economists began to shift
away from coins and towards banknotes, which was itself an indication of the
diminishing degree of importance that attached to the coinage.
38 Challis, 'Mint Output', NH16/1, pp. 688-93. C. E. Challis, Currency and the Economy in
Tudor and early Stuart England (London, 1989), pp. 7-8, 14.
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Copper tokens and alternative forms of payment
Production at the Mint of copper coins in the eighteenth century was a little over
£250,000 (Table 8) and, as with silver, their circulation was attended by a high
degree of wastage and adulteration - the result of coins being withdrawn and
melted down for private profit or for use in counterfeiting. Inadequate
distribution led to surpluses accumulating in the hands of London retailers, while
other areas of the country could be starved of small denominations. This is one
problem at least that troubled silver less. With transport costs being in relation
to value a much smaller proportion, and with a freer flow to meet local demand
through the banking system, distribution difficulties for silver were reduced.
Country banks tended not to deal in transfers of copper and the costs of meeting
its supply would therefore fall on the retailer or businessman.39
If the coins were not reaching areas of the country that were developing
rapidly and demanding small change, there would be difficulty in judging if the
supply of copper from the Mint, which by the end of the 1780s had amounted to
in the region of 170 million coins, could have satisfied demand. Estimates that
the number of counterfeit copper halfpennies and farthings had exceeded that of
genuine pieces by 1787 suggest there was a healthy demand that the Treasury
were failing to meet A further difficulty for the regal copper coinage was its not
being regarded as legitimate currency in the same way as gold and silver. Its
status was that of token money and its manufacture did not necessarily fall
automatically under the responsibility of the Mint. Within the circulating
medium it occupied something of a twilight zone.4°
The increased demands for wages that pressed upon industry towards the
end of the eighteenth century eventually led businessmen to take matters into
their own hands and arrange for the manufacture and release of copper tokens.
Throughout Britain large quantities of initially good weight pieces were issued
39 P. Mathias, English Trade Tokens: The Industrial Revolution Illustrated (London, 1962),
pp. 12, 16, 26.
4° Mathias, English Trade Tokens, pp. 14, 16.
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from the 1787, beginning with the pennies and halfpennies of the Parys Mines
Company of Anglesey. The total produced extended to hundreds of tons and for
several years after their initial appearance they were welcomed as a means of
supplying the want of small change and tolerated by the authorities. Samuel
Fereday, a factory owner from Bilston, was by no means alone in having tokens
manufactured in his own name and using them to pay his workforce. He
arranged to have struck an estimated two million penny tokens. The high
standards to which they were produced made them attractive to use but also to
imitate, and with their popularity came also lighter and more unreliable copies.41
The somewhat second class status that was conferred on copper money is
indicated by the omission of copper tokens from legislation in 1812 that
addressed the circulation of private silver tokens.42
The solace of an officially-sanctioned copper coinage came with the
production from 1797 of Matthew Boulton's copper twopences and pennies, and
from 1799 of his halfpennies and farthings. He sought to overcome the problem
of imbalances in distribution by undertaking to deliver the coins throughout the
country directly to the people from whom orders had been received. As
industrialists found, the circulation of copper went some way to substituting for
silver The likelihood is, however, that because of the weights involved,
copper's use in paying wages will have been in association with other forms of
currency (Table 8) 43
Wages varied across the country but throughout most of the eiOneenth
century a London labourer could have expected to earn up to 2s a day, while in
Oxford a rate increasing to Is 4d was common by the late 1770s. For skilled
workers in London over 2s 6d a day was typical in the seventy years after the
1720s, although most craftsmen at Westminster Abbey could earn 3s a day for a
41 R. Dalton and S. H. Hamer, The Provincial Token-Coinage of the 18th Century (Cold
Springs, 1990), introduction. C. Pye, Provincial Coins and Tokens, issued from the Year
1787 to the Year 1801 (London, 1801), the index to the plates of illustrations contains
estimates by weight of the number of provincial tokens produced. Mathias, English Trade
Tokens, pp. 52-54.
42 Ruding, Annals of the Coinage, II, 110.
43 R. Doty, The Soho Mint & the Industrialization of It
	 (London, 1998), pp. 54-55, 315-
20. Dyer and Gaspar, 'Tower Hill', NHRM, p. 448.
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large part of the eighteenth century. Even in rural areas of the country where
incomes were lower, payment solely in copper coins would have been an
unwieldy business. If paid, for example, in Boulton pennies an Oxford labourer
would have taken home a pound weight of copper for every day he worked. In
settling wages silver's importance was probably greater than that of copper,
although the reverse was more likely true of retail transactions."
Evidence of the shortage of silver being alleviated through the agency of the
gold coinage is not convincing, in spite of specific efforts being directed by the
Bank of England towards this end. The Bank lobbied the Treasury for the
striking of low denominations in gold, specifically for third-guineas or seven-
shilling pieces, in March 1758, April 1761 and November 1762. Issues of
quarter-guineas took place in 1718 and 1762, but the Bank had to wait until
1797 for third-guinea pieces to appear and when they did they were struck in
only modest quantities Their relatively small size made them unpopular at the
Mint and in exchange, which consequently meant that the advantages the Bank
saw in extending downwards gold's denominational range were not widely
shared 45
The idea of a shortage was not a uniform problem because variations in the
demand for money took place over the course of a year. For a week or more
prior to the payment of taxes there would be a want of currency. In his evidence
to the parliamentary committee of inquiry into the high price of bullion in 1810,
the banker and gold refiner William Merle described the extent of the premium
on silver that towards the end of the eighteenth century bankers used to pay:
have given an hundred and one pounds for a quantity of coin worth sixty if was
melted down, though passing for an hundred, but I have given that premium to
get it, bad as it is, particularly at harvest time; it is always very scarce then'.
Paying a premium especially afflicted those who had to find cash to pay wages.
In 1759 Sir John Barnard reported the practice of employers who were
44 Gilboy, Wages in Eighteenth Century England, pp. 12, 14, 23, 47, 220. Mathias, English
Trade Tokens, p. 26.
45 G. P. Dyer, 'Quarter-Sovereigns and Other Small Gold Patterns of the Mid-Victorian
Period', BAU, 67 (1997), 73. BE. G16/3, index entry under gold and silver coin.
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responsible for large numbers of workmen being charged a fee of 10s on every
£100 of silver they acquired. The normal course of business conducted by the
Bank of England involved it in submitting to this type of additional expense. In
March 1798 the Governor of the Bank Thomas Raikes informed the Privy
Council Committee on Coin that in purchasing silver coin for public circulation
the Bank had over many years given a premium of from 10s to 1 per cent. Not
only, therefore, did the worn silver circulate at face value, it attracted a premium
at certain times which compounded the difference between the intrinsic and the
face value. 46
Some factory owners found themselves having to search over wide areas for
sufficient coin, while to lessen the burden others might only settle employees'
wages at one-month or two-month intervals, thereby enabling the use of larger
denomination coins. Of course, interim payments might be required and if not in
cash then this would have been in goods, miners receiving coal, or a ship's mate
having a right to the sweepings of sugar or coffee from the hold. The use of
coins was diminished by tradesmen regularly accepting the settlement of
household accounts over a period of months, and the practice was not
uncommon to extend the duration of credit to six months or beyond a year.° A
sense emerges, therefore, in which as well as conventional money resort was
made to improvised forms of payment and exchange that had accompanied a
greater or lesser supply of currency for some hundreds of years.
46 D. Ricardo, Proposals for an Economical and Secure Currency with Observations on the
Profits of the Bank of England, etc, (London, 1816), pp. 37-38. Barnard, Some Thoughts
on the Scarcity of Silver, p. 1. Report and Evidence on the high price of gold bullion.
Parliamentary Papers, 1810 (349), Minutes of Evidence, pp. 40, 231. PRO. BT  6/118,
Thomas Raikes to Sir Stephen Cottrell, 13 March 1798.
47 Massie, Observations relating to the Coin of Great Britain, p. 21. Ashton, An Economic
History of England, pp. 207-08. Gilboy, Wages in Eighteenth Century England, p. 197.
Ashton, 'The Bill of Exchange', in Ashton and Sayers, English Monetary History, pp. 38-
39. Suffolk Record Office, Bury St Edmunds, HA 541/1/45, Executors' Accounts of
William Dyer, 1802-06. I am grateful to Graham Dyer for drawing these papers to my
attention.
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The restriction of cash payments, 1797
There were times during the eighteenth century when the possibility was
considered of addressing the deficiencies of silver. In 1777 buildings were
erected in the Mint to prepare for a silver coinage then supposed to be in
contemplation. The expectations of activity, however, did not translate into a
change of policy." If what government required was a crisis to stimulate
decisive action over the coinage, it found one in the second half of the 1790s that
was driven by the financial strains of an over-extended system of paper currency
and by the war against France. The Bank of England in 1793 had to survive
damaging inroads into its bullion reserves immediately following France's
declaration of war against Britain, a crisis that was sustained by the weakness of
many banking houses across the country. The extreme nervousness created by
the international situation resulted in a widespread loss of faith in the credit of
country banks and some folded under the pressure. Four years later similar
tensions, this time exacerbated by a failed invasion of Britain by French troops in
February 1797, led to a financial panic in which massive demands were made on
the Bank for the redemption of its notes. An Order in Council issued on 26
February proclaimed that for a limited period the Bank should be freed from its
obligation to pay its notes in gold on demand. The restriction period had started
and it was to continue for over twenty years, far beyond the Bank's original view
of it as a temporary expedient.49
February 1797 was in many ways a watershed in British monetary history.
By helping to generate paper credit on an unprecedented scale, the restriction of
cash payments materially assisted in Britain's ability to conduct the war against
France, and in addition, it forced attention to be directed to the copper and silver
coinages. On 3 March, within a matter of days of the decision to suspend cash
payments, Richard Sheridan proposed a motion in the House of Commons for a
new copper coinage, and later in the year Matthew Boulton received an official
48 PRO. Mint 1/17, p. 155.
49 Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling, pp. 177-78, 181-83. Clapham, The Bank of England, I,
259-60, 262, 271-72. 38 Geo. III. cap. 59.
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order to proceed with his pennies and twopences. A temporary solution for
shortage of silver was also seized upon in terms of the Bank issuing Spanish
dollars countermarked with a bust of George III and denominated 4s 9d. On the
same day that Sheridan was introducing his motion on copper, the Mint received
an instruction from the Treasury to begin preparations for stamping dollars.
Within a week there were calls for more extensive reform. While acknowledging
that the issue of the Spanish dollars was worthwhile, the Chairman of the East
India Company William Devaynes urged the Secretary of War Henry Dundas,
Lord Melville, to press for an immediate coinage of shillings and sixpences that
as well as meeting demand for currency would, he thought, act as a safeguard
against banknotes becoming too heavily discounted. The appetite for change
went so far but did not embrace Devaynes' proposals.5°
Government approach towards the management of the currency in the
eighteenth century was characterised by a delegation of responsibility, either
intentionally sanctioned as in the case of the Bank of England issues from 1797,
or in the sense of for a time turning a blind eye to beneficial private initiatives as
with the major output of copper trade tokens of the 1780s and 1790s. This is an
explanation that reveals how the economy coped almost in spite of the
underlying monetary policy Against the charges of the pamphleteers is the
argument that there was evident an economic equilibrium. Added to this,
expressions of concern over the hole in the overall extent of the circulating
medium created by falling mintages of silver could have been countered by
drawing attention to the increased production of gold and the note issues of the
Bank of England But the disinclination to reform silver was not founded on the
presence of alternative forms of currency; these acted as palliatives. It was
rather founded on a policy of supporting the primacy of gold and the economic
circumstances through the mid eighteenth century of modest growth and price
stability assisted in maintaining this policy.
50 Doty, The Soho Alm!, pp. 315-17. Kelly, Spanish Dollars, p. 22. BS. 20/32/83-84,
W. Devaynes to Lord Melville, 7 March 1797.
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By the third quarter of the eighteenth century the gold currency had assumed
such a position of dominance that altering its value with a view to addressing the
scarcity of silver could have created a damaging imbalance. Behind the
legislation of 1774 to limit silver's legal tender status and prevent the import of
light silver, was the fear that Britain would continue to be flooded with
counterfeits from abroad which, if circulated in large enough quantities, could
have threatened the position of gold. Almost fifty years earlier the extent to
which gold had acquired an enhanced importance had already been recognised.
One writer observed that 'if you raise your Crown Piece above a Penny, I
acknowledge you will soon have silver enough, but 'twill be dear Bought'. 51 A
policy of seeking to maintain stability did not of course mitigate the practical
difficulties of paying wages but it goes some way to explaining why authoritative
economic thinkers such as Adam Smith (Chapter 3, p. 47), who were promoting
devaluation of silver, were ignored or stalled on this subject for many years.
[J. Jocelyn], An Essay on Money and Bullion, etc (London, 1718), p. 33. Farrer, Studies in
Currency, pp. 31-32
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CHAPTER 3
LORD LIVERPOOL AND THE ROAD TO THE RECOINAGE
Temporary expedients
One hundred years after the silver recoinage of William III's reign, in the midst
of yet another continental war and the changed financial circumstances of Bank
restriction, there were grounds for believing an overhaul of monetary policy was
imminent. In the two years from the beginning of 1797 reform of silver was
discussed by ministers with a sense of urgency that had been absent for most of
the eighteenth century, and in the decade and a half that followed, efforts were
made to supply Britain with silver, none of which was the government's direct
responsibility but all of which were given a greater or lesser degree of tacit
official approval One of the leading players in this changed environment was
Charles Jenkinson, first Earl of Liverpool. He had been a member of the Privy
Council Committee on Coin set up in 1787 to examine the problem of the copper
coinage and he took an even more prominent role in the reconstituted version of
that committee which was called together in February 1798. By this time he was
reaching the end of his political career but he was still very much at the heart of
events in the wake of the Bank restriction crisis.
The countermarked Spanish dollars that the Bank issued in 1797 only
survived for a matter of months in circulation before the pressure from large
numbers of counterfeits forced their withdrawal. The dollars did not have the
protection in law that the regal silver coinage had and as a consequence, when
the counterfeits began to proliferate, government's disinclination to act meant
the Bank was forced to call in its dollars. But before it committed to
withdrawal, the Bank was concerned that there be a replacement and it lobbied
strongly in favour of sending silver to the Mint to be coined under the lighter
standard of 66s to the troy pound. The Governor of the Bank had a meeting
40
with Liverpool on 31 August, but Liverpool then, and earlier in correspondence
with the President of the Royal Society, Sir Joseph Banks, judged that the time
was not right. One of his chief concerns was that change along the lines put
forward by the Bank should not be attempted until the Mint was reformed. Sir
Joseph Banks had taken an interest over many years in currency reform in his
capacity as a member of the Committee on Coin.'
Six months after the Bank of England's unsuccessful application to
government, Matthew Boulton, his success in securing the contract for copper
coins behind him, proposed a plan for striking silver. He suggested as part of his
scheme that shillings be struck at the rate of seventy to the pound weight, or that
dollar-standard silver should be used. 2 At 892 fine, dollar silver was lower than
the sterling standard of 925 by 3.6 per cent. On this occasion Boulton did not
succeed but he was putting his ideas forward at a time when the price of silver
was continuing a trend from the end of the previous year of being below the
Mint price Circumstances now obtained in which silver could be sent to the
Mint without sustaining a loss. A group of London bankers, the most outspoken
of whom was Magens Dorrien Magens, decided to avail themselves of this
opportunity and in April delivered silver to the Mint for the purpose of having it
coined At the beginning of May the Bank of England also expressed an interest
in sending a large quantity of silver to the Mint with the same aim in mind.
Learning of this activity, the government ordered a stop to be placed on the
proposed coinage of the London bankers that effectively came into force at the
Mint on 10 May The Committee on Coin had already intimated its sympathy for
altering the weight standard of silver, and it will accordingly have been
disinclined towards production taking place under the existing regulations. The
prohibition remained in place until the recoinage of 1816.3
Second Report of the House of Commons, with Minutes of Evidence on the affairs of the
Bank and the resumption of cash payments. Parliamentary Papers, 1819 (282), Appendix
No. 2, p 269, reprint of Bank of England notice, 28 September 1797 indicating that the
Bank's stamped dollars were to be withdrawn. DTC X, pt II, 117-21, Liverpool to Banks,
21 August 1797 Kelly, Spanish Dollars, pp. 28-31.
2 PRO. BT 6/118, Matthew Boulton to William Fawkener, 12 February 1798, pp. 35-38.
3 Dyer and Gaspar, The Dornen & Magens Shilling', BNJ, 52 (1982), 199-201. DTC X, pt
II, 271-72, Liverpool to Banks, 5 May 1798; 274-76, Banks to Liverpool, 6 May 1798.
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In the months prior to this activity the reconstituted Committee on Coin,
including in its membership the entire Cabinet, was called together for the
purpose of reviewing the operations of the Mint and establishing the principles
upon which a new coinage of silver should be introduced. The summary of
British monetary history that Liverpool presented at the opening session on 10
February contained all the fundamental arguments that he was later to elaborate
in his Treatise on the Coins of the Realm!'
Liverpool's ideas included reducing silver to the status of a token coinage
and initially he received some support. The Bank of England in response to the
committee's questions expressed the view that 'Silver being only a Medium of
Change or Convenience among Ourselves and used in small payments we
conceive the reducing the intrinsic value thereof, so as to prevent its being
melted down or exported, could be attended with no Inconvenience whatever in
our domestic or foreign transactions'. 5 Even the failed efforts of the London
bankers and the Bank of England to have silver coined in the spring of 1798
could be interpreted as a positive sign. A year later, the writer on currency
Rogers Ruding thought a change to the coinage that would involve the abolition
of the present system was close at hand, partly because of the activities of
Liverpool's committee but also because of the suspension of minting silver.°
After some months Liverpool had to acknowledge that the variety of opinion
amongst members respecting the principles of coinage, the defects with the
present system and what remedies might be applied 'was so great, as to throw
the Business into an absolute state of Confusion'. But he remained undaunted
and three months after the first meeting of his committee he undertook to submit
a draft report detailing his firmly held views on how reform should be tackled.
While the Prime Minister, William Pitt, may have publicly signalled a recognition
4 Craig, The Mint, pp 257, 267-68 Dyer and Gaspar, 'Tower 	 NIIRNI, p.451. PRO,
BT 6/126, letter from William Pitt, 2 No ember 1787, BT 6/127, 10 February 1797
5 Kelly, Spanish Dollars, p 105_
6 R_ Rucling„ A Proposal for Restoring the Ancient Constitution of the Mint so far as relates
to the Expence of Coinage, etc (London, 1799), p. 5.
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of the need to advance a new coinage, his response to the draft report was
somewhat tardy and Liverpool feared any kind of momentum for change was
likely to be the victim of an ossified political process. Liverpool waited for a
response from Pitt through to the end of the year. There was eventually no
decision in favour of his report and by July 1799 he was already contemplating
the unhappy prospect of its being shelved. He began to wonder, however, if he
might nevertheless air his views in a published letter to the king. Illness for a
number of years delayed the project, but in 1805 his Treatise eventually
appeared
Lord Liverpool's Treatise
In his published recommendations Liverpool asserted that the principle upon
which his scheme was based was that of a single metallic standard. The
eighteenth century he recognised as having generated all the necessary evidence
to reveal the difficulties of arriving at a correct balance between two metals in a
bimetallic system He viewed bimetallism as causing perpetual conflict between
coins of gold and silver and that it 'promoted the practice of melting down and
exporting one or other sort of Coin, whenever the metal, of which either of them
was made, happened to be under-rated at the Mint, and a profit could be
made thereby'
He outlined two sets of proposals. The first of these related to the standard
of value, for which role he thought the most suitable metal would be gold
because 'in this kingdom the Gold Coins only have been for many years past, and
are now, in the practice and opinion of the people, the principal measure of
7 RM Library LIN erpool to George Chalmers, 1 December 1798; letter from UN erpool, 12
July 1799 D)er and Gaspar, The Dorrien & Magens Shilling', BA7, 52 (1982), 199.
DTC X, pt II, 225, Liverpool to Banks, 21 February 1798; 281-82, Li\ erpool to Banks, 21
May 1798, DTC XI, 57-59, Liverpool to Banks 1 September 1798; DTC XV, 14244,
Liverpool to Banks, 2 October 1804.
8 Earl of Liverpool, A Treatise on the Coins of the Realm, in a Letter to the King (Oxford,
1805), p 120.
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property and instrument of commerce'. 9 Gold, he said, was the measure of all
contracts and bargains, in reference to which prices were adjusted and
ascertained and, moreover, for the requirements of an affluent nation like Britain
coins of gold were best adapted. He did not support the idea of levying a
seigniorage for the manufacture of the standard coin because he judged that
coins occupying this position should be rated as close to their intrinsic value as
possible in order to simplify exchange arrangements with other countries.
The second set of proposals dealt with the provision of token coinages and
chiefly in this respect he had in mind silver. This subsidiary form of money, he
argued, should be accepted as legal tender only up to a certain amount, to which
end he proposed that the limit should be set no higher than the value of the
largest gold coin in circulation. Further, there ought to be a charge for
workmanship taken out of these inferior coins, 'because there can be no doubt,
that they will pass in payment at their nominal rate or value, provided that their
intrinsic value in metal and workmanship is equal to such nominal rate or value'.
Given that foreign merchants were unlikely to receive balances in coins with an
appreciable disparity between their intrinsic and nominal values, he saw in this a
means of preventing silver coins from being exported and enabling them more
properly to serve the purposes of internal trade. The potential for conflict
between coins made of different metals that had plagued the eighteenth century
whenever the market price of gold or silver rose above the Mint price would, he
thought, thereby be removed Finally, he argued that the value of the metal in
silver coins should be estimated according to the average price of silver bullion
over a number of years, and from such figure could be resolved 'a fair average of
what is likely to be its value in future at the market, with due attention to every
circumstance, which is likely to influence the price of it'.'9
The main problem Liverpool had to confront was how to make a convincing
case for a devaluation of silver and adopting a gold standard without seeming
9 Liverpool, Coins of the Realm, p. 153.
I ° Liverpool, Coins of the Reahn, pp. 156-58, 168.
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too controversial. An influential body of opinion may have shared his views but
he sensed the potentially contentious nature of his ideas. The solution he settled
on was to emphasise the essentially conservative nature of his scheme. The
perambulatory historical survey of the British coinage that he embarked upon
can be seen as part of this process of reassurance, through which he hoped to
reveal that his suggestions were in large measure already in place and that any
thoughts of radical change to the currency system were far from his mind. As a
means of overcoming official reluctance to reform silver he did not resort to a
theoretical discussion of economics, rather, as Lowndes had done before, he
drew on monetary history to make his case and implied that giving the essence of
the prevailing system legal definition was a matter of common sense.
Liverpool also had to deal with the difficulty that his proposal to abandon
silver as the official standard and effect its devaluation was in opposition to
Locke's theory of money. From the start of his Treatise he was aware of a
ghostly presence guarding the monetary tradition and was 'conscious, that any
opinion I may deliver cannot derive any weight from my single judgement, in
opposition to the respectable authorities from which I am forced, on this
occasion, to differ'. His way of dealing with this was to work at diminishing the
reputation Locke had acquired during the eighteenth century and accordingly
criticisms of the political philosopher surface on a number of occasions. He
regarded Locke's analysis of the currency crisis leading up to the recoinage of
the 1690s as too simplistic and he considered'unworkable Locke's idea that the
subsidiary type of money be left to find its own value in relation to market prices.
Liverpool was politely savage in wondering if the time Locke spent on the
philosophical speculation of monetary matters might not have been more
productively occupied in dealing with the practical nature of the problem.11
Given this dissonance between Liverpool and Locke, Liverpool's system
being respectfully acknowledged by the future Prime Minister Robert Peel, who
was as firmly wedded as any nineteenth-century politician to Locke's idea of the
I I Liverpool, Coins of the Realm, pp. 6, 76-79.
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pound sterling being no more and no less than a specific quantity of precious
metal, may seem curious: 2 How could Liverpool be included in the ranks of
sound money men when he was departing from traditional views and arguing for
a devaluation of silver? The composite legal tender system that Liverpool
promoted might be viewed as taking Locke's idea of an unchanging monetary
standard, applying it to gold and combining this with the spirit of Lowndes'
belief in the need to adjust periodically the value of coins. In this way Peel's
definition of the pound might be accommodated with Liverpool's Treatise.
Reviews of Coins of the Realm that appeared in periodicals at the time did
not hail it as offering a panacea for the monetary ills of the country. Writing in
The Gentleman's Magazine, Richard Gough acknowledged the substantial
amount of work that had gone into its preparation but he denounced the
conclusions as erroneous and if ever effected likely to result in considerable loss
to the public The reaction in The Edinburgh Review was a good deal more
complimentary It considered Liverpool had presented a concise and luminous
statement of the facts of British coinage history, commended him for having
stood apart from some established economic thinking and willingly admitted the
truth of a large proportion of his doctrines. There was, though, less enthusiasm
for his criticisms of the note-issuing activities of country bankers, the Review
feeling that the Bank of England should carry responsibility for the extent of the
paper currency Liverpool's principal recommendations regarding the adoption
of gold as the standard of value and introducing a seigniorage on silver were
judged to be theoretically questionable and practically unworkable. But the
clarity of the objections to his ideas on gold as the measure of value were
dissipated in a somewhat semantic discussion:3
If not presenting their proposals for reform in the same detail as Liverpool,
2 S D Horton, The Silver Pound and England's ,Ifonetwy Policy since the Restoration,
together ilith the Histort of the Guinea, illustrated by contemporary documents (London,
1887), pp 298-300
13 Moraine, Numismatic Guide. II, pt I, 77 The Edinburgh Ret rem. VII January. 1806 . 265.
276, 289-95.
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several writers in the eighteenth century had nevertheless come to the same
conclusion about the necessity of lowering the weight of silver coins and
adopting a gold standard. There are, for example, strong echoes of Liverpool's
work in Adam Smith's views on the currency. Like Locke, Smith was a strong
opponent of state interference in the daily business of commerce and they shared
a belief in an inherent natural order to which man-made social order should
conform as nearly as possible. Writing in 1776, Smith did not devote much time
to developing a theory of money, but he did suggest that the only way to prevent
silver from being melted down was to effect a devaluation by rating it at a higher
level, and to enact that it be legal tender for no more than a guinea. For Smith
labour was the true measure of value, and so adjustment of a deteriorated silver
currency did not carry the same undesirable implications as it did for Locke."
The distinctive nature of Liverpool's contribution lies less in the originality of his
ideas than it does in the structured manner in which he drew together the
prevailing realities of the currency and fashioned them into a new monetary
policy, detailing along the way how this policy should be implemented and how
it could be sustained.
Parliamentary committees on the currency
There were reports in The Gentleman's Magazine in September 1803 that a new
and extensive coinage of shillings and sixpences was about to be issued from the
Mint, a development that was described as extremely desirable in view of the
difficulty of obtaining small change. The following year such reports were still
being aired. The writer on currency Roger Ruding, however, envisaged the
needless expense of coining silver that would soon find its way into the crucible,
and he was not alone in harbouring reservations. 15
 In the first five years of the
nineteenth century the price of silver had been showing signs of instability
14 A. Smith. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 4th edition,
(London, 1812), 65-66. Roll, A History of Economic Thought, pp. 145-46, 149, 162.
15 Manville, Numismatic Guide, II, pt I, 73, 75.
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(Appendix 1), a trend which dissuaded Sir Joseph Banks from promoting the
idea of any imminent change to the position of the silver coinage, but the
conditions did not perturb Matthew Boulton. He believed that to wait for the
price to stop fluctuating would be to wait forever. In a letter to Banks in
February 1804 he outlined how he could contract to restore the silver currency
in one year, if necessary coining silver at as high a rate as 72s to the troy pound.
In May the Bank began to issue dollars as 5s pieces which had been completely
overstamped with a Bank of England design on one side and a bust of George III
on the other. These issues, the overstamping of which Boulton was responsible,
took the urgency out of striking silver in any other form. 16
The continued expedients of the Bank deflected attention away from
thoroughgoing reform of the currency. Added to this, the return to some order
of monetary stability was firmly anchored in the minds of politicians to a peace
settlement with France. Although the Peace of Amiens in 1802 brought a
cessation in the fighting, hostilities were renewed in 1803. At the same time the
Bank of England's restriction on redeeming its notes in cash was prolonged, the
legislation enacting that it should continue until after the end of the war.17
Lord Liverpool's plan may have been rejected but the Committee on Coin
continued to sit. Through its activities during the first decade of the nineteenth
century the Mint left the Tower of London and moved across the road to a
purpose-built site on Tower Hill, complete with eight steam-powered coining
presses of the type designed by Matthew Boulton. The new Mint, completed
and ready to begin work by 1810, was erected and equipped specifically with a
view to supplying the want of coinage. 18 The cost of relocation was over
£300,000, a level of investment that during a time of war clearly revealed
government's rediscovered sense of its responsibility as the provider of the
16 DTC XIV, 209-16, for the paper by Banks, 'Thoughts on the present state of our Silver
Money etc', February 1804; 217-22, Boulton to Banks, February 1804.
17 D. Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon (London, 1985), pp. 59-60, 62. 44 Geo. III. cap. 1.
Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling, p. 185.
18 Dyer and Gaspar, 'Tower Hill', NHRM, pp. 455-59, 461.
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nation's coinage. Abandoning the screw-press technology of the Tower was a
breakthrough that at least laid the physical foundations for change.
As the war against France progressed, an increasingly severe toll was being
registered on the financial ingenuity of the Treasury. Gold coins were exported
on a large scale at times when the exchanges moved against Britain as in the
period 1799-1800 and again in 1809-10. National expenditure increased from
£19.6 million in 1793 to £54.8 million in 1803, and ten years later it stood at
£94.8 million. Such an expansion was sustained on the back of higher national
income and a debt burden that more than doubled over the same twenty-year
period. As the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Spencer Perceval's budgets of
1808 and 1809 reflected a sense of crisis management confronted by a national
debt that seemed to be on the verge of edging out of control. He responded by
making a point of looking for ways to cut public expenditure through the more
careful husbanding of resources and improved methods of collecting taxes.19
From one point of view this expansion in credit, combined with periods of very
rapid increases in inflation between 1799 and 1809, was exerting pressure on the
currency that might have justified change. But laying plans to issue a new silver
coinage with all the attendant fears of coins being sacrificed to the export trade,
was not considered practicable.
Those who might have turned their attention to the question of the coinage
were distracted by other issues. During the first fifteen years of the nineteenth
century the subject of the standard of value and the relative merits of gold and
silver in this role was subsumed in larger issues concerning the suspension of
cash payments. Not until 1816, when the decision was taken to adopt gold as
the standard, did politicians and commentators become in any way animated
about the questions raised by Liverpool, a debate that he did not live to
19 Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling, pp. 192, 194. D. Gray, Spencer Perceval: The
Evangelical Prime Minister, 1762-1812 (Manchester, 1963), pp. 320, 353, 356-58.
Mitchell and Deane, British Historical Statistics, pp. 388, 391-92, 396, 402.
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witness. 2° An instance which demonstrates this was the controversy over the
depreciation of the Irish pound in relation to the English in 1803-04. In the final
section of the committee's report the question of finding a permanent solution to
the shortage of silver coin was discussed. The committee felt its hands were tied
on the issue by the need to resolve the larger question of stabilising exchange
rates between Britain and Ireland, but it did nevertheless venture to recommend
that the nominal value of the coinage should be retained at the existing level.
The focus of attention was the impact the expansion of note issues had exerted
on exchange rates and prices; the nature of coinage reform and possible
alterations to the monetary standard were passed over fleetingly. 21
Other indications of the trend in monetary debate were provided by The
Edinburgh Review. In the April 1803 issue a pamphlet that argued for the
perpetual continuance of restriction was severely criticised on the grounds of its
sloppy reasoning and hectoring tone, but also for adopting such a position on
managing the currency in the first place. 22
 The importance of paper currency in
terms of the value of transactions it sustained ensured that economic debate
became trained in this direction. Very broadly two schools of thought
marshalled arguments to explain the impact of restriction on the British
economy Such views as have come to be regarded anti-bullionist looked for an
explanation of the price rises of gold and silver, and of the depreciation of the
pound on foreign exchanges in wartime public expenditure and the general
disruptions afflicting trade The government and the Bank of England towards
the end of the first decade of the nineteenth century tended to support this
interpretation. They were reluctant to accept, at least temporarily, a return to
the active operation of a metallic standard based either on gold or silver. The
bullionist position, on the other hand, explained the same conditions in terms of
2 F W Fetter, Development of British Monetary Orthodoxy 1797-1875 (Cambridge,
[Massachusetts], 1965), p. 58
21 Fetter British Monetary Orthodoxy, pp 27, 37-39. F. W. Fetter (Intro.), The Irish Pound,
1797-1826 A Reprint of the Report of the Committee of 1804 of the British House of
COM/110118 on the Condition of the Irish Currency, etc (London, 1955), pp. 31, 47, 86.
22 The Edinburgh Review, II (April, 1803), 107.
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the expansion of note issues, particularly by the Bank of England. Their ranks
included the economists Thomas Malthus, John Wheatley and David Ricardo,
but they were by no means unified in their beliefs. Malthus certainly did not
agree with all that Ricardo had to say on the influence currency instability could
exert on the balance of trade, and Francis Homer, a leading figure in the debate,
placed greater weight on the role of excessive note issues in causing depression
than his fellow bullionist William Huskisson. In general terms, though, as well as
supporting a return to cash payments at the earliest opportunity and a more
disciplined control of paper currency, re-establishing either gold or silver as the
active standard of value would have satisfied most of them.23
The main crisis of the restriction period came in 1810-11. Again the
opportunity for a fundamental examination of the whole currency system was not
taken and instead the debate centred on the element of the money supply created
by the banking sector A parliamentary committee was appointed in February
1810 charged with the task of looking into the causes of the abnormally high
price of gold During the course of its deliberations officials from the Bank of
England, traders in the London bullion market, merchants and bankers were
examined, and often in such a way as to convey the strong impression that some
committee members had already formulated fairly trenchant views as to what
they thought lay behind the increase in the price of gold. Homer had managed to
pack the committee with friends like Huskisson and Henry Thornton who had
previously adopted a bullionist stance. The ministerial presence was by contrast
weak 24
The report of the committee, a clear expression of the bullionist position,
concluded that the paper circulation had grown excessive and that the
unequivocal symptoms of this were the high price of bullion and the low state of
the British currency on the continental exchanges. In passing it recognised the
23 Fetter, British Monetary Orthodoxy, pp. 47-48, 53, 58. Gray, Spencer Perceval, p. 372.
24 Bullion Committee, 1810, Report and Minutes of Evidence, passim. Feavearyear, The
Pound Sterling, p. 195. Gray, Spencer Perceval, p. 369.
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need to frame solutions to the existing instability which would embrace reform of
the coinage as well as reining in the issue of banknotes. On a number of
occasions the minutes of evidence revealed the difficulties under which the
currency was operating. Vincent Stuckey, a country banker, believed that
guineas did not circulate in the west of England to any considerable extent, while
fellow banker William Merle reported that he had seen no guineas recently and
that even seven-shilling pieces had disappeared. Bullion dealers referred in an
almost casual way to withdrawing huge numbers of gold coins from circulation.
There were also some indications of the fears surrounding the impact depreciated
paper might have on restoring the coinage. The report observed that there was
the temptation 'to resort to a depreciation even of the value of the gold coin by
an alteration of the standard, to which Parliament itself might be subjected by a
great and long continued excess of paper'.25
The debates in Parliament in May 1811 that followed the publication of the
report inevitably touched on discussion of the difficulties faced by the circulating
medium as a whole Worn and good weight silver seeming to have the same
legitimacy in law to pass at face value led the future Chancellor of the Exchequer
Nicholas Vansittart to question the nature of the currency standard. As part of
his response from the other side of the argument, Huskisson also commented on
the forlorn condition of silver, drawing attention to the imbalance in the
silver gold ratio and the unhealthy influence he felt it had exerted on the coinage.
Silver, he argued, had been exported on a large scale because of this imbalance
and that an essential reform for the future should therefore be to adjust the ratio.
The prominent politician George Canning viewed the disappearance of silver in
the eighteenth century in similar terms and, prompted by the necessity that the
silver coinage be restored to a proper condition, the Irish MP Henry Parnell
discussed the negative implications of producing coins to a lighter standard.26
25 Bullion Committee, 1810, Report, pp. 41-42, 50, 73-74; Minutes of Evidence, pp. 28, 176-
77, 210-13.
26 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XIX, cols 924-26, 969-70 (7 May 1811); XIX, cols 1032-
34, 1103 (8 May 1811).
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As was true of the committee on Irish currency, the Bullion Committee's
function was not to suggest proposals for a new silver coinage. Consequently
the debates in Parliament and the dozens of pamphlets that were written
addressing the issues raised by the report, while acknowledging the broad picture
of currency instability, wrestled ultimately with the question of whether or not
there should be a return to cash payments within two years irrespective of a
peace treaty with France. 27 The government succeeded in defeating the
committee's proposals, the need to maintain a high degree of financial flexibility
in order to continue the war being one of the most important considerations.2''
Including in his Treatise a section on paper money was very much an
afterthought for Liverpool and consequently his influence over the course of
debate during the first decade of the nineteenth century was not telling. He did,
however, have strong feelings about the subject and his views reflect bullionist
fears of an ever-increasing and depreciating stock of paper currency. 29 As a
group, bullionists had more to say on the prospect of coinage reform but they
tended to believe that this could only be successful if it were preceded by a
reduction in the paper circulation and ideally by a return to cash payments. For
both sides in the debate the two key issues were, with differing degrees of
emphasis, war and restriction, and support for a new monetary settlement
outside a resolution of either one of these was not evident.
Bullion Con:make, 1810, Report, p 75. For the extensive debates in the House of
Commons on the resolutions of Francis Horner to adopt the recommendations of the
Bullion Committee see Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XIX, cols 798-919 (6 May 1811);
XIX. cols 919-1012(7 May 1811), XIX, cols 1020-1128(8 May 1811); XIX, cols 1151-69
(9 May 1811). XX. cols 1-128 (13 May 1811); XX, cols 134-46 (14 May 1811); XX,
cols 150-76 (15 May 1811)
-X Gray. Spcnccr Perccval pp 376, 384 Parliamentary Debates, 1st set., XIX, col. 1169 (9
May 1811). XX. cols 73-74 (13 May 1811).
-) DTC XV. 259-61, LIN erpool to Banks, 18 January 1805. LiN erpool, Coins of the Realm,
pp 219-31
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Silver tokens
Lord Lauderdale and several others kept the debate on currency reform alive
over the next five years, but they had little influence over ministers." The Bank
once again, however, stepped into the breach. In the years 1810 to 1811 the
Mexican War of Independence led to a reduction in the supply of silver and to
the production of poor quality dollars that few would trust. The disruption in
the silver market and the consequent increases in price were part of the impetus
behind the Bank's commissioning the production of silver tokens. 31 In 1811 it
re-denominated its overstamped dollars at the higher rate of 5s 6d and up to
1816 it supplied the new Mint at Tower Hill with dollar-standard silver which
was used to strike tokens of 3s and is 6d. In 1797 and 1804 £.420,500 of the
countermarked dollars were issued to the public; between 1811 and July 1816,
production of Bank of England tokens amounted to 0,469,973, while the
overstriking of Bank dollars between 1804 and 1812 totalled £1,134,483. All
told, in the nineteen years from 1797 the efforts of the Bank increased the
quantity of silver in circulation by just over 1,5 million. With the total amount of
regal silver in circulation during that period estimated to be in the region of £2
million, this was a welcome contribution and one broadly within the
denominational range that had been neglected.32
The problem of counterfeits had continued to disrupt the silver currency of
the Bank but, unlike in 1797, the issues after 1804 were granted greater legal
protection, a feature shared by the similarly semi-official tokens released in
Ireland Counterfeiting Bank of England dollars of 1804 was made illegal and
this was extended to the Bank tokens for 3s and 18d. The same defence was
given to the Bank of Ireland 6s tokens of 1804, and the later additions to this
G Booth. Obscrtations on Paper Currency, the Bank of England Notes and on the
Principles of Coinage and a Metallic Circulating Medium (Liverpool, 1815), pp. 20-22;
[R Foster]. Thoughts on Peace, in the Present Situation of the Country with respect to its
Finances and Circulating Medium (London, 1814), [GL], pp. 4, 163. T. Smith, A letter to
the Earl of Lauderdale in reply to his Depreciation of Paper-Currency Proved (London,
1814), [GL]. pp 65-68
31	 Hisimy of Gold and Money, p. 321.
12 Craig, The Mint. p 214 Kelly, Spanish Dollars, pp. 25 note 30, 58, 74, 119-20.
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series, the 5d and 10d tokens first struck in 1805, and the 30d pieces of 1808.
Beyond this, the legislation giving the Irish tokens currency affirmed that in
order to promote their circulation they were to be received in payment of public
revenues, an added element of legitimacy that the Bank of England token money
acquired only in 1818 as a means of encouraging its withdrawal. Specifically,
the English dollars and tokens were permitted to be tendered in payment of
taxes, rates or duties from 5 July 1818 to 5 April 1819, after, that is, the period
allowed for their general circulation had come to an end. 33 The problem of
counterfeiting did not go away and it did hamper the Bank's otherwise helpful
intervention
The semi-official initiatives of the Bank of England helped to fill a gap in the
money supply, but there was yet further demand to be satisfied. From 1811 the
commercial sector in England and Wales attempted to address the continuing
want of money by releasing large quantities of their own token currency in silver.
Most of the issuers were merchants looking to ease the inconvenience suffered
by their respective communities Some advertised prosaically the purpose for
which the tokens were intended the inscription on a token of Shaftesbury read,
For the accommodation of the public, while messrs Ratcliffe, Elam and
Thurbon of March in Cambridgeshire proclaimed their tokens were To facilitate
trade The denomination favoured by many of the firms who arranged for the
production of these pieces was the shilling, but tokens for two-shillings and for
sixpence were available One issuer at least, Edward Butt of Stamford, followed
the Bank's lead and opted for a value of eighteen pence. The importance of the
country banking system in the distribution of silver as currency was apparent
from the involvement of many hundreds of firms in the release of new coins in
1817 (Chapter 6, p 112) But their role in this respect also reveals itself in the
active part banking houses played in promoting the fashion for tokens James
Gomme of High Wycombe, Wakeford & Sons of Andover and King, Gosling &
33 Rucling. 1nnals of Inc Coinage. 11, 103-10 44 Geo III cap 71, 45 Gco III. cap 42;
48 Gco III cap 31, 51 Geo III cap 110, 58 Geo III cap. 14 Kelly, Spawn Dollars,
pp 28-29 88-89 109
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Co. of Marlborough were all responsible for managing silver coin exchange
stations in 1817 and they all also issued silver shilling tokens in 1811
(Appendix 3) .34
Although the tokens contained an intrinsic silver content often 3d or more
below their face value, the official silver coin was by then deficient by at least the
same amount, tokens acquiring a fair level of acceptance should not therefore
have been surprising. After a degree of uncertainty attending their legal status,
legislation was brought in on 29 July 1812 forbidding their circulation, but to aid
in their withdrawal the ban was only to take effect from 25 March the following
year, a provision that says a good deal about their popularity.35
The leading Whig politician the Earl of Lauderdale, who published several
works on trade and monetary matters, argued in a pamphlet of 1813 that
necessity alone had given rise to the local token issues and that although
Parliament was inclined to suppress them the public were indebted for their
accommodation Included in an appendix to this pamphlet are extracts from
letters written to Lauderdale celebrating the advent of the private silver token.
Several of these are instructive of the daily trial that could result from
conducting business in the context of a shortage of small change. An undated
letter from Scarborough referred to the familiar sight of a shopkeeper's servant
trying every door in a street in an effort to obtain change for a guinea note, and
being unable to get any satisfaction the shopkeeper would be forced to give
credit or refuse goods A correspondent from York on 4 November 1812 wrote
of the common practice, before the tokens were issued, of giving a premium of
1 s to procure a 20s note, and in Bath receiving change for a pound note could
sometimes involve taking up to 15s in copper. The estimated quantity of local
34 The Earl of Lauderdale, Further Considerations on the state of the Currency etc
(Edinburgh and London, 1813), Appendix No. IX. J. 0. Mays, Tokens of Those Trying
Times: A Social History of Britain's 19th Century Silver Tokens (Burley, 1991), pp. 14, 36,
138.
15 Kelly, Spanmh Dollars, pp 89-91, 95, 99-100. G. R. Gilmore and G. Berry, 'Chemical
anal)sis of some nineteenth-century silver tokens from the north of England', in D. M.
Metcalf and W A Odd) (eds), Metallurgy in Numismatics (London, 1980), I, 187.
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tokens in Swansea was thought to be about five-sixths of the silver change in
circulation, while in Sheffield and Bridlington the judgement was that tokens
composed four-fifths of the silver money in use. The facility the tokens provided
was acknowledged in further legislation which prolonged their circulation into
July 1813, and additional extensions were subsequently introduced that ensured
these pieces remained in legitimate use well into the new year. 36
Pressure for reform
The twenty years from the beginning of restriction were defined by conditions of
monetary instability The demand for silver was stronger than it had been at any
time during the eighteenth century, but ministers and their advisers remained
wary of the implications of restructuring the currency; their attitude throughout
the period was decidedly conservative and responsibility for supplying sufficient
coin was shuffled onto the shoulders of the Bank of England. In the summer of
1815 the war with France came to an end. Unlike a hundred years earlier, an
inflationary crisis had been survived without major reform of the coinage, but
post-war attitudes and economic conditions engendered other pressures for
change
Responding to a question during a sitting of the Bullion Committee on the
likely consequences of a scarcity of money, the merchant John Louis Greffulhe
considered that it would be but momentary because 'other means would speedily
be devised to supply the wants of circulation'. 37 The implications of this spirit of
improvisation v,ere later to bring the businessman and politician Pascoe Grenfell
to his feet in the House of Commons on 22 March 1816 The scarcity of silver
coins, he observed, had been compensated for by the activities of Birmingham
3 Lauderdale. Further Considerations on the state of the Currency, pp 23-29 See DNB for
reference to Lauderdale. towards the end of his career, shifting his political views from that
of leading Scottish Whig to firm supporter of Lord Liverpool's administration Kelly,
.Spanish Dollars, pp 99 - 100 Mass, Tokens of Those Trying Tunes, p 20
3 Bullion Committee, 1810, Minutes of Evidence, p 130
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counterfeiters and the import from France of twelve and twenty-four sous pieces.
With the price of silver at that time only marginally above the Mint price he
wondered whether ministers would consider making provision for a new
coinage. On this occasion Vansittart, now Chancellor of the Exchequer, held out
no hope for a restoration of the silver currency. In a subsequent debate in April,
by which time silver had been quoted in the bullion market at the Mint price and
gold was also falling towards its par, Grenfell estimated that in the last twelve
months 1200,000 French of silver coins had been shipped across the English
Channel In a pointed - if grossly exaggerated - turn of phrase he indicated that
in change for a pound note people usually received one half in French coin and
the other half perhaps in counterfeits.38
There was a certain amount of resentment that peace seemed to have
exacerbated economic conditions and as more and more evidence was presented
there arose a debate on the state of the country that embraced the question of the
currency Agricultural prices fell from 1813 to 1816 by almost 30 per cent,
which was almost twice the rate of decline of other consumer goods, and the
monthly rate of bankruptcies increased markedly in the two years from the end
of 1814 Landowners blamed a reduction in the circulation of country banknotes
and a currency that after many years of depreciation was instead increasing in
value The opinion was voiced that outbreaks of violence in the spring of 1816
in some agricultural areas had been provoked by the adverse economic impact of
changes in the supply and value of the currency. 39 As well as pointing to the
abundant harvests of 1813 and 1814 as a cause of the fall in agricultural prices,
The Edinburgh Review supported the idea that restoration of the currency's
value from 1815 and a reduction in the circulation of country banknotes had
contributed to the deflationary momentum. In the House of Commons Thomas
Frankland Lewis argued that a gradual re-issuing of the paper currency by the
38 Parliamentary Dchates, 1st ser., XXXII', cols 535-36 (22 March 1816); XXXIII,
cols 1148-50 (10 April 1816). By May 1816 gold had been quoted at £4. The standard
Mint price for gold was £3 17s 10'2d per ounce.
" Parliamentary abates, 1st ser., XXXIII, cols 699-700 (28 March 1816). The Times, 10
May 1816. Mitchell and Deane, British Historical Statistics, p. 469. Fetter, British
Monetary Orthodoxy, p 74
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country banks would raise commodity prices and ease the economic distress that
deflation had caused. In pamphlets some went further by urging the continuation
of restriction, while on the other hand, the merchant Charles Prinsep proposed a
return to cash payments on the basis of a devalued silver standard. The London
banker Mathias Attwood thought a cut in the gold content of the pound was
required and he found a supporter in the controversial writer Edward Tatham,
who suggested that a reduction of the order of ten per cent would be
necessary.4°
The fall in prices was also accompanied by a less dramatic decline in wages
evident from 1813 amongst agricultural workers throughout Britain. Wage rates
in the cotton industry slumped sharply in 1815 and continued to decline over the
course of the next three years. In such economic conditions the pressure being
brought to bear on the money supply was reduced and the prospects of currency
reform could have been viewed as less encouraging. 4 ' Grenfell, a veteran from
the Bullion Committee and decidedly bullionist in his sympathies, had
nevertheless assumed the mantle of chief lobbyist on behalf of the beleaguered
silver coinage, and once the press began to support him the government found
itself being criticised from inside and outside Parliament for its policy towards
the currency The Times proclaimed that in the wake of Bank restriction had
come 'a miserable debased currency, the disgrace of our country in the eyes of
all foreigners', and was concerned that even the religious education of children
had suffered A whole generation, the paper lamented, would probably fail to
understand the parable of tribute money because 'the greater part of the counters
which pass among us for money have either no "image or superscription" '.
Like Grenfell The Times recognised in the fall in the price of silver an ideal
opportunity to take action 42
4 Fetter, British Monetary Orthodoxy, pp. 68, 74. The Edinburgh Review, XXVI (February,
1816), 144-45, 152 C. R. Prinsep, A Letter to the Earl of Liverpool on the Causes of the
Present Distresses of the Country (London, 1816), (GU pp. 22, 30. For Charles Prinsep
see F Boase, Modern English Biography (Truro, 1892-1921); for Edward Tatham see
DNB
41 Mitchell and Deane, British Historical Statistics, pp. 348-49.
42 The Times, 13 and 30 April 1816.
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With the current act covering Bank restriction due to end on 5 July 1816, a
bill was introduced in April postponing resumption for a further two years.
Reform of the coinage and the suspension of cash payments had become linked
and opinion inside and outside Cabinet on occasion treated of them in the same
breath. Ministers' thoughts along these lines were expressed by Vansittart who
feared that an immediate resumption would soon exhaust the Bank of England's
stocks and drive it once again to call for protection. This could be avoided, he
maintained, by waiting until a considerable quantity of coin had entered
circulation and public appetite had thereby been sated. For members of the
opposition in favour of coinage reform, additional opportunities to press
ministers were presented in the form of Bank restriction debates. Homer took
just such an opportunity on 1 May when he was able to inform the House that he
understood a new silver coinage was being considered, although there had been
no mention of such a measure in the Prince Regent's speech in February at the
beginning of the parliamentary session. Homer urged caution in deciding the
standard at which it would be set given that simply re-establishing the old Mint
rate could be inconvenient and unjust for some. While Vansittart was giving
nothing away at this stage, suggesting the old currency could only be restored by
gradual change, plans were in the process of being laid. In the meantime the
government won its two-year reprieve from resuming cash payments without
much dissent 4'
Grenfell was helped in his cause by a petition presented by retail traders from
a ward of the City of London praying for a new silver currency. Leading off a
debate on 3 May on the state of the coinage he was able to extract from William
Wellesley Pole, Master of the Mint, an assurance that the subject was indeed
under the consideration of ministers." Members of Parliament might have been
forgiven for regarding this as just official prevarication of the type that had led
the silver coinage into its worn condition in the first place. There were certainly
43 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XXX1II, cols 1-4(1 February 1816); XXXIV, cols 147-49,
152 (1 May 1816).
44 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XXXIV, cols 239-43 (3 May 1816).
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considerations that might have led government to take a circumspect attitude.
The last time a major recoinage of silver had taken place, at the end of the
seventeenth century, the cost was some £2.7 million." In the unfavourable post-
war economic circumstances of 1816 and with relentless demands for reductions
in public spending, the prospect of a potentially expensive recoinage might have
led ministers to think twice. Liverpool, Vansittart and the Foreign Secretary,
Lord Castlereagh, wrote a collective letter to the Prince Regent urging upon him
the absolute necessity for retrenchments in expenditure and in particular desiring
that no further alterations be carried out at the Royal residence at Brighton."
There was also the question of the restlessness of the 'lower orders' and threats
of riotous behaviour on account of the difficult economic climate. Might not the
adoption of a new coinage and the prospect of losses that this could entail for the
holders of the old currency seem overly provocative at such a time? Moreover,
although silver was at par in 1816, at times in 1815 it had been as high as 6s 91/2d
(Appendix 1) What guarantee could there be that new full-weight pieces would
not fall victim to a rise in the price of silver and quickly disappear into melting
pots?
Government cannot have been blind to such reservations but there were
other factors to consider The need to prepare for an eventual end to restriction
had begun to occupy ministers' thoughts and the provision of a new silver
coinage was seen as a necessary step towards resumption. The much improved
state of the foreign exchanges and the return of silver to its standard Mint price,
whatever the fluctuating nature of such indicators, made the conditions for a
recoinage in 1816 more suitable than they had been for some time A modest
amount of public and parliamentary pressure had also built up during the first
few months of the year, at the same time as the appearance in circulation of large
amounts of light foreign silver threatened a descent into even more instability
45 Challis, lord Hastings', NHILV1, p 397
4( A Aspinall (ed ), The Letters of King George 11/, 1812-1830 (Cambridge, 1938), II, 158-
59, Liverpool, Vansittart and Castlereagh to the Prince Regent, 15 March 1816
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The political class had undergone an education in monetary affairs through the
restriction period, as a consequence of which such matters were more readily
debated. In post-Waterloo Britain there was less likelihood that an extended
period of time would be allowed to elapse without the question of the coinage
being aired
The circumstances, however, were not those of an administration caving-in
under pressure. Ministers earlier in the parliamentary session had persisted with
deeply unpopular property tax proposals, suffering in the process a barrage of
petitions and acrimonious parliamentary debates. The fiscal measures were
defeated by a triumphant opposition but the episode reveals a government
prepared to live with considerable public hostility in pursuit of its aims. In
referring to petitions against the tax Lord Castlereagh said, 'no one would say
that the deliberative faculties of parliament ought to be so limited or paralysed by
them, that the legislature of the country was to look to the sentiments
entertained beyond the walls of that House for the rule and guide of the course it
had to pursue' 47 The administration might, therefore, have been expected to
withstand the comparatively slight lobbying for coinage reform, with its
negligible attendant petitions, had it not wanted change. The intervention of
Grenfell doubtless helped to prompt ministers to reflect that without the excuse
of wartime disruption to fall back on the chaotic condition of the currency, which
could only grow worse, had become indefensible. Once this realisation had
dawned there was little need for persuasion.
With a determination now to proceed with reform, proposals were drawn up
in some haste On 17 May, the Prime Minister, the second Earl of Liverpool,
and Vansittart had a meeting with Jeremiah Harman, the Governor of the Bank
of England, at which they put forward the scheme, clearly sent before its time,
like Shakespeare's Richard III, 'into this breathing world, scarce half made up',
47 J E. Cookson. Lord Liverpool's Administration: The Crucial Years, 1815-1822 (Edinburgh
and London. 1975), p 60. Parliamentary Debates, 1st scr,  XXXII', cols 421-55 (18
March 1816)
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that the Bank take upon itself the silver coinage. The Bank firmly declined. The
Prime Minister even conceiving of the Bank's taking on this role is an indication
of the importance it had assumed as a supplier of the nation's metallic as well as
paper currency. The approach was also, however, a demonstration of the extent
to which ministers had become divorced from their responsibility for the silver
coinage."
The Privy Council Committee on Coin met on 10 May and by the twenty-
first a series of recommendations had been decided upon setting forth the
principles of a new currency system. In the years that had elapsed since the
committee's disagreements over the first Earl of Liverpool's ideas, its
membership had changed, and it now outlined a set of resolutions occupying a
remarkably succinct four pages - one of those the title page - that was in essence
the plan originally advocated by Liverpoo1.49
Gold coins alone were proposed to be declared the standard, while those of
silver were to be considered merely as representative and not acceptable as legal
tender in sums exceeding two guineas. The fineness and the denomination of the
silver coins was to remain unchanged, but the report suggested that to prevent
their being melted down the weight of the pieces should be diminished to the
extent of 66s instead of 62s being struck from a pound of silver. The coinage of
gold was to remain unchanged in fineness, weight and denomination, and the
practice was to continue of exacting no charge for the expense of minting. The
committee, however, thought that for silver a charge for manufacture and a small
allowance for seigniorage ought to be levied to the extent of 4s out of each troy
pound of silver minted In settling on this figure the committee had
'endeavoured to fix on such a Rate as will on the one hand be sufficiently high to
protect the new coins, by a small increase of their nominal Value, from the
danger of being melted down and converted into Bullion when the Market Price
of Silver rises, while on the other, it will, they trust, not be found to be so low as
48 Shakespeare. Richard III, Act I, Scene 1. Kell), Spanksh Dollars, p 105.
4 PRO BT 6 I28A. 10 May 1816, pp 320-22
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to afford any encouragement to the issue of counterfeit Coin if the Market Price
of Silver should fall'. The advice was offered that before any issue of new coin a
stockpile of £2.5 million should be built up - £2 million for use in Britain and
£500,000 for Ireland. Finally, the report gave some general guidance on the
latitude that should be allowed in exchanging the existing currency for the new.
Provided that officers of the Mint could judge that a coin had emanated from the
Tower of London then it should be received in equal value by tale for the new
silver."
The difference between the proposals of this report and those contained in
Liverpool's Treatise are of detail rather than substance. The report, for
example, gave figures for the higher nominal rate of silver, while Liverpool was
happy merely to state the principle and advantages of such a measure. On the
few occasions when he did resort to specifics his lead was not taken by the
committee The upper legal tender limit for silver it doubled from Liverpool's
suggestion of a guinea because two guineas was thought likely to be the largest
gold coin in circulation, and the minimum stockpile of new silver required before
a general issue it set at £500,000 less than Liverpool's estimate.
The Coinage
Events now moved swiftly The conclusions of the report were accepted and
within a week the Prime Minister was proposing a motion in the House of Lords
on the adoption of a new coinage of silver, requesting the concurrence of peers
in enacting the necessary legislation. In the debates that followed two days later,
he acknowledged the contribution his father, the first Earl of Liverpool, had
Report of the Lords of the Council on the state of the coin. Parliamentary Papers, 1816
(411) There is no eN, idence in the Treasury Papers that reform of the silver coinage was
being discussed at official level any earlier than May 1816: PRO. T 2/73; T 9/5-6; T 27/74-
75; T29/139-42.
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made to the subject and then moved on to detail the new settlement, following
closely the recommendations of the Committee on Coin.51
Some reservations were naturally enough expressed. Francis Homer was not
alone in believing reform of the coinage was possibly unwise before the end of
restriction. Presenting a reasoned case, the financier and statesman Alexander
Baring urged the adoption of silver as the standard on the grounds that
establishing a restored currency would be easier with silver because it was valued
at four per cent less than gold. Outside Parliament the London accountant and
pamphlet writer Thomas Smith thought the Coinage Bill had not gone far
enough in reducing the weight of silver coins; he believed that unless a rate of
80s to the pound were adopted the new currency would still be at risk from
increases in the price of bullion. There was also the question of the twenty-
shilling piece as opposed to the guinea.52
As early as 7 May The Times had optimistically reported that striking such
coins was being seriously considered, commenting that a great convenience to
trade would be achieved if this was in prospect. Virtually every speaker during
the second reading of the bill made a point of expressing support for the
introduction of a coin denominated twenty-shillings. Thomas Frankland Lewis
estimated the number of guineas in circulation to be half a million and that no
great inconvenience could therefore be expected to arise from recoining them.
The Master of the Mint admitted that consideration had been given to the
possibility of introducing a pound coin but that the suggestion was initially ruled
out on the grounds that recoining a potentially large amount of gold would be
inconvenient, and that the guinea was very widely accepted. The weight of
opinion inside and outside Parliament could not now be ignored, and
reassurances were given that the question would be re-examined in a more
positive light In musing that the appearance of a twenty-shilling coin could be
51 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., )00CIV, cols 857-58, 860 (28 May 1816); XXXIV,
cols 912-17, 946-64 (30 May 1816).
52 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XXXIV, cols 964-65 (30 May 1816). T. Smith, A Letter
to the Rt. Hon. Earl of Liverpool on the Proposed New Coinage (London, 1816), pp. 24-26.
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so distinct from the old guineas as to cause no confusion from their circulating
together, Pole was already conveying the government's change of heart.53
Of all the members of the House then present John Wilson Croker, Secretary
to the Admiralty, seems to have been most pleased with the shift in position on
the question of the pound coin. For him this was recognition of the principle of
applying a decimal division of money and he saw the debate on coinage reform
as an ideal opportunity to consider giving the various parts of the circulating
medium a decimal relation to each other. 'It would be almost unpardonable', he
said, 'for the legislature at this time to re-enact and legalize-a-new those
barbarisms in the division of our coin which were attended with great
inconvenience ' Even though his scheme to coin an ounce of standard gold into
five twenty-shilling pieces, each shilling being worth ten pence of the existing
money, was given strong backing in the press, decimalisation, unlike in the
1960s, was not 'a mysteriously inflammatory subject'."
On a number of occasions The Times ran commentaries, initially
congratulating Croker for making the suggestion, then moving on to put forward
its own detailed plans for a decimal currency backed by a silver standard. After
the Coinage Bill had been passed the newspaper continued to press for further
debate on the subject Sir Joseph Banks received a decimal currency plan from
the geologist John Farey on 16 June. Despite Farey's efforts at persuasion
Banks expressed reservations and he remained opposed to the scheme. In the
House Croker's colleagues were not overly taken with the prospect of
decimalisation As usual Baring's contribution was more penetrating than most.
Although he saw it as the best system to adopt if a currency were being
established, he felt the existing arrangements were extremely convenient for the
53 The Times. 7 May 1816 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XXXIV, cols 1018-20, 1022-23
(7 June 1816) The Times, 31 May 1816; 8 June 1816.
54 Parliamentary Debates., 1st ser., XXXIV, cols 1024-25 (7 June 1816). N. E. A. Moore, The
Decimalisation of Britain's Currency (London, 1973), p. 46.
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common purposes of life.55
Concerns were registered about the expense of the recoinage and on the
strong feelings that would be encountered in calling in the old silver, but on the
whole the plans stimulated little debate in the House of Commons. The
measures were not picked over in any detailed way and the opposition to the bill,
such as it was, lacked any kind of cohesion. Pole was doubtless relieved that the
bill passed without even a division of the House and that he had carried it
through 'with as great a degree of unanimity as was ever manifested upon a
question of such interest, importance, and difficulty'.56
The same could not be said of the House of Lords. The proposals for reform
were subjected to a dogged if not hugely persuasive challenge from Lord
Lauderdale, who of all his parliamentary colleagues was the only one to express
serious misgivings about the principles upon which the legislation was based. In
his view the measures failed on virtually every level. The wrong metal had been
chosen as the standard for the wrong reasons at the wrong time, during a period
of restriction when the continued circulation of banknotes would drive the new
coins into the hands of bullion refiners. Consequently, he saw the scheme as a
great and needless cost to the public purse, the population in general also
suffering at the hands of a policy that would force them to exchange their old
coin at a discount He wanted Parliament to have time to reflect on this, a
matter of great importance that 'must involve the country in very serious
additional difficulties, and impose very heavy additional burdens on the public,
without doing an earthly good, or serving any useful purpose whatever'.57
55 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XXXIV, cols 1025-26 (7 June 1816). The Times, 11, 14,
17, 21 and 28 June 1816. Sutro Library, California, Co. 3:66, Farey to Banks, 16 June
1816. For details of another proposal for a decimal s)stem see H. Goodwyn, A Short
Account of a Plan for the New Silver Coinage for Improving the Currency of the Kingdom
and Introducing the Decimal Principle into all Money Transactions (London, 1816), [GL],
pp. 8-10.
56 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., )(XXIV, cols 1018-20, 1024-26 (7 June 1816). Journal of
the House of Commons, LXXI, col. 461 (14 June 1816); col. 499 (21 June 1816).
57 Parliamentary
 Debates, 1st ser., XXXIV, cols 917-23 (30 May 1816); XXXIV, cols 1122-
25 (17 June 1816); XXXIV, cols 1235-39 (21 June 1816).
67
He was supported in this view by opinion in the press. Alongside its
decimalisation campaign The Times unleashed a series of withering editorials
throughout June and into July highly critical of the government's conversion, as
it perceived, to Lord Liverpool's doctrines over Locke's theory of money. It
poured scorn on the idea of establishing a gold standard in a country that had
long since ceased to be acquainted with the sight of gold coins. The measures
were described as 'hasty and inconsiderate', representing 'a great and dangerous
innovation', and they should certainly be discussed more thoroughly before being
forced on the country. Lauderdale's motion to appoint a committee to inquire
into the present state of the coinage and the expediency of adopting the system
now proposed was, however, negatived without a division, and by 22 June the
Coinage Bill was on the statute books.58
What had been provided for was the repeal of such aspects of earlier
legislation of Charles II, William III and George III as related either to
prohibitions against minting silver coins of the realm or the proscription that 62s
to the pound was the weight at which such coins should be struck. Gold was to
continue to be accepted by the Mint at the existing rate of 13 17s 10'2d per
ounce and it was to be the sole standard measure of value, legal tender in
payments without reference to limitation Silver was to be coined at 66s to the
pound and to be legal tender only up to payments of 40s (Table 9) Old coin
would be received at face value at the Mint and, in addition, the Treasury might
appoint persons throughout the country to assist in carrying out the business of
exchange A clause in the act also indicated that from a date yet to be set by
Proclamation the Mint would be open to accept silver from the public, who in
return would receive 62s to the pound, a seigniorage being levied of 4s General
access to the coining of silver, however, never became operative because the
necessary Proclamation was never issued (Chapter 7, pp 161-62) 59
8 The Tunes 14. 15. 25 and 28 June 1816; 1 and 9 July 1816
1 56 Geo III cap 68
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After submitting its report on 21 May the Committee on Coin continued to
sit. Two sessions were held in 1817 and three the following year, but its
deliberations were of less moment. A pattern of two or three meetings annually
continued into 1822, after which sessions became more infrequent, until in
February 1836 the committee was finally wound up, almost fifty years after it
was first convened." The problems that had brought it into being had largely
been resolved, and with the advent of an active Mint Board it became
marginalised
' PRO BT 6 128A. pp 323-85
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CHAPTER 4
WILLIAM WELLESLEY POLE
Biographical background
The move from the Tower of London to Tower Hill changed the technology of
coining at the Mint and also something of the ethos of the organisation. The
investment in heavily engineered machinery and imposing new buildings
massively increased capacity, and ministers were intent that, unlike in the Tower,
the coining presses would not be left idle for months at a time. Under this
changed environment and with an extensive recoinage in prospect the Treasury
found in William Wellesley Pole a thoroughly appropriate Master. He was
regarded by colleagues in government as an energetic and sound administrator.
More than anyone else Pole can be credited with the introduction of the new
coins and with shepherding the country through the disruption of a recoinage
and exchange
In her memoirs the society mistress Harriette Wilson wrote that in the next
instalment she would immortalise 'Lord Maryborough, Grand Master of the
Mint, and the Art of Love'. In a cartoon published in February 1817 on the
subject of the recoinage and exchange, the same man was depicted as Matt of
the Mint, one of the unsavoury characters who peopled John Gay s eighteenth-
century play 7he Beggar's Opera, the Mint being the name given to a district in
Southwark that had been notorious for its criminal element.' Such allusions to
Pole as a man of salacious and disreputable ways are, unfortunately for the
colour they would have injected into a brief glance at his career, not the stuff of
T Little, pseud, [J Stockdale], (ed ), Memoirs of Harriette Wilson stritten by herself
(London, 1831). IV, 248-49. lain grateful to Hugh Pagan for draw ing this reference to my
attention Pole was created Baron Mar)borough in 1821. P. E. Lewis (ed.), John Gay: The
Beggar 'A Opera (London, 1976), P. 119 catalogue of Political and Personal Satires
preserved in the apartment of Prints and Drawings in the British Museum (London, 1870-
1954), IX, 733-34. no 12865, cartoon by C Williams
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which his life was made. If applied to William his son, on the other hand, who
acquired the sobriquet Wicked Willy for his dissolute lifestyle, they would have
about them a more plausible air. But the subsequent volume of Harriette
Wilson's memoirs was never published, leaving her readership tantalisingly ill-
informed. As for Pole's life as a villain in Southwark, no evidence has as yet
come to light.
Pole was born on 20 May 1763 at Dangan Castle, Ireland, into an established
gentry family. He had one sister and four brothers. His elder brother Richard,
Lord Wellesley, became Governor General of India, and was one of the foremost
political figures of his time but never quite fulfilled the promise of his early
career. Of his other brothers, Arthur, later Duke of Wellington, in contrast to
Richard went on to achieve more than anyone could have expected; Gerald,
amongst other clerical appointments, served as Bishop of Durham; while Henry,
later Lord Cowley, pursued a successful career as a diplomat. Pole acquired the
surname by which he became generally known in 1778 on his inheriting the
estates of his cousin William Pole of Ballyfinn. He held three seats during his
political career, representing the family borough of Trim in the Irish Parliament
from 1783 to 1790, East Looe in Cornwall under the government interest for the
following five years and from 1801 until he was created Baron Maryborough in
1821 he sat for Queen's County in Ireland. He acquired the additional title of
third Earl of Mornington on the death in 1842 of Lord Wellesley. He did not
show any serious interest in politics until his late thirties when his opposition to
the union with Ireland in 1801 led him to seek re-election to Parliament after a
five-year absence. From acquiring the seat for Queen's County he supported the
government and soon found an official position, his first appointment in 1802
being Clerk of the Ordnance Office. In June 1807 he became Secretary to the
Admiralty and from October 1809 until August 1812 he was Chief Secretary for
Ireland, also holding during his tenure in that office the chancellorship of the
Irish Exchequer. He was appointed Master of the Mint in September 1814 with
a seat in Cabinet, a position he retained until August 1823 when he joined the
household of George IV as Master of the Buckhounds. From 1834 into the
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following year, at the age of seventy-one, he returned to government service
under the ministry of Robert Peel as Postmaster General. He died ten years later
on 22 February 1845.2
Parliamentary and political reputation
Being Master of the Mint, Pole stood at the centre of the recoinage and
exchange. He set demanding standards for those with whom he worked and was
a vigorous official who raised the office of Master above the sinecure-tarnished
reputation it had acquired during the eighteenth century. His standing in the
world of politics was more mixed. Lord Grenville, Prime Minister from 1806 to
1807, said Pole was 'one of the most efficient men that ever filled the station he
held at the Ordnance', and George Canning too had a favourable opinion of him.
Political commentators, and indeed colleagues, could at times, however, be far
from gracious in their assessment of his qualities; the image emerges through
their eyes of a deeply conceited, hot-tempered individual, who had a view of his
own talents that orbited far above any contact with reality.'
Political historians have tended to be rather dismissive of Pole, portraying
him as relevant to the flow of events only by virtue of his family connections and
his moving in the same circles as the major political figures. He is bracketed
with that second rank of ministers in Liverpool's post-Waterloo Cabinet upon
whom the Prime Minister could not readily rely should legislation have been in
need of a stout defender. Lord Bathurst, Frederick Robinson, Charles Bragge-
2 DVB R G Thorne (ed ), thstoiy of Parliament: House of Commons, 1790-1820 (London,
1986), V. 511-15 E Longford, Wellington. The Years of the Sitord (London, 1969), pp. 9-
10, 27 E Longford, If "dlington, Pillar of State (London, 1972), pp. 43-44, 468. See PRO.
Mint 118. p 29, Mint 22 12
3 Craig, The Mint, pp 225-28. Thorne, House of Commons, 1790-1820, V, 512. There is a
reference in J S Batts, British Manuscript Diaries of the 19th Century: An annotated
listing (Fonmell and London, 1976), p. 27, to a diary kept by Pole from 1808 to 1822 and
said to be in the possession of the Duke of Wellington, but the current archivist of the
Duke's papers is not mire of any such diary having survived. A further reference to the
diary is to be found in W Mattlims, British Diaries, An Annotated Bibliography of British
Diane.% itritten betiteen 1442 and 1942 (London, 1950), p. 168.
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Bathurst, Nicholas Vansittart and Lord Sidmouth are amongst those ministers
often included with Pole under the heading of unexceptional. Benjamin Disraeli
deemed the Cabinet ministers who held office in the twenty or so years after
1815 to be a cluster of mediocrities headed by an arch-mediocrity - the arch-
mediocrity being Robinson who was Prime Minister in 1827.4
If The Times' obituary of Pole were to be believed, he should be seen as
someone who bungled his way through Regency politics with an agenda of
priorities that began and ended with the pampering of his own vanity. His
speeches in the House of Commons were judged undignified and ineffectual, his
conduct of official business by no means skilful, his talents in general mediocre,
while his grasp of the principles of government was thought limited. In his
favour, The Times was prepared to concede that at Eton he was a writer of
elegant Latin verses and a sound scholar, recognising in him the qualities of
manliness and zeal, and paying him the slighting compliment of 'not being
deficient in that sort of practical activity which sometimes obtains for men in
high office the reputation of being men of business'. His service as Master of the
Mint was passed over with the comment that the office he held did not require
abilities of the highest description, and waspishly the obituary supposed that the
duties of the undemanding post of Master of the Buckhounds were sufficient to
occupy his entire attention 5 The writer Samuel Johnson once said of journalists
that they were 'without a Wish for Truth or Thought of Decency', and Pole
without doubt suffered at the sharp end of this aphorism.6
A profile written by Thomas Barnes, editor of The Times from 1817 to 1841,
published in Parliamentary Portraits - a collection of character sketches of
leading political figures of the early nineteenth century - embellishes the sense
4 For Disraeli's comment see Robinson's obituary, Annual Regi.ster, 1859, pp. 475-77.
Cookson, Lord Lis crpooLs Administration, pp. 7-8, 284, 308, 333, 384. N. Gash, Lord
Lit crpool Thc Lifc and Political Career of Robert Banks Jenkinson, Second Earl of
iverpool (London, 1984), pp 5, 116, 174. W Hinde, George Canning (Oxford, 1989),
p 305
Thc Tunes, 24 Febniary 1845
6 D Hudson, British JournalLsts and Newspapers (London, 1945), p. 7.
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that Pole was a minor political player with a further series of cutting remarks.
Barnes judged that one of Pole's most noteworthy features was the inquietude of
his temper: 'his tone and manner makes him nearly the most unpleasant speaker
in the House. He is always angry, and his voice being sharp and shrill, and
always raised to its highest pitch, grates on the ear a discord nearly as horrible as
the tuning of five fiddles.' Edward Bootle Wilbraham, who in an attack that
included most of Liverpool's Cabinet expressed similar sentiments, remarking
that Pole rarely spoke in the House of Commons but that when he did he was
always in a passion.' Bootle Wilbraham being an opposition MP and Barnes a
Whig journalist, their opinions might with some justification be regarded as less
than even-handed In his assessment of Castlereagh, however, as an urbane man,
conciliatory in tone, graceful in manners and possessing 'invincible courtesy',
Barnes at least showed that he could be generous in his treatment of Tory
politicians, whatever Barnes' liberal inclinations he was not a belligerent
partisan
Against the jaundiced assessment of Pole in The Times and the somewhat
caricatured sentiments of Barnes should be set other views. The novelist and
Tory NIP Robert Ward had a deep respect for him, commenting once that in a
comparison with Lord Wellesley, Pole stood a thousand times higher. Spencer
Perceval also held him in high regard. In a letter to the statesman Lord Lonsdale
in 1812 on prospective changes to the administration, Perceval wrote that should
Pole give up the Irish secretaryship he would 'justly look to some high official
situation in this country', and he went on to note that such were his claims upon
him 'in consequence of his firm adherence made in recent circumstances, and his
7 Cnticus. pseud • IT Barnes], Parliamentary Portraits, or, Sketches of the Public Character
of some of the most distinguished Speakers of the House of Commons (London, 1815),
pp 32. 118-24 Hudson, British Journalists, pp. 30-32. D. Hudson, Thomas Barnes of The
Tunes (Cambridge. 1943), p. 21; Charles, Lord Colchester (ed.), The Diary and
Corre.spondence of Charles Abbot, Lord Colchester, Speaker of the House of Commons,
1802-1817 (London, 1861), II, 201, Bootle Wilbraham to Lord Colchester, 26 January
1821
8 [Barnes], Parliamentary Portraits, pp. 18-19. Cookson, Lord Liverpool's Administration,
p. 37.
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very considerable abilities, I could not leave Pole to retire without an office'.9
As a speaker in the House of Commons his reputation waxed and waned. While
he came to the defence of his brother's activities in India and intervened in
relation to the business of his own official duties, during the first decade of the
nineteenth century he seldom took part in parliamentary debate. When he did,
the Duke of Richmond, who was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland during Pole's tenure
as Chief Secretary, said that Pole lacked command either of himself or of his
audience On assuming his position in the Mint he took a more active role in the
business of the House He mounted a staunch defence of the Prince Regent in
1816 against whom accusations of profligacy had been made, and even those
with whom he was not close, like Robert Peel, recognised that he could be a
daunting opponent 1(1
Over the course of his career in Parliament Pole did not tend to distinguish
himself as an orator He may have been offering advice behind the scenes, but he
was not overly inclined to run to the aid of fellow ministers when the
government's case was under attack The attributes Pole brought to the office of
Master of the Mint did not include a particular knowledge of economics In the
extended debates of 1811 on the report of the Bullion Committee, the Speaker
of the House of Commons was not troubled by a contribution from him, and
between the coming of peace with France and 1819 he only briefly involved
himself in any meaningful way in debates on the question of the resumption of
cash payments Being essentially responsible for the running of a
manufacturing establishment, the nature of his duties as Master by no means
made such an involvement a prerequisite Although the Coinage Bill of 1816 did
not require a great deal of defending, for Pole this was fortunate given his self-
confessed shaky grasp of the intricacies of monetary theory In a debate in the
E Phipps tf u Ir y of the Political and Literary Life of Robert Plummer If ard F.sq
(London. 1850 . I, 424 S Walpole, The Life of the Right lion S. Perceval (London,
1874) pp 261.-71
Thorne, ii u rf Common 1790-1820, V 512, 515 N Ga It, Afr .Secretary Peel 7he
Lift. of Sir R h rt 1 ecl to 1830 (London 1961), p 285 Parliamentary Debatcs 1st ser
XXXIII cols 5 )3-10 21 March 1816)
Parliament irv Debates 1st scr,  XL, cols 714-724 (24 May 1819)
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Commons three years later he declared that he had endeavoured to make himself
master of the subject of currency reform by reading carefully all the pamphlets
that professed to discuss the question, concluding that he should speak with
great diffidence on this issue, only seeing, as he did, a great difference of opinion
rather than the clarity of a single answer. He was not allowed to get away with
such a naively honest expression of his ignorance. The opposition may have had
little cohesion but there were among its ranks men as such Henry Brougham and
George Tierney whose debating skills outshone those of most on the government
front bench. On this occasion Tierney criticised Pole for not addressing himself
properly to the question that had been raised and for answering a matter of some
concern to Parliament in such a lame and unengaged fashion. The brief debate
descended into a petty squabble, but laying himself open to such an attack is
indicative of Pole's at times unconvincing performances in the Commons.12
From the Mint's point of view, and as far as the recoinage was concerned, to
have a Master who was not deeply embroiled in the business of government was
an advantage Lord Bathurst in 1809 combined his control of the Mint with
being President of the Board of Trade and Foreign Secretary, while Lord
Clancarty for a time during his mastership between 1812 and 1814 also served as
head of the Board of Trade as well as being Ambassador to The Hague.° The
criticism that can be levelled against many of his predecessors and several of
those who followed him of devoting too little time to the affairs of the Mint,
does not apply to Pole
The completion of the recoinage may also have been assisted by his having a
nervous temper He reacted angrily to set-backs, prompting him constantly to
urge greater effort from his colleagues to ensure that the timetable for striking
the new coins would not slip (Chapter 5, p. 107). If not always a commanding
presence in the Commons he did have other qualities that set him apart from
12 Parhamentary abates, 1st ser., XXXIX, cols 149-56 (29 January 1819).
11 Craig. The Ahnt. pp 226, 258, 300-01.
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some other ministers and to which Perceval was doubtless alluding. The
assessment of Richmond, balancing Pole's weaknesses and strengths, is apposite:
Pole's unpopularity is against us. His manner is not conciliatory
and even our best friends are often out of humour with him. You
know before his appointment I feared his warmth might do harm.
I really have a great regard for him and should be sorry to do
anything to prejudice you or anybody else against him, but it is
impossible to conceal his extreme unpopularity. He is a most
excellent man of business but wants some of the qualifications to
be a perfect chief secretary. 14
A reforming Tory nimi.ster
During Pole's time at the Mint, the impression is that he represented a force for
change Within a year of assuming control he submitted proposals for alterations
to the Mint establishment that struck at the deputy system, ensured higher
salaries for those officers whose jobs were judged to have been hitherto ill-
rewarded and redefined the responsibilities of several posts. In addition, two
years later he presided over the most significant change in a century to have
effected the silver coinage But to what extent should he be given credit for
these reforms'?
 Was he administering policy formulated elsewhere or was he
responsible for the ideas on which changes were based?
There are indications in his career before coming to the Mint of his seeking
to alter existing systems Reflecting on the impact he made at the Admiralty
Robert Ward was convinced that Pole had 'done more for the Board in three
weeks than ten years had done before'. While he may have been spirited in his
conduct of affairs there is also evidence that he allowed practices to continue
14 HMC Report on the Manuscripts of Earl Bathurst preserved at Cirencester Park, (London,
1923), p. 155 The term warmth was here referring to Pole's temper
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that his successor to that office, John Wilson Croker, on discovering them,
regarded as a point of principle upon which to resign. Within two weeks of
assuming the secretaryship, Croker established a reputation for integrity by
refusing to sign the monthly requisition for cash that came from the Paymaster of
the Marines, at that time George Villiers, without evidence of how previous
advances had been used. Further enquiry relieved him of the need to stand down
when the discovery was made that serious deficiencies did indeed exist in the
Paymaster's accounts which, as Croker pointed out some years later, had been
allowed to pass unnoticed by his two predecessors. Villiers was not so
fortunate, being forced to relinquish his position in January 1810.' 5
 Pole had
therefore been willing to live with the status quo of other departments without
necessarily questioning too deeply long-established practices, and indeed by
conducting himself in this way he was behaving in an entirely acceptable manner.
The idea of Tory ministers under Liverpool's administration introducing radical
changes within departments of state was very much the exception rather than the
rule 16
As he settled into his responsibilities as Master there was within the Mint a
more commanding presence directing affairs. Pole's name was more visible than
was that of his immediate predecessor, Lord Clancarty, in the daily management
of business, in the writing of letters, in the closer supervision of colleagues and,
with the impression he gives of being more demanding of those around him,
there was an air of a department instilled with a greater sense of purpose."
Although Pole's contribution was almost certainly decisive in the
introduction of reforms to the Mint establishment in 1815, the inspiration behind
15 B Pool (cd ), Thc. Croker Papers, 1808-1857, New and abridged edition, (London, 1967),
pp 3. 14-15 Thorne. House of Commons, 1790-1820, III, 535; V, 453, 513.
16 For details of the difficulties Pole encountered as Chief Secretary to Ireland see
W E Vaughan (ed )„4 A rels History of Ireland. Volume V Ireland Under the Union, 1801-
70 (Oxford. 1989), II, 43, 45-48, W. Wellesley Pole, Substance of the Speech of the Rt.
Hon William Wellesley Pole in the House on the 8th March 1811 upon a motion of the Rt.
Hon George Ponsonby relative to the conduct of the Irish Government (London, 1811);
and Phipps, Robert Plummer Ward, I, 394, 403.
17 PRO Mint 1 18, pas.% MI
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the changes originally came from Sir Joseph Banks. In a paper that he prepared
in 1812 and presented to Clancarty, Banks put forward proposals for altering the
administrative structure and some of the rates of pay within the Mint. No
immediate action was taken but having familiarised himself with the organisation,
Pole evidently concurred in the plan, and not only in the character of what had
been proposed but also the detail. Banks appears as a kind of guiding spirit in
Pole's mastership. The coincidence of views between Banks' sentiments in 1812
and stances later adopted by Pole both in respect of the principles underlying
coinage design as well as in the general operations of the Mint, is too strong for
the Master not to have been influenced by the President of the Royal Society.
The donation to the Mint through Banks of an important collection of coins,
medals and books in 1818 was not a one-off act of generosity, but rather the
culmination of years of mutual respect."
The attack on the deputy system, as part of the reforms of 1815, although
important in that it happened at all, was also less a product of Banks' or even
Pole's originality than of a movement to abolish sinecures that had been rumbling
away within official circles since the 1780s. The proposals, though, seem to
have been a little more forthright in this regard than the Act which gave them
legal force. The Comptroller, John Tekell, remained in place along with a
deputy into the 1840s, while Pole's intention had been that Tekell attend to his
duties personally, thereby relieving the establishment of the need for a deputy.
Although on the recommendation of a Select Committee of Finance many
sinecures were abolished in 1817, pensions were granted in lieu of those
sinecures which in effect is what the retention of the post of Comptroller for
John Tekell represented. 19 Despite what might have been seen as positive action,
a cartoon by William Elmes probably published in 1816, accused Pole together
with Liverpool, Vansittart, Viscount Melville and others of being 'State
18 DTC XVIII, 199-225, paper by Sir Joseph Banks on reform of the Mint. PRO. Mint 1/54,
pp. 9-47, 48-77; Mint 1/18, p. 153-62. Dyer and Gaspar, 'Tower Hill', NHRil I, pp. 473,
479-80.
19 A. S. Foord, 'The Waning of the Influence of the Crown', EHR, 62 (1948), 499-500.
J. Wade (ed.), The Extraordinary Black Book etc. Lists of pluralists, placenzen, pensioners
and sinecurists (London, 1831), p. 402.
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Cormorants' swallowing annually 'an aggregate sum: under the name of salaries,
independent of indefinible emoluments which result from other sources of
gain...'. The 1815 reforms, confirmed by a new indenture of 16 August, were
more of a realignment within the Mint than a revolution; the basic structure of
how the department operated remained intact for a further twenty years.
Although Pole's activity in this regard might nevertheless be felt to conform to
the description of him as a good man of business, his energies are worthy of
more than a double-edged compliment. He was here setting about reordering a
branch of government that had throughout the eighteenth century been one of
the bastions of sinecurism. Two of his political colleagues, Clancarty and
Bathurst, although in a position as former Masters to have effected change, had
not addressed as he did some of the more antiquated arrangements that had been
handed down as good administrative practice.2°
When Pole took to the floor of the Commons on 30 May 1816 to introduce
the Coinage Bill, he did so not as its author - the credit for that lies largely with
the first Earl of Liverpool - but as an administrator seeing a piece of legislation
onto the statute book. His abilities in this direction were never much in doubt,
the questions rather surrounded his judgement as a politician and reputation as a
parliamentarian. The task with which Pole was charged of introducing a new
coinage may not have required the dexterity of a diplomat but its successful
completion did require the asperity of an energetic and determined man, and in
these qualities he was not deficient.
Looking at his time at the Mint, the restoration of the gold and silver
coinages stands out as his major and lasting contribution. Although of an
administrative nature, the expectation might not have been misplaced that this
very real achievement would have prompted a more sympathetic treatment by
The Times - even of a Tory politician by a Whig newspaper. Moreover, he was a
20 Catalogue of Political and Personal Satires, IX, 679-80, no. 12781. Dyer and Gaspar,
'Tower Hill', NHRIvI, pp. 472-77. PRO. Mint 1/18, pp. 153-62, 332. Report from the
Select Committee on the Royal Mint, Parliamentary Papers, 1837 (465), Appendix No. 1,
pp. 1-11.
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minister who shuffled between the second rank of appointments, never holding
any of the major offices of state. He was at no point, therefore, charged with the
responsibility of taking momentous decisions, which makes The Times' attack on
him, peppered as it is with faint praise and knowing jibes, seem somewhat
gratuitous. 21 With the exception of Frederick Robinson, who was roundly taken
apart as weak and indecisive, contemporary assessments of his parliamentary
colleagues, while pointing out their suspect debating talents, or their meagre
political skills, were by no means as harsh. 22 His arrogant manner and fiery
temper probably made him too many enemies down the years but whatever the
reason, he was certainly singled out for special treatment. There is in Pole the
hard-working, artistically sensitive man who was concerned above and beyond
the strict demands of his duties to restore the British currency to a condition of
being not merely functionally acceptable but beautiful as well. Then there is the
pompous, self-serving character who operated on a fuse too short to sustain the
unqualified respect of many of those with whom he worked.
21 For Pole's dismissal from the Cabinet and as Master of the Mint see F. Bamford and the
Duke of Wellington (eds), The Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot, 1820-1832 (London, 1950), I,
205. 208-10, 253-55, L Strachey and R. Fulford (eds), The Greville Memoirs, 1814-1860
(London. 1938). I. 149; J. Bagot, George Canning and his Friends etc (London, 1909), II,
192-94, Aspinall, The Letters of George II, III, 38-39, George IV to Lord Li\ erpool, 6
NON ember 1823, and Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, Memoirs of the Court of George
II', 1820-1830 (London, 1859), I, 488-89, II, 7.
22 For the obituar) notice of Lord Bathurst see Annual Register. 1834, p 233, for Nicholas
Vansittart see Annual Reg/Ater, 1851, pp. 261-62; for Lord Sidinouth see Annual Register.
1844. pp 208-11
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CHAPTER 5
THE RECOINAGE
Popular reaction to the recoinage
From June 1816 the theory of currency reform gave way to the practical
concerns of striking and planning the exchange of the coins. But the most
immediately controversial aspect of the recoinage for Pole and his colleagues
surrounded what was to be done with the existing currency. If Parliament had
been fairly docile in its response to the Coinage Bill, out in the country, amidst
the serious economic slump of 1816 and the troubled atmosphere this fostered,
news of the recoinage was received with more emotion. Anxieties were
inevitably raised by the announcement, and initially ministers did not help their
cause. Statements were made with regard to the condition of old coins that
were to be accepted in exchange for the new that had an eye more on economy
within the public service than on a generous or sympathetic treatment of holders
of the worn currency.
Speaking to the Committee on Ways and Means on 27 May, the day before
the Coinage Bill received its first reading, Vansittart said that the Mint was
planning to accept old coins only if they bore some legitimate impression and,
he continued, given that this would not include a very large prop( rtion of the
present currency, no great expense was anticipated. The appalling condition of
the coinage meant that the chances of coming across a regal silver coin bearing
any kind of impression were slim. Reports of what was proposed accordingly
caused alarm in the press and were considered as 'a gross and crying injustice'.
An editorial in The Times later in the year mentioned that 'it has been justly
observed, that the plain shillings are to those which bear a distinguishable
impression in the proportion of nearly 30 to 1'. A concerned inhabitant of
Neath explained in a letter to the Mint that 'the lower Order of people cannot
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get goods unless there is a dye on each Shilling which of course is Impossible to
find' .1
Government had added a measure of tension to a country already enduring
economic hardship and bouts of popular unrest. Pole himself was evidently
conscious of the unhappy mood of the country in the summer of 1816 when he
described how 'the citizens have lost all their feelings of pride and richness and
flourishing fatness, trade is gone, contracts are gone, paper credit is gone, and
there is nothing but stoppage, retrenchments and bankruptcy'. Pole's interest in
the stars remains to be confirmed, but if he had been an enthusiast he would
have discovered that they were also presaging ill omens: according to the
calculations of an astronomer from Bologna, who had observed spots on the
sun, a great solar catastrophe on 18 July 1816 was to put an end to the world by
conflagration. He was arrested.2
A more considerate government approach towards the existing currency
emerged in the months following the initial announcement, and even from the
first discussion of the Coinage Bill in Parliament such intimations were
apparent. In explaining as he did in May the guidelines on the old silver,
Vansittart had done nothing more than express the official position as presented
by the Prime Minister in Parliament, if handled by Liverpool with a little more
political sensitivity. Pole, by contrast, gave in the House of Commons a much
more liberal slant to the policy, explaining that the plan was to accept all coins
of the realm however reduced they might be in weight, but with the proviso that
'it could not be expected that base or foreign coin could be received in exchange
for the new coin'.3
The straitened nature of the times may have imbued in people a meagre
amount of trust in the word of ministers, and the situation was not helped by the
exposition of the policy at Westminster being less than consistent. The
I Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XXXIV, cols 827-28 (27 May 1816). The Times, 29 May
1816; 23 September 1816. PRO. Mint 11170,T. Morgan to Pole, 24 June 1816.
2 Bagot, George Canning and his Friends, II, 33-32. The Times, 20 June 1816.
3 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XXXIV, cols 916-17,960-61 (30 May 1816).
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response to reports of what was intended led, in more than one city, to the issue
of notices by bankers and shopkeepers to the effect that they would receive no
shillings and sixpences in future. By the second week in June the Mint had
begun to receive letters complaining of the restriction retailers were placing on
the circulation of old silver and the pressures this was exerting on trade. In
many instances worn coins were submitted to the Mint for examination in the
hope of obtaining reassurance that such specimens of the circulation would be
accepted when the new silver was released. The response, however, did not
always offer solace. Out of the twenty shillings belonging to John Cockell of
Chippenham, twelve were judged counterfeit after examination at the Mint, and
while the shillings submitted by George Weedon of Bath were given a clean bill
of health, the sixpence he sent was found to be a foreign coin and therefore
unacceptable. John Radley of Bath mentioned in a letter, passed on to the Mint
for reply, the report he had heard that of the coins sent to Tower Hill not more
than one third had been found acceptable. Being precise about the proportion
considered dubious following examination is not actually possible because
figures were not always recorded. Nevertheless, on the basis of the quantities
that are specified, in the region of half were identified during the last six months
of 1816 as either foreign or counterfeit. 4 In view of the relatively small
numbers involved there would be little value in extrapolating from this any
statistical significance.
Uncertainty fed the rumours of the supposed harsh line over the position of
the old silver; retailers and the general public alike were wary for fear they
would be left with a stock of unexchangeable coin on their hands. A passage in
The Gentleman's Magazine from the second half of 1816 suggested that
tensions over the refusal of the old currency stemmed from certain ill-disposed
people having spread reports that on the appearance of the new silver coin none
of the current sixpences would be accepted in the exchange. 5 For many years a
live and let live attitude had prevailed towards the questionable authenticity and
obviously deficient weight of the silver circulation. Once the foundation of
4 PRO. Mint 11170, J. Cockell to Pole, 2 July 1816; G. Weedon to Pole, 22 June 1816;
J. Radley to R. H. Davis, 19 June 1816; and passim.
5 The Gentleman's Magazine, Supplement to LXXXVI, pt 11 (1816), 620,
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trust upon which this ad hoc token coinage system was based came into
question, chaos of uncertainty threatened. Reports coming out of Bristol in June
revealed that the Post Office there had refused to take plain shillings and
sixpences, and W. Ringer, a tradesman acting as Overseer and Guardian of the
poor of St Nicholas Parish in Bristol, confirmed the sense of anxiety when he
wrote to the Mint of the public apprehension, particularly amongst the poorer
classes, at the restrictions on passing the old silver coin.6
At an early stage in response to these reports official notices were
circulated. Following complaints from shopkeepers in Dumfries regarding
receipt of the old currency and the convening of a public meeting on the subject,
a letter was written to Vansittart which elicited on 15 June something of a volte-
face from the Chancellor. His line was now that because large numbers of the
plain shillings and sixpences appeared to be of the established fineness, they
would not be refused when presented for exchange. On 21 June, the day after
disquiet in Liverpool arose as a result of thirty or forty tradesmen asserting that
they would take 'no silver coinage except Bank Tokens and the genuine coin of
the Mint', an announcement from the Home Secretary was published in the
press that was to be sent to mayors throughout the country.
I am directed by Lord Sidmouth to inform you, that his Lordship
is aware that considerable inconvenience has arisen, in many
parts of the country, from an apprehension that the defaced silver
coin now in circulation will not be taken in exchange for new
coinage, now preparing: he therefore directs me to apprize you,
that the defaced coin of the realm will be taken in exchange for
the new coinage, as soon as the latter is completed.7
Throughout the second half of 1816 the Mint received dozens of letters
reflecting the loss of confidence in the circulation of the old silver, to which the
usual response included the promise very much in the same vein as Lord
6 PRO. Mint 11170, T. Fuidge to Pole, 14 June 1816; W. Ringer to Pole, 14 and 16 June 1816.
7 The Times, 20 and 21 June 1816. Ruding, Annals of the Coinage,I1, 115.
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Sidmouth's. Official reassurances doubtless had their effect, but by September
the prospect of considerable disturbance, warnings of which had been heard
from Chester and Lichfield, took on a more threatening aspect. 8
 Mid to late
September was harvest time, one of the peak periods of demand for coins during
the year and therefore one particularly fraught for those who had to deal in a
currency in which trust was ebbing. Differences in the seasonal demand may
help explain why in the autumn tempers became especially frayed, rather than
four months earlier when details of the reforms were first announced.
The refusal during September of several tradesmen in Hull to receive
shillings at their nominal value resulted in a considerable crowd of people
gathering in protest. Tensions grew during the day, leading in the evening to a
violent attack by an angry mob, said to have consisted chiefly of women and
children armed with stones and brickbats, on the house of a grocer, J. Todd &
Co; although its role in the incident is not detailed in the newspaper report, the
firm was presumably one of those which had looked askance at the worn coin.9
Sunderland suffered a serious disturbance in very similar circumstances. As
in Hull, the Riot Act was read and troops were called out to calm the populace,
but not before the large assemblage of rioters had nearly demolished the
windows of several shops and looted all the stock from the premises of Mr
Middlebrook. On 21 September London also experienced a short-lived crisis of
confidence in the old currency - albeit with less violent consequences - from the
refusal at Billingsgate Market of shillings and sixpences. On the same day the
Police Office in Queen Square, Westminster, was thronged with tradesmen
enquiring of the Magistrates how they must proceed in the wake of uncertainty
in the coinage. A report in The Times identified one person who said that he
had taken £50 in plain silver that morning but could get no other tradesman to
take any of it from him in business. Notices issued from the Magistrates' office
at Queen Square and by the Lord Mayor, Francis Hobler, declaring that the
Bank of England would not refuse any shillings or sixpences on account of their
8 The Times, 3 and 6 June 1816. PRO. Mint 11/70, J. James to Pole, 14 September 1816;
T. Lister to Lord Sidmouth, 3 September 1816.
9 The Times, 20 September 1816.
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being plain, provided they were English, offered the necessary expression of
official confidence. Crowds thereafter assembled at the Bank with the peaceful
intent of exchanging their old coin for Bank of England notes and tokens. The
Bank itself issued a notice which practically speaking determined the beginning
of the exchange period for the old silver several months ahead of the official
two-week period: 'all shillings and sixpences of the Coin of the Realm, whether
Plain or Not, will continue to be exchanged at the Bank of England as
heretofore, till the issue of the new Silver Coinage, which will not take place
before the month of February next'. The unease in London soon subsided but
not before alarm and disruption of trade had for a time been felt throughout the
City .1°
In October Sir Joseph Banks was sanguine about the situation. He believed
that the difficulties experienced with the circulation of sixpences were being
mitigated by the copper coinage. But as the exchange approached, further crises
of confidence swept through several areas. In December a magistrate from
Anglesey claimed that officers of the Customs had begun to refuse plain
shillings and that retailers had therefore followed suit, while by the third week
of January Henley, Reading, Nettlebed and Marlow were reported to be in a
state of considerable confusion because of shopkeepers' distrust of the old
money. The Courier on 22 January under the heading 'On the Obstruction to
the Circulation of Silver' ran the following verse:
What wonderful change we see in our day,
How varied and inconsistent our woe;
Hard times, we complain, will not let our cash stay,
While we grumble and growl that we can't make it go!ll
Not as threatening as the activities of the frame-breakers in Nottingham nor
the inflammatory resolutions of radicals like Henry Hunt that were being
10 The Times, 23 and 27 September 1816. Ruding, Annals of the Coinage, II, 117.
11 Museum of the History of Science, Oxford, Gunther MS 14-17, Banks to Davies Gilbert, 16
October 1816. PRO. Mint 11170, J. H. Hampton to the Mint, 23 December 1816; G. Norton
to the Mint, 16 January 1817. The Courier, 22 January 1817.
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published and aired at public meetings across the country directed towards
reform of Parliament, the disturbances connected with the currency, especially
during the autumn of 1816, nevertheless form part of the picture of social
unrest. The recession in trade after the end of the war with France brought with
it protests against unemployment, made worse by the discharge of a third of a
million men from the armed forces. But as well as being economically based,
the dissent also had political aspirations that sometimes denied the ending of the
war any influence over economic matters. At a meeting in Palace Yard on 11
September, the promoter of parliamentary reform, the Rev. Mr Parkes, said:
The present unexampled and increasing sufferings in agriculture,
manufacture and commerce, are not an effect of a sudden
transition from war to peace, but of an underlying progressive
transition from the constitutional liberty of Englishmen, to the
abhorrent despotism of an usurping borough faction, with its
taxation without representation, and its septennial power.12
There was a degree of collective action against government's recoinage policy,
but the riotous behaviour never generated momentum enough to develop into an
organised network of opposition. Although impacting on commercial as well as
the 'labouring' interests, what was noticeably lacking in these outbursts, and
what helps define their scope, was any sustained petitioning of the newspapers
and Parliament such as happened during the successful challenge to Vansittart's
property tax proposals earlier in 1816.
From the Chancellor's uncompromising parsimony, the official line
softened when confronted by the realities of the circulation. By January 1817
James Morrison, formulated an interpretation that went so far as to embrace a
general perception of authenticity as being acceptable when, in response to
enquiries, he wrote that plain or not, all sixpences and shillings 'that have been
generally considered as coin of the Realm' will be received for the new coin.
Although the target figure of striking £2.5 million of new silver coin was not
12 Gash, Lord Liverpool, p. 128. The Times, 12 September 1816.
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adjusted in light of the more open-minded official attitude, the original estimate
that very little would be legitimately received necessarily shifted towards
embracing a much larger proportion of the existing coin.13
New silver coins for Ireland
Reform of the currency was needed in 1816 and this was no less the case in
Ireland where the deficiencies of the silver circulation had for many years been
widely reported. In the House of Commons on 2 March 1804 John Foster, MP
for County Louth and last Speaker of the Irish Parliament, determined to bring
the condition of the currency of Ireland to the attention of a committee of
enquiry. 'There was scarcely any thing in the shape of money to be seen', he
lamented, tut a miserable coinage of adulterated copper, and of counterfeit
shillings, so bad, that for a pound Bank note, even at its depreciated value, 26 or
27 of such shillings would be given in exchange." 4
 Foster got his committee of
enquiry but the problems remained. Twelve years later there was still doubt
over whether the strains under which the Irish currency laboured would be
addressed.
Immediately prior to embarking upon the recoinage a new assessment of the
quantity of silver coin still active in Britain and Ireland was not commissioned,
the figures that were employed to assess the size of what was thought
immediately necessary being based on subjecting available estimates to the
judgement of ministers. In his Treatise Liverpool believed that £1 million
would be required as a first step in renewing the coinage of Ireland. Consistent
with its approach to other estimates proposed by Liverpool, the Committee on
Coin decided on a smaller figure, £500,000, and recommended that this quantity
be supplied out of the stockpile of new coins. This was in line with the range of
between £400,000 and £500,000 that Jeremiah D'Olier, a Director of the Bank
of Ireland, judged in 1804 would be necessary to restore the silver circulation.
13 The Times, 3 and 28 December 1816. PRO. Mint 11171, Morrison to J. Mountford, 15
January 1817.
14 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., I, col. 652 (2 March 1804).
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With its Dublin, east coast and midlands bias, the Bank of Ireland was probably
presenting a limited impression of the whole country; as with views on the
extent of the silver coinage circulating in Britain as a whole, such a sum did not
necessarily bear a close relation to what was required.15
The Coinage Bill omitted the recommendation of the Committee on Coin in
relation to assigning a proportion of the new currency for Ireland. The
exclusion was justified on the grounds that since the Bank of Ireland tokens had
been made legal tender in the payment of all taxes and duties up to the repeal of
the Bank Restriction Act, at which point they were to be exchanged for coin of
the realm, there was no need to make any provision for a separate distribution of
the new silver. In 1816 the dollars and tokens of the Bank of England did not
share this added legitimacy (Chapter 3, pp. 54-55). 16 The Committee on Coin
through its recommendation of £500,000, however, had drawn attention to a
deficiency, and so the issue arises of whether the government was ill-judged in
excluding Ireland from the provisions of the recoinage or whether there was in
fact good reason to believe that the silver circulation was adequately served by
bank tokens.
Although the condition of the British and Irish currencies was not hugely
dissimilar, in Ireland the situation was somewhat more parlous. Aside from the
irregular issues of siege pieces during the Civil War of the mid seventeenth
century, no Irish silver had been minted since the reign of James I. The absence
of a designated silver currency prompted the circulation of British coin, but
rather than passing at the same face value, in Ireland these coins were accepted
at the enhanced rate of 13d. One assessment suggested that during the first
decade of the nineteenth century the lack of anything like a sufficient quantity
of coin had resulted in the best silver coins in Ireland having suffered a 57 per
cent loss of weight.17
15 Liverpo 1, Coins of the Realm, pp. 185,204. Report of the Committee on Coin, 1816, F. G.
Hall, The Bank of Ireland, 1783-1946 (Dublin, 1949), p. 91.
16 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XXXIV, cols 959,963 (30 May 1816).
17 Ruding, Annals of the Coinage, II, 102,104. A. Dowle and P. Finn, The Guide Book to the
Coinage of Ireland from 995AD to the present day (London, 1969), pp. 52 99. letter, 7 hi'
Irish Pound, pp. 10,17.
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The distinct legal position of the Irish tokens was a corollary of the
especially appalling condition of its currency. Although the state of the silver
coinage in Britain made the circulation of counterfeit pieces alongside genuine
coins something of an inevitability, in Ireland the situation had been taken a
stage further towards the legal recognition of counterfeits by the practice of
government offices accepting them and paymasters in the army knowingly
using them to pay troops. The currency committee of 1804 was even reluctant
to refer to a silver coinage circulating in Ireland at this time, preferring instead
to talk in terms of 'the base metal and notes and I.O.U.'s substituted in its
place'. To have promoted the official acceptance of tokens in Ireland, in the
context both of a more corrupted circulating medium and a history of a more
liberal official attitude towards adulterated pieces, was not all that unexpected.
Allowing the tokens to be accepted in payment of taxes and duties will have
enabled them to become an integral part of the money supply and this may have
coloured ministers' thinking on deferring the introduction of the new silver.18
Excluding the countermarked dollars issued by the Bank of England in 1797
and 1804, the vast majority of which did not remain long in circulation, between
1804 and July 1816 production of Bank of England dollar-standard currency
amounted to £4,604,456 - more than double the estimated size of the official
silver coinage of Britain. Between 1805 and 1816, £1,340,000 was produced of
the Bank of Ireland tokens of 5d, 10d and 30d; issues of the Irish dollar of 1804
amounted to £237,468, giving an overall total of £1,577,468. Taking D'Olier's
admittedly low estimate of the size of the Irish silver circulation of £500,000,
over three times more in tokens was therefore struck. 19 To this might be added
the 600,000 unstamped dollars that the Bank of Ireland put into circulation in
1804 before production of any of the other token money. Far more dollar-
standard money was released in both Ireland and Britain than was thought to be
circulating of the official silver currency, but Ireland seems to have been
relatively better served.
18 Fetter, The Irish Pound, pp. 18, 85. Kelly, Spanish Dollars, p. 64.
19 Kelly, Spanish Dollars, pp. 33-34, 59, 119-20. Dyer and Gaspar, 'Tower Hill', NHRM,
pp. 454, 472. Doty, The Soho Mint, pp. 327-28.
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Attitudes differed as to whether the amount of tokens met the needs of
circulation. In response to Henry Parnell's motion for the assimilation of the
British and Irish currencies in April 1809, John Foster judged that the quantity
of currency in Ireland was sufficient to answer all domestic purposes. Henry
Parnell's silence on the subject might be considered as supporting Foster; in
seeking to unify the currencies, drawing attention to the existence of any
inadequacies should have been a legitimate concern. By contrast, in December
1812 William Vesey Fitzgerald, the Chancellor of the Irish Exchequer, wrote to
Robert Peel, then Secretary for Ireland, about the need for additional numbers of
tokens to supply the demands of bankers and merchants. The supply of tokens
may not always have been ideal but their presence certainly helped and if
thought more accommodating than those of the Bank of England, less urgency
might legitimately have attached to an immediate release of new silver in
Ireland 20
Adequately to provide for Ireland on the same basis as Britain with a
network of exchange stations and very probably a larger stockpile of new coin
would have delayed the completion of the recoinage by several months. The
inconvenience and additional expense may have presented a problem but there
was no obvious legal impediment to issuing the new coins in Ireland. By the
Proclamations of 12 February and 1 March 1817 the new silver was made
current in Great Britain and Ireland. Although the assimilation of the British
and Irish currencies did not take place until 5 January 1826, the question to be
resolved by that time was merely one of abolishing the higher rate at which
British coins had circulated in Ireland and enforcing the standard rate.21
In the debates in Parliament over the Coinage Bill during May and June
1816, the claims for renewing the silver coinage of Ireland were not pressed; the
government's intentions were neither referred to again nor challenged. The
20 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XIV, cols 75-77, 85-86, 90-91 (18 April 1809). The
reference to 600,000 unstamped dollars is taken from unpublished notes on the Irish tokens
compiled by Colm Gallagher, as are the comments of William Vesey Fitzgerald: BL.
Additional MS 40202, fol. 715, December 1812.
21 6 Geo. IV. cap. 79.
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currency pamphleteer Thomas Smith was one of the few voices of support in
1816 for extending the measures of the Coinage Bill throughout the United
Kingdom. In September of that year the Prime Minister raised with ministerial
colleagues the question of the effect the recoinage and exchange might have in
Ireland and the regulations that might be necessary with respect to its debased
currency. Nothing more, however, was heard of his enquiry. Between 1814
and 1826 the monetary situation in Ireland was hardly ever raised in Parliament,
as was instanced by the debates on the resumption of cash payments in 1819,
during which little separate consideration was given to conditions there. The
first report of the House of Commons committee appointed to investigate the
Bank and resumption drew from Henry Parnell the comment that 'it would
almost appear that the committee on Bank affairs had wholly forgotten those of
the Bank of Ireland, since no mention was made of them by any member of the
committee'. His resolution ten years earlier to assimilate the currency of
Ireland with that of Britain received no significant support, and although the
merits of what he had to say on the subject in 1819 were not denied, action was
again deferred. The eventual passage of assimilation onto the statute books in
1826 was marked in the House of Commons by the most perfunctory of
debates 22
The release of Irish dollars and tokens from 1804 did much to dampen the
more extreme abuses the currency suffered towards the end of the nineteenth
century. The extent of these issues and the added time and expense of fully
involving Ireland in the recoinage and exchange probably helped cool official
backing for the Committee on Coin's original recommendation. But more than
this, the exclusion of Ireland had about it the symptoms of a selective amnesia
v.hich afflicted Westminster politicians on the subject of Irish currency matters.
The unsp ken assumption might have been that, as with the old silver, the new
coins would in the normal course of trade find their way across the Irish Sea.
22 Parliamentary Debate , 1st scr., XIV, col 91(18 April 1809); XXXIX, col. 1424 (6 April
1819 ; XL, col 1194 (16 June 1819); 2nd ser., XIII, col. 576 (12 May 1826). I ettcr, The
In h P und pp 55-61 Smith, A Letter to Liverpool on the Proposed New Cotnage, p,11.
PRO. NI nt 1 54 Liverpo It Van mart, 25 September 1816, pp 375 76. I or Parnell see
DAB
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Government policy conveys the impression, then, of an absence of interest as
opposed to the absence of any problem. The irony of this episode is that the
removal of the Bank of Ireland tokens from circulation in July 1825 was
justified on the grounds that the recent issues of the new silver coins meant they
were no longer necessary.23
Assistance from the Soho Mint
Even without having to worry about Ireland, the recoinage was a major
undertaking and one that represented the beginning of a new era for the British
coinage. On 8 June 1816 James Lawson, Superintendent of Machinery at the
Mint, in a letter to Matthew Robinson Boulton, son and heir to Matthew
Boulton's industrial businesses at Soho, Birmingham, wrote that 'as you will
see from the newspapers we are now going to be busy'. News of the recoinage
did indeed have a dramatic impact on the atmosphere within the Mint. In a note
to the Treasury, officials were informed on 11 May that no coinage was then
carrying on, except for a small quantity of silver tokens for use in the colonies
of Essequibo and Demerary, of which the total struck amounted to £8,000. The
end of May was such a quiet time that the Mint Board did not meet because
there was little or no business to discuss. From this somnolence the
organisation was thrown into the mild panic of the beginning of June when Pole
and Morrison were arranging for rebuilding work to be carried out by the Office
of Works, worrying about potential staffing problems and placing orders with
Matthew Robinson Boulton for the supply of additional coining presses and a
raft of other pieces of machinery and equipment.24
The first order identified as specifically relating to the recoinage was dated 7
June; in the following eighteen months, over two dozen further orders were
23 6 Geo. IV. cap. 98. I am grateful to Co1m Gallagher for his advice on the nature of the Irish
currency during the first two decades of the nineteenth century and for his guidance on the
likely size of the silver circulation.
24 PRO. Mint 118, pp. 340, 358. MBP. 413, J. Lawson to M. R. Boulton, 8 June 1816.
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addressed to Birmingham, the total cost amounting to £2,039 1s 1d. 25 Good
business though this was for Boulton, there was an element of altruism in his
approach to the needs of the Tower Hill mint, or rather, a sense of being willing
to assist in what was an undertaking for the benefit of the nation. The Mint
having placed an order with Boulton for two new coining presses, as a
safeguard against failure, the offer was made from Birmingham that in the event
of an emergency one of the Soho presses could be sent down to London - a
handsome gesture that halved the Mint order.26 Boulton was also willing to
assist the Mint in the preparation of coinage tools by freely placing at its
disposal his reducing machine at Soho. Operating as a three-dimensional
pantograph, a reducing machine traces the details of a relief image and
translates them to a cutter which reproduces the design in the form of a steel
punch at coin size. Towards the end of December 1816, Benedetto Pistrucci,
the Italian artist who had been appointed to the Engraving Department of the
Mint some months earlier, accompanied by Lawson, spent several days in
Birmingham supervising the production of a tool from one of the artist's
models.27
Being uncooperative was not in Boulton's interests, but in placing orders
with Soho during 1816 the Mint nevertheless encountered little of the frostiness
that had grown up between the two establishments over the years. By taking on
the striking of copper coins in 1810 for the East India Company, the new Mint
had begun to accept work, that is, the supply of copper coins, that Boulton felt
was exclusively his preserve. The years 1816 and 1817 may not be typical of a
mood that had developed into one of mistrust, but this period nevertheless
suggests a situation in which the assistance of Soho was readily and willingly
available.28 Apart from the request made of Boulton to supply a replica of his
reducing machine to be erected at Tower Hill, something that he was keen to
discourage, orders were responded to promptly and with courtesy. An
25 MBP. 413, passim; MBP. 470, passim.
26 MBP. 413, Lawson to Boulton, 13 June 1816; Morrison to Boulton, 24 June 1816; Boulton
to Morrison, 26 June 1816.
27 MBP. 533, Lawson to Zacchaeus Walker (an employee of Boulton's at Soho), 18 December
1816. PRO. Mint 11/71, Pole to Lawson, 23 December 1816.
28 Doty, The Soho Mint, pp. 145,159,161-63.
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explanation of the cordial relations probably lies in the fact that the dispute
between the two mints was over the copper rather than the silver coinage.29
Striking the first of the new coins
Serious consideration was being devoted to initiating a recoinage at the end of
April and within two months the Mint was on the verge of going into mass
production. This represented a remarkably compressed time-scale. On 1 May
Francis Horner indicated in the House of Commons that he understood
ministers were contemplating a new silver coinage; on 10 May the Committee
on Coin met and raised a number of questions with Pole which gave a clear
indication of the Committee's position as later detailed in its formal
recommendations; on 17 May Liverpool and Vansittart made their approach to
Jeremiah Harman to ask if the Bank would be prepared to take over
responsibility for the silver coinage; on 21 May the Committee on Coin
submitted its report that formed the basis of the Coinage Bill; on 28 May
Liverpool and Pole presented the Bill to Parliament (Chapter 3,passim).
One of the first references to the recoinage in the Mint records and one that
suggests there was not much prior warning given to the Mint establishment
before the announcement was made in Parliament, was a letter of 1 June from
Pole to Colonel Stephenson of the Office of Works requiring bricklayers and
carpenters for work on some of the offices. In a similar vein, Pole wrote on 3
June to Robert Smirke, the Mint's architect, stressing that the moneyers, who
were responsible for the production of coins, must begin their work with all
despatch and requesting as many rooms as possible be given over to them.3°
There are indications that the Commissariat Office had begun sending silver to
the Mint as early as 24 May, and the Bank of England had also commenced
similar deliveries before the end of the month. While this activity predates by
three or four weeks the successful passage of the Coinage Bill and therefore
29 PRO. Mint 11170, Boulton to Pole, 16 January 1817. MBP. 413, Boulton to Lawson, 16
January 1817.
30 PRO. Mint 118, p. 340.
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might be thought jumping the gun somewhat, the impression is of the Mint
establishment being suddenly jolted into action at the beginning of June.31
A potential lead to unravelling when notice of a recoinage may first have
been given is provided by the presence of Benedetto Pistrucci. An artist of
some repute in his field of gem engraving, he came to England in the summer of
1815 and was recommended to Sir Joseph Banks by the French mineralogist
Etienne Gilbert, Marquis de Dree. Banks is thought to have introduced the
Italian to Pole probably at some point during the first few months of 1816. In
his autobiography, Pistrucci refers to a commission given to him by Banks to
execute an effigy of George III based on the portrait by the Mint engraver
Nathaniel Marchant used on the Bank of England 3s token. The stylistic
similarities between the Marchant effigy and Pistrucci's portrait of George III,
as used on the new shillings and sixpences, suggest that either this
commissioned model or one very much in the same vein was utilised for the
new coinage. Exactly when Pistrucci began work on his portrait of the king is
not clear. Coinage tools were, however, available towards the end of June and
the Chief Engraver, Thomas Wyon Jnr, who copied the Italian's model in steel,
would have needed at least a month to generate two punches - one for the
shilling and a smaller one for the sixpence. But even if the Mint were in
possession of Pistrucci's effigy of the king by early to mid May, which suggests
the preparation of the original model dates from April at the latest, the
presumption should not be made that Banks and Pole had at that point been
forewarned of a recoinage and were making progress on the design work.
Nevertheless, Wyon was almost certainly busying himself on copying the king's
effigy before the Coinage Bill was presented in Parliament, but extending the
start of the recoinage back into March or April is a speculative venture.32
31 Dyer and Gaspar, 'Tower Hill', p. 482. Commons' Report on Resumption, 1819, Appendix
No. 18, pp. 319-21.
32 Treasury approval for Pistrucci's appointment was granted on 26 June 1816. PRO. Mint
1/18, pp. 358-59; Mint 1/19, pp. 7-8; Mint 21/1, Morrison to Master's Office, 22 June 1816.
RM. Library. RM. Museum Accessions Register, 1816 to 1850, p. 5. A. Billing, The Science
of Gems, Jewels, Coins, and Medals, Ancient and Modern (London, 1867), pp. 174, 190.
H. B. Carter, Sir Joseph Banks, 1743-1820 (London, 1988), p. 516. Mitchell Library, New
South Wales. ML Banks MS 743.3, Banks to Sir Charles Blagden, 19 August 1816.
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The progress towards striking the first coins is indicated by reference on 25
June to technical problems having been encountered with the dies. Pole's
account of the recoinage written in 1817 specifies 4 July as the day on which
the production of the new coins began, and reports of activity, of close to
300,000 new sixpences having been coined in recent days, appeared in The
Times on 9 July.33 The Governor of the Bank of England received half a dozen
of the new sixpences from the Mint on 4 July. The next day in a letter to his
son-in-law, the diplomat Charles Bagot, Pole reported that he was fully engaged
about the coinage, and enclosed for him one of the sixpences. 34 On 27 June,
Pole had an audience with the Prince Regent and with struck pieces being
despatched to members of the Master's family within a week's time, an
opportunity to seek the Regent's unofficial approval of the new coinage designs
based on preliminary strikings may have presented itself. Specimens of the
shillings and sixpences were formally submitted to the Prince Regent on 25
July, approval to proceed with the proposed designs being given on 3 August.35
Difficulties over design
With the new coins being passed around ministerial circles as soon as they were
struck and other pieces no doubt leaving the Mint during the summer and
autumn, there should have been no surprise that they were being discussed in
the press several months prior to their official release. The Times on 20 August
referred to the controversy that surrounded the use of BRITT in the inscription,
a debate that was revisited in 1860 over the issue of bronze coins. A letter of 18
September to the editor of The Gentleman's Magazine outlined the objections
that had been raised to the inscription on the new coins, in particular to the
doubling of the T in BRITT. The correspondent discussed at length the
accurate use of Latin abbreviations and concluded that there were precedents for
using a double T in such a context.36
33 PRO. Mint 1 54, p. 530. The Times, 9 July 1816.
34 PRO. Mint 118, p. 358; Mint 1/19, pp. 10-11. Bagot, George Canning, II, 31-32.
35 The Times, 28 June 1816. PRO. Mint 1/19, pp. 26, 107-08.
36 The Times, 20 August 1816. The Gentleman's Magazine, LXXXVI (1816), 299-300.
G. P. Dyer and P. P. Gaspar, 'Richard Sainthill and the New Bronze Coinage', BNJ, 54
(1984), 266-70.
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A different effigy from that used on the shillings and sixpences was planned
for the half-crown, and this created one of the major difficulties over the design
of the new coins. On 10 November Pole asked for adjustments to be made and
requested Thomas Wyon Jnr to show Sir Joseph Banks a trial piece for him to
comment on. Banks was approached for advice on questions of taste as well as
on matters of policy; he was consulted not out of idle routine but as a semi-
official part of the decision-making process. Having heard from his friend, Pole
reported to Morrison on 17 November that Banks very much disapproved of
Wyon's head for the half-crown: 'Sir Joseph criticises it very severely and
thinks Pistrucci is very much dissatisfied with it'. The production schedule,
however, was such that there had to be a commitment to Wyon's dies. The
distaste Pole had for the work of his Chief Engraver in this instance manifested
itself in an instruction that half-crowns struck from his dies be sent, when the
time came for distributing the new coin, to the most distant parts of the country.
During the first week of January, Pole lamented, 'I am in despair when I think
of the number of bad half-crowns we shall issue!'. Once the coins were
released, there was no shortage of detractors who shared his opinion and laid the
blame squarely at his feet (Chapter 6, p. 138).37
The attempts made by Pistrucci at revising the portrait were not successful,
and at this point the solution of using Boulton's reducing machine to create a
more accurate reproduction was seized upon. In view of his having worked at
Soho for several years before coming to Tower Hill, the idea of exploiting the
technical assistance that this device offered more than likely came from
Lawson. The intention was for a half-crown tool generated in Birmingham to
be put into production on 1 January. Although Pole admitted that he could
hardly expect this, it was a typical example of his forcing progress against the
odds, especially given that Lawson and Pistrucci did not arrive at Soho until 24
December.38
37 PRO. Mint 4/26, Pole to Morrison, 29 September 1816; 10 November 1816; 17 November
1816; 21 November 1816; and 5 January 1817.
38 PRO. Mint 11/70, Pistrucci to Pole, 24 December 1816; Lawson to Pole, 26 and 29
December 1816; Mint 11/71, Pole to Lawson, 23 December 1816. MBP. 533, Lawson to
Walker, 18 December 1816.
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The work undertaken in Birmingham in December and January acted as a
kind of trial by which the Mint assessed the potential of Boulton's reducing lathe.
The initial results delighted Pistrucci, and Pole wrote to Boulton commending the
copy of one of the gems as admirable. But the trip did not resolve the question
of the effigy for the half-crown. The plan eventually adopted was for part of the
neck and shoulder to be cut away on the existing Wyon punch from which
Pistrucci could then work. A new portrait was prepared along these lines and
thereafter a more positive view of the aesthetic qualities of the coin began to
emerge. 39
 In defence of Wyon, whatever changes were made to the effigy by
cutting away the shoulder, no radical difference is evident in the essential
character of the likeness (Figure 7 no. 4 and no. 5). If Pole and Banks were
dissatisfied with Wyon's copy they must presumably have been dissatisfied with
Pistrucci's amended version.
Accounts that have been written of when the Mint in London first acquired a
reducing machine have mentioned 1819 because of Pistrucci's purchase of one
from Paris. Looking at the question slightly differently, however, through the use
made of Boulton's machine, its association with the Mint can be dated from
18 1 6 40
 
The difficulties experienced over the design of the half-crown were
fruitful in one sense - the Mint was made aware, sooner than would otherwise
have been the case, of the benefits of employing a reducing machine. But
whatever advantages it brought, Pistrucci did suffer at the hands of the new
technology on the way back from his visit to Soho, he endured a rather eventful
journey during which his trunk came loose, the chaise broke down and he and his
travelling companion both caught colds - Lawson catching his from having to
walk up to his knees in mud.4'
39 PRO. Mint 11 70, Lawson to Pole, 25 December 1816; Mint 11/71 Pole to Boulton, 14
January 1817, Mint 4/27, Pole to Morrison, 3 January 1817. MBP. 413, Boulton to Pole, 25
December 1816, MBP. 322, Lawson to Boulton, 6 January 1817.
40 PRO. Mint 11/71, Pole to Lawson, 23 December 1816; Pole to Boulton, 14 January 1817.
MBP. 413, Boulton to Pole, 16 January 1817. J. G. Pollard, 'Matthew Boulton and the
Reducing Machine in England', NC, 7th scr 11 (1971), 316-17.
41 MBP. 322, Lawson to Boulton, 6 January 1817; MBP. 533, Lawson to Walker, 11 January
1817
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Precisely when production of the first effigy for the half-crown gave way to
the new type is not clearly documented. A possible answer lies in the
coincidence of the break in output of all silver coins between 4 March and 21
April, and royal approval of the new design for the half-crown being received
on 26 April. Minting of the new design might, therefore, have begun from the
third week of April and, if so, the delay would have been consistent with the not
unreasonable wish of ensuring that all half-crowns released for distribution
during the period of the exchange in February were of one type. The
availability of master tools for the half-crown does not necessarily give a clear
indication that production of the new design took place from 21 April.
Pistrucci's half-crown punch being packed off to Birmingham to be copied for
the sovereign on 21 February suggests that acceptable master tools were
probably available by at least that date. It is not certain, but not impossible, that
they remained idle up to the March break in striking silver. 42
 While the designs
may have been the same, the new coins released in February 1817 were not of
the same type in one sense: the tradition of changing the date on the coins at the
turn of the year was maintained.43
Building up the stockpile
The Coinage Bill specified that the Mint was to strike the 12.5 million in seven
months, which equated to producing 62,500,000 pieces, 37,500,000 pieces
being in shillings and 25,000,000 pieces in sixpences.44 No mention was made
of the proportion of the new coinage that was eventually to be accounted for by
half-crowns. The programme of work was daunting. A memorandum from
Pole to the Mint Board on 12 June set out how he saw the recoinage unfolding:
500 ingots were to be assayed, melted and coined each week, and he believed
that, provided the bullion came in regularly from the Bank of England, keeping
42 Royal approval of the original design for the half-crown was received 18 January. PRO.
Mint 1 54, pp. 315-16; Mint 4171, pp. 18-19. MBP. 413, Lawson to Boulton, 21 February
1817.
43 PRO. Mint 4126, Pole to Morrison, 1 December 1816.
44 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XXXIV, cols 959-60 (30 May 1816).
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pace with the supply of raw material would entail a daily production of 335,000
pieces; to achieve this the Mint's eight presses would each have to work at a
rate of sixty a minute for very nearly twelve hours each day; and he imagined
that the stockpile could be produced within thirty weeks. Even starting
immediately - a luxury that he did not have - this programme would have taken
the recoinage into the second week of January 1817. Depending, therefore, on
the length of time before mass production began, February or possibly even
March should realistically have been in his mind as probable finishing dates.45
The machinery had been prepared for its task and the moneyers blooded in
the use of the Boulton presses by the five years of Bank of England token
production amounting to 28,177,254 pieces. There were delays encountered
during the first years of using the new machinery, for example, in 1811 the rolls
of the rolling mill were broken. In one sense government's dawdling for several
years over when or whether or not to issue a new coinage allowed for a
potentially swifter period of transition during 1816 in view of the familiarity the
workmen had acquired in using the new technology. Compared, however, to
the intensity of the recoinage, the token production paled. From the end of
October 1811 through to the summer of 1812 the Mint, when in production of
Bank of England tokens of 3s and 18d, tended towards a weekly rate of
approximately £47,500, which equates to just over 400,000 pieces. Pole was
therefore asking his colleagues in 1816 to strike in a day or so what had taken a
week to produce five years earlier.46
The scheme was ambitious, heralding a period of change and adaptations
that proved necessary to cope with the planned output. The Mint was equipped
well enough to strike the new coins without a massive re-investment
programme; the Tower Hill site had after all been erected with this purpose in
mind, but concern centred around the speed at which the stockpile was to be
built up. As well as a need for extra workmen and for sundry alterations
conditional on coping with a substantially increased flow of work, in the event
45 PRO. Mint 118, pp. 351-53.
46 Kelly, Spanish Dollars, p. 120. PRO. Mint 1117 ,passim.
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of progress being halted there was also the requirement for emergency cover in
the shape of spare capacity. As was mentioned above, Boulton was asked to
provide an additional coining press; two new adjusting rolls for the rolling mill
were also ordered together with six additional boilers for the steam engines and
two further carriages and sets of moulds for the Silver Melting House. The
coining press was not in the end needed during 1816, and did not actually arrive
from Birmingham until April 1817, after the initial stockpile had been
completed. Alterations were suggested to the construction of buildings that
would aid the processing of blanks. From mid August the moneyers began to
work twenty-four hours a day, and the hours of work of smiths and labourers
engaged in the production of dies were regularised at a ten-hour shift starting at
six in the morning:"
Putting a precise figure on the number of people employed at the Mint at
any one time is not possible in part because the records of how many casual
workmen were employed by the moneyers have not survived. The size of the
core body of employees that made up the Mint establishment and the Company
of Moneyers can, however, be ascertained, and from this an estimate can be
calculated of the increase in staffing that was necessitated by the recoinage. In
accordance with the Indenture of 16 August 1815, the establishment during
1816 totalled thirty-two, while the number of moneyers was eight with one
apprentice. To this fixed group of forty-one were added two assistants in the
King's Assay Office and two in the Master's Assay Office, two extra clerks in
the Bullion Office and a weighing assistant in the Mint Office. As the
recoinage progressed, further appointments were made, including two turners,
an engineer and a die polisher, which by 12 August amounted to twenty-three
additional employees. By April 1817, the extra clerks and assistants numbered
forty-six .48
47 PRO. Mint, 118, pp. 361-62, 366; Mint 119, pp. 24, 33-36, 74, 179. MBP. 413, Lawson to
Walker, 5 April 1817.
48 Indenture between His Majesty and the officers of the Mint. Parliamentary Papers, 1816
(414). Mint Report, 1837, Appendix No. 1, pp. 19-20, gives details of the indenture of 6
February 1817 which brought the establishment to thirty-three. RM. Library. Company of
Moneyers' file. PRO. Mint 1 54, pp. 113-15; 272-73; Mint 1/19, pp. 43, 186-87.
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This figure gives the temporary increase in the establishment, to which
should be added the artificers and workmen employed by the moneyers and the
melter. Nineteen of those who started in 1816 were still serving in these two
departments in February 1823 but a larger number will almost certainly have
been taken on, and the same applies to other departments where casual workers
were called on but whose names have not survived. The need for assistance
also extended to the request being made of Boulton to supply any skilled
workmen that he could spare, but his response to Lawson's approach on 8 June
was not encouraging; Boulton was concerned that he would be depriving his
own operation.49 The 106 people known to have been working at the Mint
during the period of the recoinage represented almost a threefold increase on the
core group. The actual number employed will have been higher and an overall
figure of 150 may not be wide of the mark.
As the stockpile was being amassed silver was supplied from the Bank of
England and the Commissariat Office in the form of ingots and Spanish dollars.
Newspaper reports in September of bullion once more ebbing back towards
Britain indicated that the balance of international trade was turning in the Mint's
favour. Of the silver imported into the Mint up to the end of 1816, 54 per cent
was in the form of dollars. Robert Bingley, the King's Assay Master, drew
attention to a problem having been encountered with meltings derived from the
use of dollar silver. Larger variations in the standards to which the different
South American mints manufactured dollars meant that the fineness of the silver
was slightly outside the expected range. To a marginal degree the silver for the
new coinage was therefore inferior in fineness to the trial plate against which
the coinage would be judged. A rating, however, of 8dwt worse than standard
silver as opposed to the 7.5dwt, which had been applied up to the end of
November, he believed would address the matter. Taking the recoinage to the
end of 1817, at £2,039,990 3s 3d the Bank of England supplied a much larger
quantity of bullion both in the form of ingots and dollars than the £449,173
made available by the Commissariat Office. After the old silver had been
49 PRO. Mint 118, pp. 362-63; Mint 3/94, names of artificers, workmen and boys employed by
the moneyers and melter, 1 February 1823; Mint 1/19, pp. 285-86. MBP. 413, Lawson to
Boulton, 8 June 1816; Boulton to Lawson, 10 June 1816.
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withdrawn it was melted and employed to continue the recoinage; at the new
rate of 5s 6d an ounce, over £2 million was generated from the worn silver, the
equivalent of 44 per cent of the bullion imported for the currency.5°
Pole and the moneyers
There were set-backs. Some, such as the problems in July of dies clashing
together without a blank having been fed through, which caused sixpences to be
struck that were thought unfit for circulation, were difficulties that would have
been encountered in the normal course of minting. Others, however, related to
the unusually rapid production. 51
 The intense rate at which the coins were
struck inevitably meant that there would be misstruck pieces amongst those
released. They are represented in the collections of museums and continue to
turn up not infrequently in the hands of coin dealers, but their extent in relation
to total production was probably very small. Their survival may be more
representative of an interest in unusual pieces, rather than evidence of extensive
minting errors.
The most persistent and seemingly insoluble problem that threatened the
progress of the recoinage, at least as far as the Master was concerned, was the
rate of output sustained by the moneyers. On 21 August, in a melancholic
mood, he wrote to Morrison that he could not conceive the meaning of the
moneyers' inadequate level of production. Two days later he expressed at
length and in uncompromising terms his deep anxiety at the very great
deficiency in the numbers struck in the preceding three weeks, a deficiency he
calculated to have reached 1,340,396 pieces. He suggested to the moneyers that
at the heart of their failure was a want of method in the way they processed the
metal strip and blanks, going on to detail ways in which they could improve the
flow of work. The moneyers, although conceding that improvements could
indeed be made, nevertheless felt that Pole was pushing too hard too soon.
5° The Times, 2 and 21 September 1816. Commons' Report on Resumption, 1819, Appendix
No. 18, pp. 319-21. PRO. Mint 1/19, p. 127.
51 PRO. Mint 119, pp. 11-12.
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Comparing the estimated daily output of 335,000 that had originally been
thought necessary in June with the record of what was produced from the
beginning of August, during the three weeks referred to, the moneyers did have
a point. To have included in the actual output figures the deficiency mentioned
by Pole would have set the daily rate of production at over 400,000, whereas the
moneyers' rate was closer to 350,000 - in keeping, that is, with the original
target.52
The profile of output suggests a reasonably consistent pattern of production
(Table 10 and Figure 8). When the deliveries that the moneyers made to the
Mint Office were recorded on consecutive days, something which was even
more regular than the specified target of every other day and which happened
frequently throughout the second half of 1816, a fairly reliable daily picture
emerges. Production slowed in September as evidenced by an eight-day period
during which the moneyers made no returns to the Mint Office. On the
nineteenth Pole referred to the interruption, prefacing his comment with
mention of a potential problem over the supply of dies, but he did not point
specifically to what lay behind the interruption. By the twenty-eighth the
situation had improved to the extent that he could write, 'I am very much
pleased with the returns and it makes me very happy to find the moneyers have
exerted themselves so much. I hope now there is no doubt of the numbers
continuing to be fully and regularly kept up.' From mid October through into
November, however, Pole became increasingly incensed, referring to the
'bungling uncertainty of their manufacture', to 'frightful' deficiencies and
'provoking and unpardonable' work rates. The essence of the problem,
eventually fixed upon in November, was that twice as many blanks were being
punched from the metal strip as were being sized. Identifying the problem did
not bring a solution and the onset of January was still eliciting from him
comments regarding 'scandalously deficient' returns.53
52 PRO. Mint 119, pp. 67-75; Mint 9/33, Account of silver monies coined, 13 July 1816 to 31
May 1817.
53 PRO. Mint 4/26, Pole to Morrison, 19 September 1816; 28 September 1816; 20 October
1816; 17 November 1816; 24 November 1816; Mint 4/27, Pole to Morrison, 3 January 1817.
Sizing was a method of correcting the weight of blanks by filing their edges.
106
For all the ink that Pole expended on chastising the moneyers, the
difficulties encountered, although causing concern that the programme of work
might be hampered, did not resolve themselves into major set-backs. Neither
did they alter materially a monthly production rate that between August 1816
and February 1817 was sustained, with the exception of September, at between
seven and nine million pieces. An even clearer view of the consistency of
production is revealed through the deliveries of coin to the Mint Office; out of
the 153 separate deliveries made between 13 July 1816 and 29 May 1817, 130
were for the sum £19,800.54
 There is a temptation to look at the overall pattern
of output which never fell precipitously below original calculations and read
into Pole's concerns the groundless anxiety of a bullying manager. The
language he used was often immoderate and the moneyers would have had
some justification for thinking their efforts had gone unrecognised. The
difficulty he confronted was in being a victim of the timetable he had proposed
to government; he was induced to seize on the vagaries of daily output figures
because there was little provision for days of lost production.
Breakdown of output by denomination
Between the beginning of July 1816 and the end of February 1817, output of the
new silver amounted to £2,696,166 (Table 11 and Figure 9), the target of £25
million being reached about 17 February. With the recoinage starting early in
July, the estimated thirty weeks that were thought necessary to complete the
stockpile would have taken production up to about the end of January. The
optimism of the estimate was therefore foiled by roughly two weeks - hardly a
disaster - indeed, something of an achievement.
The month and a half gap between 4 March 1817 and any further output of
silver coin might reasonably be seen as bringing to an end the completion of the
stockpile. In spite of the omission of half-crowns from the original plan, they
were struck to the extent of 17.9 per cent of the value of output up to the first
54 PRO. Mint 9/33, Account of silver monies coined, 13 July 1816 to 31 May 1817.
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week of March. At 65.8 per cent, shillings made up by far the largest share of
the new coinage, with the value of sixpences amounting to 16.3 per cent (Table
12 and Figure 10). Looking at the production of new silver over the whole of
1816 and 1817, a not dissimilar picture emerges, with shillings at 58 per cent of
the value of output, although representing a lower proportion than in the
stockpile, still coming out as the principal coin; sixpences at 15.5 per cent
mirrored fairly closely their stockpile figure, but half-crowns at 26.5 per cent
had advanced a good dea1.55
In the eighteenth century, or at least until 1757, the different denominations
were produced in a fixed value ratio from a given quantity of silver: crowns
represented 20 per cent of the total, half-crowns 30 per cent, shillings 40 per
cent and sixpences 10 per cent. From 1757 through to 1816, production of regal
silver coins was limited to shillings and sixpences, together with very modest
quantities of the smaller silver denominations of fourpence, threepence,
twopence and penny. With shillings accounting for two-thirds of the value of
output and sixpences one-third, the infrequent mintings in the second half of the
eighteenth century do not offer a suitable comparison with a complete
recoinage, but the balance of the 1816-17 production did reflect a continuing
trend towards a larger number of smaller denomination coins. Production over
the eighteen months from July 1816, resembles only very broadly the traditional
early eighteenth-century approach to the output of denominations. Sixpences
and shillings, though, took up more of the proportion formerly assigned to
crowns. In arriving at the denominational breakdown of the new coins,
consideration was no doubt given to the likely composition of the existing silver
circulation. The calculations of the first Earl of Liverpool in this regard, which
put half-crowns at 30 per cent and shillings and sixpences combined at 70 per
cent, may well have acted as a rough guide.56
Why crowns and half-crowns should have been excluded from the initial
stockpile and why no fuss at all was made of their exclusion might be explained
55 For the number of pieces struck of each denomination see Table 13 and Figure 11.
56 PRO. Mint 116, pp. 42-43. Liverpool, Coins of the Realm, p. 185.
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by the experience, recounted in many instances in pamphlet literature as well as
by Liverpool in his Treatise, of people rarely encountering them in the course of
trade. The intention, as detailed in the Coinage Bill, was however to strike half-
crowns as well as crowns - an intention repeated by the Prime Minister in
Parliament on 17 June 1816. From the point of view of the pressing nature of
completing the stockpile, a larger number of higher denomination coins would
have had the attraction of easing the burden. Their being struck was merely a
question of timing and when in September the Governor of the Bank of England
specifically requested that they make up a proportion of the new silver to be
issued the following February, the Mint complied.57
Evidence of one or more of the coining presses failing for any length of
time during the recoinage was not apparent until 26 March, when Lawson
informed Zacchaeus Walker at Soho that the great screw of one of the presses
had given way. He was accordingly more than usually keen to enquire after the
progress of the new coining press that had been ordered from Boulton. In
reflecting that the broken screw had, in the course of producing the 3s Bank of
England tokens and the half-crowns, struck millions of blows, he saw little
reason to complain. 58 Escaping major delays at the hands of unreliable
machinery was a cause for no small amount of satisfaction. Pole was personally
disappointed by the original effigy for the half-crown and annoyed about the
public ridicule he was forced to suffer on its account, but he might have drawn
solace from the knowledge that the Mint had delivered the 123 million of new
coins broadly within the time-scale he had set out. The currency of silver that
had been anticipated for decades was completed roughly within seven months.
57 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XXXIV, col. 1125 (17 June 1816). PRO. Mint 1 54, Pole
to Vansittart, 16 September 1816, pp. 342-44.
58 MBP. 413, Lawson to Walker, 26 March 1817.
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CHAPTER 6
THE EXCHANGE
Regional distribution of the new coin
The gold recoinage of the 1770s had a regional element built in to the
withdrawal of the old coin which at that time involved a network of receivers in
twenty-four locations across the country taking in, over the course of a month
and a half, the worn gold coin and exchanging for it coin of lawful weight. Some
forty years later the scale of a similar operation with respect to silver was to be
executed over a much wider area in a shorter time scale.' No detailed proposals
dealing with this question were laid before Parliament by the Prime Minister, but
Pole sketched out the plan as it was eventually implemented of distributing to all
principal towns and cities a sum of money, supposed to coincide with the
circulation of the district, and of effecting an exchange of the currencies within a
short period of time 2
In 1799 Ruding had proposed that the old silver be withdrawn gradually.
The receivers of public revenue, he thought, could after a certain time take in the
silver money by weight only, cutting it when tendered and thereby in a very few
years nearly all of it could be brought to the Mint. An extended period for
removing the existing currency had been adopted during the recoinage of
William III's reign and it had resulted in a major fraud being committed against
the Mint, whereby counterfeiters profited by defacing the new coin as it was
issued and returning it to the Mint as old silver. In 1816 withdrawal and issue
over a number of years was specifically ruled out with reference to the mistakes
of the Great Recoinage
1
LIN erpool, Coins- of the Realm, p 204 Ruding, Annals of the Coinage, II, 88-89.
2 Parhamentarv Debates, 1st scr., XXXIV, cols 912-23, 960-64 (30 May 1816).
3 Ruding, A Proposal for Restoring the Constitution of the Mint, p. 29. Parliamentary
Dehate.s, XXX1V, col 960 (30 May 1816).
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Detailed proposals for the conduct of the exchange, to set the new silver on
its way unencumbered by the presence of the plain shillings and sixpences, were
prepared during the summer months of 1816 and by September they were being
discussed by ministers and others. 4 One of the thorniest questions to be resolved
was how much each area would be assigned. There was a suggestion at one
point that the local knowledge of country bankers be utilised to ascertain what
quantity of new coin a given locality would require to exchange the old currency.
The problems of such a system falling prey to over-estimation were obvious, but
the system was nevertheless adopted for Scotland. The allocation of money for
England and Wales, as initially described in Pole's plan, was rather based on
population, using as a guide the most recent abstracts laid before Parliament; the
estimated stockpile of £2.5 million was to be divided by the gross number of
people of both sexes and all ages. The resulting figure of coin per person on the
basis of a population for England, Scotland and Wales of roughly 12 million,
would have been 4s 2d. Using this as a guide the coin was allocated to a
selection of hundreds of towns and then apportioned according to the number of
bankers established at each place. Francis Freeling, Secretary of the Post Office,
was called in to give his advice not only on matters of population and means of
transport but also to assist in making revisions to this formula by taking into
account regional variations in trade 5
Once the exchange had begun, many stations made applications for more
coin and the Mint responded as it saw fit Flexibility was also built into the
arrangements by encouraging bankers to share consignments of new coin and
transfer quantities to neighbouring towns. Given the necessarily uncertain art of
calculating a specific amount for each town or even county, the decision was
made in favour of a form of distribution that could respond to the actual
demands of the country as they arose The final accounts of how much each
4 PRO Mint 1 54. Pole to Vansittart, 16 September 1816, pp. 342-44, for details of the plan
for the exchange see pp. 345-68. Vansittart to Pole. 23 September 1816, pp. 372-74;
LIN erpool to \Talisman, 25 September 1816, pp 375-76.
5 PRO Mint 1 54. p 535. Mint 11 74. minutes of meeting of London bankers. 22 January
1817 AhAtracts Ansucrs and Returns of the Population of Great Britain in 1811,
Parliamentar) Papers. 1812 (316), p 509
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town received are not, therefore, consistent with the application of a pattern of
distribution based on coin per head of population.'
Applying to the distribution demographic considerations was not a new idea.
In 1811 the Bank of England had decided upon this course as a means of
providing a more demand-centred approach to the circulation of its tokens. The
scope of the Bank's scheme was less ambitious than that proposed for 1817,
including as it did eighty-one locations, but the policy nevertheless demonstrated
an awareness in the capital of one of the enduring problems with the system of
circulating the metallic currencies - its being not sufficiently sympathetic to the
requirements of the country as a whole. Matthew Boulton, too, had made
efforts in this direction, committing himself to delivering copper coins to any part
of the country from where orders were received.' For the new silver to have
been issued only from Tower Hill would therefore have been going against
recent trends A system of national dissemination was not, though, extended to
the gold coins when they came to be issued later in 1817 and copper for years to
come had to rely on the natural momentum of commerce to reach the provinces.
7he role of the banking community
After the announcement in May 1816 that there was to be a recoinage, enquiries
were received at the Mint and the Bank from firms or individuals requesting that
they be considered as agents in the exchange of the new coin They were
politely logged For England and Wales the network of hundreds of people,
appointed by and acting under the authority of the Treasury, w,ho would
administer the daily business of the exchange, was founded on the country
banking system The involvement of this group made a good deal of sense:
through their activities, in association with their London agents, lame quantities
6 PRO Mint 1 54, pp 480-81. Mint 11 71, Attwood & Co to the Mint_ 1 February 1817.
Nunn & Co to the Mint, 8 February 1817.
7 Kelly, Sparmsh Dollar. pp. 84-85. Doty, The Soho Ifint, p. 318.
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of the existing currency had ended up in the tills of retailers. The Bury St
Edmunds' banker James Oakes will not have been alone in organising regular
deliveries of Bank tokens from London. They were used to handling significant
amounts of cash and the position of some as tax collectors further added to their
familiarity with the currency; the nature and prevalence of counterfeits and
foreign pieces would have been common knowledge to them. They had become
an essential part of the fabric of regional finance throughout the country and
their coverage was such that a comprehensive dispersal of the coin to almost
every part of Britain could be assured from the very start.'
There is not complete agreement between banking historians on the extent of
the increase in provincial banking during the second half of the eighteenth
century, but there is consensus that it continued apace through the Napoleonic
Wars with the result that by 1810 there were 783 firms operating. The slump of
1816 had led to bankruptcies within their ranks but with roughly 700 remaining
in business, calling upon their services for the exchange was particularly
appropriate Legislation limiting the number of partners a firm could contain
made them vulnerable to the vagaries of the economic cycle; by 1825-26 they
had declined to 554 and by the beginning of the 1840s to 311. 9 Conducting the
exchange through the agency of an extended banking community would have
remained an option ten or twenty years after the recoinage but that the timing
coincided with one of the high points in the spread of local banking was
opportune In cities such as Liverpool and Newcastle several firms were
employed to release the new money. In places where the local bankers refused
to act, Commissary officers assumed responsibility for the exchange and were
also on hand in other areas to offer assistance. Choosing them to run some of
the stations may have been determined by their availability in view of the recent
slackening of military commitments. The exchange in Scotland was placed under
8 PRO. Mint 11 70, R Cattle to Lord Lascelles, 5 June 1816; M. Abraham to Pole, 26 June
1816. Ashton, An Economic History of England, pp. 181-82. J. Fiske (ed.), The Oakes
Diaries Busine.ss, Politics and the Family in Bury Si Edmunds, 1778-1827 (Woodbridge,
1991), II, 205,8 July 1816.
9 Clapham, The Bank of England, II, 1-2, 120-21. L. S. Pressnell and J. Orbell, A Guide to
the Historical Records of British Banking (Aldershot, 1985), p. xvi.
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the control of the Bank of Scotland. m
 A further advantage in asking country
bankers and the Bank of Scotland lay in their being expected to act without
payment, except in respect of their expenses and an allowance for the inspection
of the old silver. The support the scheme received within the Treasury is not
surprising
To effect the exchange within two weeks was acknowledged at the time as
likely to be of benefit to trade by minimising disruption. There was little feeling
that such an operation, although complicated, was unduly fraught." The
Governor of the Bank of England's view was that a fortnight would be ample,
while Sir Joseph Banks, although seeing no better way of proceeding, confessed
'I quake a little when I consider the possible result of 770 persons in England
etc, an unknown number in Scotland and Ireland [being] entrusted with the
management of £2,500,000 without any responsibility attaching itself to any one
of them' His summary was not necessarily correct, for example in relation to
the inclusion of Ireland and the actual numbers who were eventually to be
involved But his questioning of the extent to which bankers would be obligated
to conduct the exchange and held to account for the money sent to them should
have been a concern for ministers. The tone of his remarks reflected well the
sense that despite the sanguine attitude of government and the Bank, nothing
quite like this comprehensive regional exchange had previously been attempted.12
The country mints established at Bristol, Chester, Exeter, Norwich and York
during the Great Recoinage of the 1690s did not make a significant contribution
to the overall amount of coin issued. Only 26 per cent of the pieces struck
during that recoinage were produced at a local level, whereas in 1817 the idea
was to issue the vast majority of the new silver regionally, direct to the people.
A further difficulty for the exchange lay in the silver having to be sent out in the
middle of winter Fortunately, at least in some parts of Britain, the winter was
PRO Mint 1 54. pp 450-52, 463-66; Mint 11 9, station numbers 205, 210-14, 277.
71w Dines, 18 and 21 January 1817.
12 PRO. Mint 1 54, Pole to Vansittart, 16 September 1816, pp. 342-44; Banks to Pole, 20
September 1816, pp 369-70.
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particularly mild: primroses and cowslips were reported to be in blossom before
the end ofJanuary.13
To have expected a department the size of the Mint, with a permanent staff
of less than one hundred, to take on the business of a nationwide distribution
without help from those who could reasonably be thought of as interested parties
would have been asking too much. The involvement of several groups in this
operation, the Bank of England, the Bank of Scotland, the hundreds of country
bankers, the Commissariat, as well as the Corporation of London and the
Goldsmiths' Company, should not have been viewed as the Mint in a crisis
seeking help where it could; rather it represents evidence of a policy which made
the best use of the most appropriate people to help realise an important public
undertaking
Along the way, however, relations between the cooperating parties were not
always entirely harmonious In May 1816 the Bank had declined Liverpool's
offer to take over outright control of the silver coinage, and in the original
scheme for the exchange a similarly extensive devolvement of responsibility to
the Bank had been envisaged Pole indicated to Vansittart, 'you will perceive
that the Issue and Exchange will be wholly managed by the Banks of England
and Scotland, and by the private Bankers'. As the exchange drew closer
increasingly large quantities of old coin were being presented at the Bank and the
attitude took hold in Threadneedle Street that the Old Lady was being too
readily put upon The Governor, Jeremiah Harman, in a meeting with the Prime
Minister and the Chancellor pointed to the unreasonableness of thinking to
impose on the Bank 'so much of the Odium and responsibility of a measure
which in fact exclusively belonged to the Mint'. By offering advice and being the
only bank in London to permit the exchange to take place on its premises the
13 Challis, 'Lord Hastings', NIIRA1, pp. 385-86. The Times, 13 February 1817.
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Bank of England did become an active participant; it avoided, however,
submitting to the administrative minutiae of the undertaking."
Postponement of the exchange
Batches of the new coin were packed ready to be transported across the country
in boxes containing six £100 bags - four bags of shillings and one each of half-
crowns and sixpences. The distribution began on 18 January 1817. Within the
next eighteen days approximately £1,800,000 was sent to towns and cities in
England and Wales as well as to stations in London. On one day alone, 21
January, 1553,800 was despatched. The bulk of the new coin was transported
by coach, specific amounts being delivered to individual country bankers. After
the dust had settled on the exchange, Pole reflected that of all the coin sent out
not a single bag had gone astray The boast was true as far as new coin was
concerned but a small quantity of the old, specifically two bags which probably
amounted to /200, was stolen on its return journey to the Mint from the charge
of Gill 8.: Co of Tavistock A man was arrested 15
The exchange was scheduled to begin on Monday 3 February and to last until
the seventeenth Proclamations and notices to that effect appeared in the press.
The Prince Regent on opening the new session of Parliament on 28 January
informed the House of Lords that the new coinage had been completed and its
issue was imminent The following day a further Proclamation was circulated
postponing the start until Thursday 13 February, with the period for the
exchange now to continue up to and including the twenty-seventh. The
explanation, reported in 7he Times, was that Monday had not after all been
thought the best of days to begin, because workmen would still have most of
BE G8 18 Memorandum from the Go% ernor to the Committee of Treasury, 6 February
1817 PRO Mint 1 54, Pole to Vansittart, 16 September 1816, pp 342-44 Annual
&giver 1817. p 13
PRO Mint 1 54 pp 397-408, 530-42, Mint 11/72, the Mint to Gill & Co 2 April 1817, the
Mint I Curtis & Co 19 April 1817
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their wages left and business at the stations would therefore be too hectic.
Moreover, a meeting at Spafields, organised by the political radical Henry Hunt,
had been planned for 3 February and the authorities feared for the tranquillity of
London. The announcement coming with less than a week's notice gives cause
to suspect the official line. The reasons reported may have been justification for
a delay of a day or two, but The Times was not convinced that they could
explain a deferment of several days. Some other unforeseen impediment was
suspected. No fan of Hunt, the paper speculated whether he could have been
prevailed upon to put off his meeting 'and have gathered his pretty little innocent
lambkins together on some future day'.16
In his account of the exchange, Pole claimed that all the principal towns and
districts in Britain had been provided with the new coin by 3 February - upwards
of 70 per cent of the £2.5 million stockpile of new coin had left London by that
date - but that a Cabinet decision changed the day to the thirteenth. The most
likely reason for the postponement, however, was that insufficient time for
distribution and setting up the exchange stations had been allowed. Delaying
sending out the new coin as long as possible was understandable given the
temptations that might have arisen. In addition, Liverpool was concerned that
publicising the government's intentions could have been profitable for the
coiners of Birmingham Enough complaints were received by the Mint during
the first and second weeks of February from towns - evidently not principal
towns - that had seen no sight of the new coin to suggest that this policy had not
been altogether successful.17
The timetable of events became very compressed during the last two weeks
of January The country bankers were formally asked to cooperate during mid
January, the Bank of Scotland was consulted about its involvement on the
1, Parliamentary Dtbates, 1st ser., X3CXV, cols 1-5 (28 January 1817). PRO. Mint 1/54,
pp. 452-54. transcript of Royal Proclamation, 29 January 1817; pp. 470-74, transcript of
Ro)al Proclamation, 12 February 1817. The Times, 29 and 31 January 1817.
17 PRO. Mint 1 54. pp. 530-42; Liverpool to Vansittart, 25 September 1816, pp. 375-76; Mint
11/71, the Mint to Ray & Son, 5 February 1817; the Mint to R. Surridge, 12 February 1817.
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sixteenth; a committee of bankers, brought together to assist in organising the
operation in London and more generally throughout the country, was set up on
the twenty-second; and an application was made to the Common Council for use
of the Guildhall as the central station for the exchange in the City on the twenty-
third. Although a great deal was done prior to 3 February it was not enough to
begin the exchange as originally intended."
Dollar-statidard silver
There was a certain amount of positive anticipation about the appearance of the
new coinage In his Political Register William Cobbett wrote that it would drive
out of circulation a considerable quantity of 'fictitious trash', and that 'we should
now, to a limited extent at any rate, hear our tills once again rattle, our pockets
chink with the sound of something real'. The marketing angles of its
introduction were not neglected by Kipling of Cheapside, who advertised the
assurance that he would continue to take French coin as well as English shillings
and sixpences for the best and cheapest hosiery manufactured, while those who
required a means of detecting counterfeits could buy Andrew's Gold and Silver
Taste at 3s a bottle 19 But there was also apprehension that having the new coins
circulate alongside the Bank of England tokens was courting disaster.
Not only were the Bank issues struck in dollar-standard silver, vvhich at 892
was inferior to the sterling silver of the new coins by 3.57 per cent, but the
difference between the intrinsic value of the tokens and their face value NN as also
greater than the seigniorage that applied to the new currency the market \ alue
of dollar silver varied constantly, but taking the price as 5s 4d, the highest at
which the Bank of England bought dollars in that year, the tokens, being struck
IX
	 Times, 24 Januar) 1817. CLRO Common Council Papers, 23 Januat .N 1817 PRO
Mint 11 74, minutes of meeting of London bankers, 18 and 22 Januar) 1817, Mint 11
Pole to Lord Melville, 16 January 1817.
Cobbett' y Weady Political Register, 1 February 1817 The Tone,s, 6, 22 and r FebruaiN
1817
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at the rate of 6s 4d per ounce, were then circulating at 12d over their intrinsic
value; the new silver coins, taking the price of sterling silver in 1817 at its
highest of 5s 31/2d per ounce, by comparison were to be issued at just 2 1/2d above
their intrinsic value. The fear was that since the new coins circulated at a lower
face value than the Bank issues in relation to their silver content, they would be
taken out of daily use, melted down and the silver employed to produce
counterfeit tokens. The Morning Chronicle argued that the higher premium
over intrinsic value at which the old coin had circulated compared with the issues
of the recoinage, meant the government's policy towards the Bank's metallic
currency was no different from releasing the new and yet allowing the old silver
to continue in use. Why bother with an exchange at all if it was not going to
apply to the whole of the silver currency?2°
The withdrawal of the Bank issues was the responsibility not of the Treasury
but of the Bank and, probably not unmindful of the possible costs involved,
ministers had no intention of interfering in the redemption arrangements.
Pressure could of course have been brought to bear to effect the calling in of the
tokens, but the dual circulation of both types of money was expected for a
limited period only. Whatever further reservations may have surrounded the
acceptance of a token regal silver coinage soon evaporated when the coins were
released. The old silver, by virtue of its severe wear, had effectively been a
token coinage for many years and in using the Bank issues a familiarity with
fiduciary currency had evidently become well established.
The exchange in England and Wales
The view of the press was that the exchange would cause a little bustle but no
great inconvenience to the public. The Courier said of 13 February, 'nothing is
20 Kelly, Spanish Dollars, pp. 78, 124. Morning Chronicle, 22 and 28 January 1817.
Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., )COCV, cols 894-901 (5 March 1817). Although of a
lower fineness, dollar-standard silver on occasion fetched a higher price than standard bar
silver partly on account of the shifting supply of Spanish dollars from South America.
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heard this morning but the tinkle of the new coinage: the issue in a few hours is
without precedent in extent in any country: the order and regularity with which it
is conducted is admirable'. One man was reported to have turned up at a
London station with 1,100 sixpences and to satisfy him took virtually the whole
day. A firsthand account of the exchange from a banker comes from James
Oakes.
We occupied the Guild Hall & had Mr Clay, Mr Fortnum and Jno
Haddock, our Clerk, as Inspectors. Being the first Day Numbers
thronged but due order was kept - only 2 admitted at a time from
ten to four o'clock & nothing could be more orderly. We took in
about 6 or 700£ of old silver for New & agreed to a single 6d
finish[in]g tell[in]g, weigh[in]g & sealing up by abt 1/4 before 6 &
left me rather before 8 We then sent to the Bank & completed
every thing for the Eveng 21
As can be seen from Oakes' description of the day, the exchange will have
involved the bankers in a considerable amount of work. If the rate of business
was not always as intense as on the first day, the bankers nevertheless had to be
available over the course of the fortnight and the operation will accordingly have
dominated much of their time. They took custody of the new coin sent; they set
up stations suitable for the accommodation of the public which were often but
not always at the premises of the bank; they ensured the presence of clerks to
record the details of each application for new silver; they submitted accounts to
the Mint - the request from Tower Hill was for daily returns - detailing in
summary form the transactions of silver from and to the public; they transmitted
surpluses of new coin to neighbouring stations when necessary; they arranged for
carpenters to erect counters, constables to keep order and the inspectors to
examine the old silver tendered, eventually, they ensured the despatch back to
21 The Tunes, 25 January 1817; 17 February 1817. The Courier. 13 Febniar) 1817. Fiske.
The Oakes TharleA, II, 213, 13 February 1817.
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London of the old coin, as well as the return of any excess new silver that they
did not wish to purchase in Bank of England notes.22
Despite being a Thursday rather than a Monday, and the somewhat genteel
picture painted of the initial issue in London and Bury St Edmunds, the first day
was in many places a frenzied affair. There were reports of windows being
smashed at Tonbridge because of the pressure of the crowd, a problem also
experienced at Appleby and Salisbury. Mistakes in the accounts of stations at
Wellingborough, Chipping Norton, Windsor and Aberdeen were blamed on the
hurry of business on the first day. 23
 There was the story of a pickpocket having
relieved two gentlemen of 07 in banknotes as they were forcing their way
through the crowd at the exchange station in Hatton Garden. Some complained
of having to wait for hours and still failing to have their silver exchanged. In his
study of the London poor, Henry Mayhew recorded the memories of the
'Aristocratic' Crossing Sweeper of the day the old silver was cried down: 'my
hat wouldn't hold the old silver and halfpence I was given that afternoon. I had
.such a lot, upon my word, they broke my pocket'. He went on to say that he
was nearly squeezed to death when he took his hatful down to Coutts to have it
changed A week into the exchange The Times assessed that there had been an
initial rush of business followed by a marked slackening off. 'So rapid and
extensive has been the exchange of the old silver for the new coinage, that the
large hall given exclusively by the Bank of England for the public
accommodation was yesterday nearly empty, and three-fourths of the persons
employed for the purpose of exchange were left entirely idle.' 24
 Throughout
England, Wales and the Channel Islands £2,176,087 was received in old coin,
and out of that total, including the money taken in by the Bank and the Mint,
22 PRO. Mint 1 54, pp. 435-39.
21 BS. Unsorted Letter Book for Sther Coins Exchanged, Bank of Scotland to Morrison, 29
July 1817 PRO Mint 11/15, station number 13; Mint 11/25, station number 201; Mint
11 28, station number 275, Mint 11/29, station number 292; Mint 11 36, station number
430, Mint 1137, station number 442.
24 H Man hew , London Labour and the London Poor: A Cyclopaedui of the Condition and
Earnings qf those that will work, those that cannot work, and those that NN ill not work
(London, 1967), II, 467-68 The Tunes, 14, 17 and 19 February 1817, Morning Chronic le,
15 February 1817
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1612,819 was withdrawn in London (Table 14). Rather like the decimalisation
of Britain's currency in 1971, the success of the recoinage and exchange meant
that it was news for a day or so, and thereafter without much of a controversy to
exploit the press understandably lost interest.
For London large amounts of silver were dealt with at four principal stations
all within the City - at the Bank of England, Goldsmiths' Hall, Guildhall and
South Sea House, which was located at 37 Threadneedle Street. In addition,
notice was given in the press of parts of the capital that would be served by
sixteen auxiliary stations; Abbey Street, Oxford Street, Westminster, Spitalfields
and Bermondsey were amongst the places chosen (Appendix 3). London banking
houses had refused, when asked by the Mint, to open their doors to the
inhabitants of the capital for fear of too much disruption to the normal course of
business. But they were not uncooperative: they agreed to take charge of some
of the smaller stations in London, to have their clerks offer assistance where they
could, to involve themselves in the committee of bankers on the introduction of
the new coin and they expressed a willingness to take in old silver as it was
presented to them. Fifty-five banking houses in London received £1,200 each for
the accommodation of their customers. Out of that number the accounts of only
forty-four have survived. On the day before the beginning of the exchange, to
satisfy himself that the arrangements were well in hand, Pole conducted a tour of
several of the London stations.25
Old coin could also be presented at the Mint but this was to take place only
from the beginning of March, after it had ceased to be current, and to continue
through to the end of May; the facility was offered as a means of sweeping up
what remained of the heavier silver, a minimum weight for shillings being set at
87gr which only allowed for a 6 per cent reduction from the standard. Worn
25 GC Court Minute Book 23, 5 February 1817, p 185, The Tunes, 13 February 1817, PRO
Mint 11 74, pnnted notice issued by the Mint, 11 February 1817; Mint 1/54, pp 417-19,
469-70, 536
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silver could legitimately be cut, broken or defaced if tendered in payment from
the end of the official exchange period on 27 February.26
The exchange in Scotland
In the autumn of 1816 the Bank of Scotland requested from the Mint
information on the arrangements for the exchange, but along with many others it
had to wait until January for confirmation of the nature of its involvement. The
Mint from an early stage constructed its plans for Scotland around the Bank.
The delay in providing information, however, stemmed from the deliberate policy
of not only keeping the new coins from being seen too widely but also in
preventing any knowledge of the detailed arrangements for the exchange being
disclosed The advice from Pole to the Chancellor was that implementing much
of the programme could be postponed until January and 'our mode of
Distribution even need not be known to the Bank of Scotland till that time'.27
Robert Dundas, Viscount Melville, Governor of the Bank of Scotland and in
1816 first Lord of the Admiralty, made a direct application to Pole on the subject
of the Bank's role and he is probably to be credited with securing for the Bank
the distribution of the new coinage. Pole wrote to him on 16 January expressing
the wish of the government for the Bank to play an important part in the change-
over, and in the weeks that followed, the frustrating silence of the previous
months was transformed into a regular exchange of letters. Although the Bank
had been granted control over the introduction of the Scottish recoinage issues
of 1707-09, it was not necessarily the automatic choice 110 years later. Having
the duty bestowed upon it was regarded as something of a coup against its old
-6 PRO Mint 11 74, printed notice issued by the Mint, 20 February 1817; Mint 1/54, pp. 489-
91, transcript of Royal Proclamation, 1 March 1817
PRO Mint 11 70 G Sandy (Secretary to the Bank of Scotland) to T Coutts, 30 August
1816, Mint 1/ 5 4, Pole to Vansittart, 12 October 1816, pp 377-78 BS. 1/21/3, Sandy to
Pole 27 No% ember 1816, p 78
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rival the Royal Bank of Scotland which traditionally had stronger connections
with London and enjoyed a greater degree of official favour.28
How much each area was to receive and who were to be the individuals
appointed to issue the coin were decisions left to the Bank of Scotland. The
Mint having ultimate responsibility was not, however, a disinterested party in
how matters were organised. Advice passed readily between London and
Edinburgh and there was little if any evidence of friction or of either party's
regretting the choice of this way forward. 29 Details of how the operation was
planned to work in England and Wales were provided and in large measure the
same system was adopted, but in the area of distributing the coin the Bank relied
on estimates supplied by bankers throughout Scotland. In Kirkcaldy, the branch
of the Bank of Scotland suggested that in the order of £6,000 would be
necessary for the accommodation of that town. Charles Campbell, the Bank's
agent in Greenock, judged that between £20,000 and £40,000 would be
required, a gross over estimation when seen in relation to the £10,600 of old
silver eventually taken in." A further difference between the systems adopted
related to the involvement of Commissariat officers. Their assistance was not
available north of the border which meant that the coverage of the exchange was
not as comprehensive as perhaps it might have been. The Bank admitted that the
northern regions in particular had not been as well served as had originally been
intended because of the difficulty in finding suitable people to conduct the
exchange '1
On 23 January £300,000 was despatched by ship to Scotland, a further
£40,200 following in March by the same route. Two days prior to the shipment
on the twenty-third, a convoy of Ordnance waggons carrying £200,000 of silver
21t PRO Mint 11 70, Lord Melville to Pole, 16 January 1817; Mint 11/71, Pole to Melville, 16
January 1817, Pole to Sandy, [23 January 1817]. Checkland„Scottish Banking, pp. 65, 295.
Sin ille, Bank of Scotland, p. 78. For Lord Melville see DNB.
2) PRO. Mint 1 54, Pole to Sandy, 23 January 1817, pp. 428-34.
3 BS 1/438 33, G Drysdale to Sandy, 24 January 1817, P. 1; BS. Unsorted: Letter Book for
Silver Coins Exchanged, pp. 1-3, 54.
31 BS. 20 32 139, Sandy to Pole, 15 March 1817.
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set out to deliver coin to Scotland and the north of England. The Nottingham
Journal reported that the progress of the 'cavalcade' excited much interest; each
waggon was drawn by six horses and attended by two well-armed artillerymen,
in addition to the drivers who were also armed. William Stace, of the Ordnance
Department, who was charged with ensuring the safe passage of the convoy,
wrote to Pole from Morpeth in Northumbria that 'all classes seem to feel an
anxiety for the new coin to be brought into circulation and we have crowds of
people at every place we stopped'. The convoy arrived in Edinburgh on 3
February with £93,000, over half the original sum having been distributed to
towns in Yorkshire.32
The pattern of the exchange as reported in England of a rush of business on
the first day was similar to the experience of the Bank of Scotland's office in
Greenock On 13 February £700 was taken in, and in the following two weeks
amounts varying between £100 and £400 were received. On the last day a
further flurry of activity beset the office with £1,600 being presented. 33 The
view of the Bank was that the plan devised for Scotland had given general
satisfaction Accounting for the major shipments as well as transfers of coin for
smaller amounts, £433,800 was sent to Scotland during the first few months of
1817, in exchange for which £423,400 was received in old coin (Table 14).
Mint records refer to seventy-one stations having been established in Scotland.
Accounts of the exchange that have survived in the Bank of Scotland's archive,
however, suggest that there were at least as many as eighty-five in operation.
The disparity can probably be accounted for by the survival of more detailed
records at the Bank, and at least in some instances by the amalgamation of the
accounts of separate stations into one town account before submission to
London (Appendix 4).34
32 The Times, 25 January 1817. Nottingham Journal, 1 February 1817. PRO. Mint 11/5,
invoice to the Bank of Scotland for £300,000 in new coin, 21 January 1817; Sandy to Pole,
24 March 1817, Mint 11/4, W. Stace to Pole, 30 January 1817; 3 February 1817; 14
February 1817
11 BS Unsorted. Letter Book for Silver Coins Exchanged, pp. 22-43; unpaginated account
sheets for the Bank of Scotland's office at Greenock.
14 BS Unsorted . Letter Book for Silver Coins Exchanged, the Bank of Scotland to Pole, 3
December [1817]. PRO. Mint 1/54, pp. 410-11.
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Although the banking historian S. G. Checkland has argued that the Bank
made a profit out of the exchange, there seems little other than circumstantial
evidence to support this claim. Bank dividends paid in October 1817 did rise to
43/4 per cent from the 41/4 per cent paid in April of that year, and there was an
increase in the Bank's undivided product in the accounts at March 1818 over
that at March 1817. There is no evidence, however, pointing to the exchange
making or even contributing to this enhancement, and apart from the £2,765 of
expenses claimed from the Mint, how the Bank could have generated any
revenue from the operation is difficult to see.35
The silver circulation of Scotland by the second decade of the nineteenth
century consisted principally of the remnants of the £320,372 struck at the
Edinburgh mint between 1707-09 and a proportion both of the issues of the
London mint and the token money of the Bank of England In his estimate of
the number of coins remaining in circulation throughout Britain, the first Earl of
Liverpool did not make separate allowance for Scotland, although he did remark
that the country suffered from a great want of coins and capital. The greater
reliance on notes in Scotland might account for there being no issue of silver
tokens under the authority of the Bank of Scotland, to meet the dearth of official
coin as there had been with the Banks of England and Ireland. In addition, the
commercial sector in Scotland during the second decade of the nineteenth
century did not follow Wales and England in the issue of silver tokens 36 Despite
the sense of a modest amount of specie, the Bank of Scotland's Secretary,
George Sandy, nevertheless found himself having to concede that the quantity of
old coin had turned out to be much greater than originally supposed Inevitably
there w, ere deficiencies in some places"
The plan to execute a swift distribution in Scotland floundered a little on the
sheer distances involved in transporting the coin to all the outlying regions, and if
3 Chcckland	 nil h Banking p 295 BS 1/5/11, Ordinary Court Minutes 11 Mai L li 1818
PRO Mint 1 54 pp 561-61
3 Lnerpool Coin of the Realm, pp 186 225-26
3- BS 2 32 13) Sandi, to Pole, 15 March 1817
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the winter weather was going to be a factor anywhere it would be in the
Highlands and the west of Scotland. Reports from Buteshire on 7 March
referred to there still being numerous applications for exchange by poor people
from the Highlands, who had been prevented from coming sooner by
tempestuous weather. 38 The Sheriff Deputy of Inverness-shire wrote at the end
of February of between £.15,000 and £20,000 of old coin remaining in
circulation, for which, he believed, twice as long as had been allowed would be
needed to complete the exchange if the ruin of thousands of people were to be
avoided. Such applications were often attended with a touch of melodrama. Far
from seeing a short change-over period as an advantage some pointed to the way
in which trade had been hampered by this policy. Alex Robertson, an
upholsterer from Peterhead, was addressing precisely this issue when in March
he wrote to the Home Secretary, Lord Sidmouth. 'The Emissaries of factions',
he warned, 'are availing themselves of every thing that may further their views'
and, he went on, let me assure your Lordships it is easier to quell 10 Mobs in
London than one in the Highlands of Scotland.' George Sandy believed there to
be a certain amount of exaggeration in the reports of severe distress, and in
relation to the charges of Alex Robertson he thought a complete
misrepresentation of the situation in Peterhead had been related. Additional time
in remote areas was, nevertheless, officially sanctioned by the Directors of the
Bank of Scotland on 15 March and under the authority of this decision the
withdrawal of the old silver continued into June."
hivecting the old silver
The inspectors of the old coin were appointed by the bankers. The advice
offered from Tower Hill was that people be chosen for this role whose regular
employment involved them in handling silver or coin, such as shopkeepers, and,
18 BS Unsorted Letter Book for Silver Coins Exchanged, p. 47.
19 PRO Mint 11 6, C. Grant to S. A. Lushington, 6 March 1817; A. Robertson to Lord
Sidinouth, 14 March 1817; Sandy to Pole, 15 March 1817; 26 March 1817. BS. Unsorted:
Letter Book for Sth er Coins Exchanged, Bank of Scotland to Morrison, 17 June 1817.
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therefore, in whose professional judgement trust could be placed when
confronted by blank discs purporting to be coin of the realm. The inspectors
were drawn from the ranks of silversmiths, tax collectors and bank employees,
all of whom were vouched for by the bankers themselves or other respectable
members of the community. Charles Campbell in Greenock appointed as
inspectors two silversmiths, Robert Tumbull and John McLeod. Over thirty
years later the practice of the Mint's using bank tellers during the recoinage on
account of the well-known accuracy of their work was still being held up as an
example of sound administration. When confronted with particularly large
quantities of silver a selection was made from the total amount, examined as
representative of the whole and if confirmed genuine the remainder would be
assessed in bulk by weight. In settling cases of dispute inspectors were
instructed by the Mint to err on the side of the public. The government was
faithful to its assurances of the previous year in the sense that whether by design
details, colour and ring or by scraping the surface, if coin could be determined
genuine it was to be allowed as such at its nominal value regardless of its
condition Notices from 1816 advising the public of the proscriptions attaching
to base and foreign coin were repeated. The provision was made, however, that
silver rejected at exchange stations could be presented at the Mint where it
would be accepted in quantities of not less than £5 by tale at its standard silver
value 4 )
Although promises had been made in 1816 that no coin would be excluded on
account of its weight, a minimum, below which old silver was not to be received,
was enforced With the allowance for wear at 32 per cent for shillings and 50
per cent for sixpences, the parameters were, however, set at their most
reasonable and with reference to what was estimated to be the state of the old
silver The Mint had from time to time carried out experiments on the extent to
which the old coins had been diminished by wear (Table 2). In September 1816,
4 PRO Mint 1 54, pp 350-51, 440-44; Mint 11/74, notice issued by the Mint, 11 February
1817, Mint 1 41, pp. 148-50. BS Unsorted: Letter Book for Silver Coins Exchanged,
pp 18-19
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with arrangements for the exchange in mind, a total of £,500 in old coin was
received from the Bank of England. Sample shillings were found to have lost
approximately 30 per cent and sixpences up to 40 per cent of their original
weight, results which acted as a guide to formulating precisely how generous the
tolerance for wear should be.41
One of the questions frequently asked of the Mint by bankers responsible for
the stations was whether or not taking Irish coins in exchange for the new silver
was acceptable. Press reports of Irish shillings and sixpences, which 'seem
scarcely to possess any intrinsic value at all', inundating the circulation indicated
the difficulty that might have arisen. The stock answer to such an enquiry was
that most of the Irish shillings being of good silver would be allowed.42
The pieces referred to will not have been examples of the last regular issue of
Irish silver, being hammer-struck coins of James I they would have had 200
years' use behind them, and Bank of Ireland tokens for 10d and 5d are unlikely
to have acquired the labels 'shillings' or 'sixpences'. The newspaper reports and
references in Mint documents more than likely had in mind a type of coin of
which magistrates were warned in 1804. A notice issued by the Lord Mayor of
London on 8 December included the observation that the Irish counterfeit coin
'is not only very light, but base in quality, and will be readily known from the
thinness of both shillings and sixpences, and their being marked with a number of
letters and figures' 4i In the collection of the National Museum of Ireland there
is a group of fifty-five extremely worn silver coins that correspond fairly closely
to this description They approximate to the diameters of shillings and
sixpences, and are defaced with punch marks. In some instances full surnames
are visible, probably of tradesmen, but mostly the countermarks are a seemingly
random arrangement of letters. The composition of these pieces, known as slap
tokens, was evidently variable, sometimes British silver coins being employed,
PRO Mint 1 54, Morrison to the Bank, 18 September 1816, pp. 368-69; 370-71; 44243.
4- The Tunes, 13 April 1816. PRO. Mint 11/71, the Mint to Raper. Swann & Co, 1 February
1817, the Mint to Davis, Williams & Co, 6 February 1817.
43 Rucling„zinnals of the Coinage, II, 104-05.
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while on other occasions coins of baser alloy, but there is nevertheless a strong
probability that bankers were referring to this type of money during the course of
the exchange in 1817."
The often quoted view of the first Earl of Liverpool that by 1760 half-crowns
had vanished in great numbers and crown pieces had almost totally disappeared,
should be taken to mean disappeared or lost from active circulation. The
indications in the years prior to the exchange of hoarding were strongly
confirmed during the change-over to the new currency. In January 1805 John
Tennent was convicted of breaking into the house of Robert Shaw from whom
amongst other items he stole a quantity of gold coins, three crowns, four half-
crowns, sixty shillings and nine sixpences. When rumours of doubts surrounding
the acceptance of the old currency surfaced in the summer of 1816 the wife of a
church warden in Monmouth was induced to reveal her secret of hoarding silver
coin, over some considerable time she had accumulated £.300 in shillings.45
Twelve years after John Tennent's conviction the inspector at the station in
St Martin's Lane, London, was seeing the clear evidence of coins having been
deliberately set to one side. He assessed on one day that the silver taken had
been of the very best description, principally consisting of crowns and half-
crowns The Manchester Mercury reported that the last three days of the
exchange had chiefly brought in hoarded coins of Elizabeth I and succeeding
reigns in good preservation, including crown pieces of Charles II and William III
as well as various coins of Anne and George II. The likelihood of a story that
appeared in the same Manchester newspaper being accurate is questionable, but
if true it too would point to large quantities of silver lying idle. Lately, the paper
44 W J Da is. The Nineteenth Century Token Coinage of Great Britain, Ireland, the Channel
blonds and the ble of Man (London, 1904), p. xxxix. P. Seaby, Coins and Tokens of
Ireland (London, 1970), pp 154-55. R. A. S. MacAlister, 'A Catalogue of the Irish
Traders' Tokens in the Collection of the Roal Irish Academy', Proceedings of the Royal
Insh Academy. XI, (1931), 167-70. I am grateful to Michael Kenny of the National
Museum of Ireland for draw mg the collection of worn Irish silver to my attention, and to
Donal Bateson of the Hunterian Museum for his advice in identifying these pieces.
45 Liverpool. Coins of the Realm, p. 2. A New Pocket Dictionary of the Lives of Upwards of
One Hundred Criminal Characters (London, 1811), p. 119. The Preston Chronicle and
Lancashire Adveraser, 10 August 1816.
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related, an apparently poor old man with a clownish gait had been observed
walking to and fro before the British Linen Company's bank in Dumfries. After
considerable hesitation he ventured in, whereupon, having asked if they took the
old silver, he presented 1.500 worth. One writer summed up the situation by
commenting that 'many a fusty bag of accumulating faces have been dragged
from their "cave of slumbers" '.46
Problems with the change-over
Originally allowing a uniform two-week period for the exchange throughout
Britain was something of a misjudgement of the time that would be necessary to
accommodate places as far apart as Inverness and Ipswich. Not only had several
stations received no consignment of new coin by the postponed start date, with
only a few days of the exchange period remaining some were still awaiting their
first delivery Following several failed attempts to secure a supply direct from
the Mint, the anxiety of the people of Bolton was only relieved by a hastily
arranged transfer of coin from Preston; the delay, however, extended the
exchange beyond 27 February (Figure 12).47
A few days after the official close of the stations, Morrison informed
Commissary Officers employed across the country in issuing the new coin that
'the time for the general Exchange cannot be prolonged but any relief you can
afford the Poor is desirable, you must make it appear that it is quite your own
Act, Keep it quiet and consider this letter as perfectly Confidential'. In his
evidence in 1819 to the parliamentary committee on the resumption of cash
payments, Pole conceded that a few days further time had been allowed to the
inhabitants of a few distant or obscure places for them to bring in their old coin.
But a few days was a positive gloss on an extension that for example on the
4( PRO Mint 11 62, London station number 22. The Manchester Mercury and Harrops
General .4dn erwer, 11 and 18 March 1817.
47 PRO. Mint 11 6, I Brocklebank to Pole, 22 February 1817; Mint 11/71, Mint to Clayton &
Co, 22 Februar) 1817
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Channel Islands amounted to some weeks: the exchange began on 29 March and
ended on 5 April. While such a concession would not be unexpected for Jersey
and Guernsey or parts of Scotland, other towns with much less claim to
obscurity, such as Abergavenny, continued receiving old coin well into March."
In many instances too little coin was originally despatched. Over 400
requests were received at the Mint from stations seeking additional quantities.
In most cases either a fresh consignment was despatched or the bankers were
told to approach other stations in the hope that they had been sent an amount
over and above what was needed. Objections were raised from communities that
were not allocated their own station and supply of silver. On 16 February
Maurice Johnson, a Justice of the Peace from Spalding, wrote to the Mint
complaining of the town having been passed over in the distribution
arrangements 'The clamour of the people', he pleaded, 'is increasing for want
of an exchange of the old silver' While this town's demands were addressed
directly, others, such as Rochdale, had to rely on neighbouring areas for an
exchange facility The number of times stations reported surpluses of new coin
was in the region of half the number that complained of shortages: 49 But
regarding initial efforts to estimate the needs of the country as unimpressive
would be harsh Built into the system were mechanisms, such as the transfer of
coin between stations, for addressing shortages and surpluses which helped
refine what were inevitably rough indications of how much a given area would
require Moreover, the intention had been to absorb with the new silver as much
of the old as possible, rather than to provide a quantity of coin that was actually
required for a healthy circulation. Complaints of shortages of new silver were
not therefore unexpected. A wish to have an amount in excess of the exigencies
of the exchange probably accounts for a fair number of the demands for
additional supplies
48 Lords' Report On Resumption, 1819, Appendix D. 10, pp. 378-79. PRO. Mint 1/54, P. 492;
Mint 11/34, station number 393; Mint 11/74, notice on the exchange on Guernsey issued by
Commissary G White.
49 PRO. Mint 11/6, M. Johnson to the Mint, 16 February 1817; Mint 11/71, J. Entwistle to the
Mint, 17 February 1817; and passim; Mint 11/72, passim.
132
Counterfeits of the new silver appeared very soon after their release. On 14
February reports were published of base money, simulating that of the new,
already having been received in change. A Drury Lane Theatre was accused of
tendering a counterfeit coin and before long they were being sighted from
Gloucester to Kilmarnock. Denials from The Courier on 14 and 19 February
that such coins existed were overtaken some weeks later by a report in the same
paper of the prosecutions of William Clarke, Mary Anne Porter and Diana Ford,
for uttering counterfeits of the new silver." Elsewhere details of the base coins
and their more obvious defects were made public. The shillings were reported to
weigh about the same as a sixpence and the casing of silver to be very thin, but
the edge milling and the design details, of some counterfeits at least, were
thought good and therefore capable of deceiving. In the case against William
Hutchison and his wife the pieces purporting to be shillings were said to be of a
bad colour and imperfect impression. One suggestion was that a method had
been devised of beating a sixpence to the size of a shilling, which in certain
instances could account for the designs having an enlarged appearance and the
pieces being visibly defaced A number of weeks after the initial reactions of
concern a less complimentary view of the counterfeits tended to surface in the
press, an attitude which probably developed alongside an increasing familiarity
with the genuine coins 51
A study of the court cases dealing with the counterfeiting of coin held at the
Somerset Quarter Sessions during the first half of the nineteenth century, has
revealed that between 1828 and 1837, whenever details of the dates of the coins
are recorded, they mainly comprised the coinage of 1816-20 Moreover, of the
surviving counterfeits of the period 1816-55 the overwhelming majority are
copies of the last coinage of George III 52 For some years to come, therefore,
the recoinage issues remained a favourite of coiners.
50 Ruding. Annals of the Coinage, II, 109 The Courier, 14 and 19 February 1817, 5 March
1817 Morning Chronicle, 21 February 1817; 6 and 7 March 1817
51 The Tunes, 17 Febniary 1817, 6 March 1817 Morning Chronicle, 7 March 1817. The
Manchester Alercurv, 3 March 1817 The .S'all.shuty & Winche.ster Journal, 3 March 1817
52 I am grateful to Stephen Minnitt for proNiding me uith details of his study into
counterfeiting in Somerset in the early nineteenth century.
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Assessment of /he exchange
A year after the change-over had been completed, the lessons that could be
drawn from it were being discussed with reference to the withdrawal of the Bank
tokens. Thomas Babington, in the House of Commons, argued that agents
should be appointed in all large towns in the country to call in the token money
as had been the case some time ago with respect to the old Mint silver, while
John Curwen, MP for Carlisle, on the other hand, called to mind a letter he had
received from Selkirk which bemoaned the plight of many poor persons who
were kept in want of the necessaries of life on account of the difficulties of
exchanging their old silver coin. Curwen hoped that the same difficulties would
not be repeated over the tokens. There were critics and supporters of how the
exchange was conducted, the balance of opinion, however, tended in favour of
seeing the operation as a success.53
The view of The Salisbury & Winchester Journal that the banks of
Weymouth had completed the exchange to the entire satisfaction of the public
was a view echoed throughout Britain, and even The Times' 'stern alarums' in
1816 respecting the Coinage Bill had been changed to remarks that referred to
'this useful measure of the new coinage' that had been 'happily and ably
conducted' Twenty-four years later Pole was still receiving congratulations for
the manner in which the exchange had been administered. In June 1841 the
Duke of Cambridge, on returning a book Pole had sent him on the introduction
of the new silver, remarked that he was 'astonished at the quickness with which
you have executed the very difficult task. It proves clearly the admirable system
upon which you acted and the perfect method you adopted to carry this intricate
business through in a.fortnight.'54
53 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., )(XXVII, cols 331-32 (11 February 1818).
54 The Salisbury & Winchester Journal, 3 March 1817. The Times, 3 February 1817; 6 March
1817. Le\ ens Hall Bagot Papers, Documents relative to His Majesty's Mint from 1812 to
1819, letter inserted at pp. 45-46, Duke of Cambridge to Pole, 25 June 1841. The book to
hich reference v‘as made seems never to have been published.
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A spirit of cooperation pervaded the undertaking in the country, which was
reflected in banking houses who may otherwise have been rivals for business
helping to meet the balance of regional demand by transferring new coin
amongst themselves. James Oakes had a meeting with fellow bankers from the
surrounding area of Bury St Edmunds to ensure they all acted in each other's
interests during the exchange. So far from regarding their involvement as an
unwanted burden were quite a number of bankers that they asked to be
considered for exchanging the gold coin if such an operation were to take place.
The matter of expenses was one of the largest elements of the correspondence
relating to the change-over, extending to hundreds of letters, but the idea that
claiming excessive allowances might be a legitimate recompense for their efforts
occurred to virtually none of those employed. In only three cases out of many
hundreds did a serious dispute arise between the Mint and those who ran the
stations all in Gloucestershire and two curiously from the same town,
Cirencester 55
The correspondence between the Mint and those involved in the exchange
amounted to over 14,000 letters. The Master of the Mint opened accounts with
496 country bankers, fifty-five London bankers, sixty-five Commissary Officers,
twenty-four carriers and many minor suppliers. The actual number of exchange
stations throughout Britain was probably in the region of 640. The summary
details of the accounts in Appendices 3 and 4 do not include every appointed
location at which silver was issued As well as this stemming from not all of the
accounts having survived, the omission also reflects the situation at some
stations of the business transacted involving only the receipt and onward
distribution of new coin, rather than the operation of an actual exchange facility.
The average cost of running a station worked out at about £40. The net expense
incurred in freight, insurance, paying inspectors and charges relating to the
recoinage itself vas £527,267 This calculation includes a deduction of
£233,764 for the profit arising from the difference between the purchase price of
55 Fiske, 7 hc OaAes Diaries, II, 212,6 February 1817. PRO. Mint 11/71, passim; Mint 11/72,
pa.s.sIFn. Mint 1 54. p 523.
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silver and the Mint price at which the new coins were issued. 56 The machinery
of government had been strengthened since 1793 as a consequence of many
years of war and the major logistical operation of maintaining an army overseas.
Managing the recoinage and exchange seems at once fraught, but however
demanding, as an exercise in the functioning of government it was not
remarkable.
The involvement of many others outside the Mint in the execution of the
exchange meant many letters of thanks were despatched after the accounts had
been settled Pole wrote of his sincere gratitude to the Committee of Bankers, a
body upon whom the Mint leant heavily in coordinating affairs throughout the
Wales and England Circular letters were sent out to all the country bankers
who managed the withdrawal and issue of the coin, acknowledging the
commitment they demonstrated and praising the 'peculiar moderation' of the
expenses submitted and 'the total abstinence from all desire of remuneration'.
The Bank of Scotland also received thanks for its exertions and effectual
assistance on behalf of the public. In the House of Commons, the Master
expressed his sincere belief that without the active assistance of the banking
interest in London, Westminster and every other part of the country the measure
could never have been completed 57
James Morrison, like the Mint official Thomas Hall during the Great
Recoinne, was the unsung hero of this whole business; he provided the constant
administrative backbone and was the man charged with executing the Master's
instructions 58 An extra payment from the Treasury was made to Morrison at
Pole's behest in recognition of his efforts, embracing as they did responsibilities
beyond the normal scope of his duties. Of Pole's relationships with his
colleagues, that with Morrison stands out as having been especially good, but it
was not necessarily an unbroken vista of bonhomie. On a not infrequent number
PRO Mint 1 54 pp 409-11, 530-42, 579
PRO Mint 1 54. pp 495-96, 522-23, 528-29, Mint 11/71, Pole to 1 Smith, 3 March 1817
Parhanuntarv abaft s. 1st set- , XXXV, cols 894-901 (5 March 1817)
8 Challis 'Lord Hastings', MIRA p 393
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of occasions Pole wrote to his deputy in an angry and impatient tone. In
October 1817 he asserted that 'I cannot tell you how vexed I am at the matrix
for the reverse of the crown piece being spoilt in the die press room', going on
to rebuke Morrison by insisting that 'the next order you give for work not to be
begun till Pistrucci is on the spot, must be given to some person responsible, and
who must take care, at his own peril, that it is not disobeyed'. Although
Morrison was always left in no doubt as to the strength of the Master's feelings,
he was rarely the chief target of Pole's chagrin.59
In a letter of 30 August 1823 addressed to Pole - by that time Lord
Maryborough - the chief officers of the Mint expressed their admiration for him,
for the manner in which he had not only managed the department but also for the
mettle he had shown in introducing the reforms of 1815. These were more than
perfunctory statements of appreciation that for formality's sake the chief officers
felt obliged to make. They also commissioned the design of a medal to
commemorate his time at the Mint, an expression of gratitude, paid for by the
officers themselves, that other Masters of the first half of the nineteenth century
were not accorded The inscription on the medal drew attention to the recoinage
as the major achievement of his mastership. To be honoured by his colleagues in
this manner speaks well of those attributes of sound administration that even his
political opponents were prepared to concede.°
Reaction to the new coins
The balance of opinion was in favour of the idea of reform and tended to
compliment the manner in which it was introduced, but the response to the
designs of the new coins was mixed. The Morning Chronicle's opinion of the
shillings as 'very handsome' stands out against much hostility. The Times
5 9 Morrison had exercised the duties of Master's deputy since 1802 but only in September
1815 Vn as the post formally recognised as part of the Mint establishment. PRO. Mint 1/18,
p. 182. PRO Mint 4 27, Pole to Morrison, 19 October 1817. PRO. Mint 1/23, pp. 242-43.
60 PRO Mint 1/23, pp. 244-47. Bagot, George Canning, II, 193 note.
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reported that 'the new shilling and sixpenny pieces are more enriched than usual
in their ornament, but we do not recognise that superiority of design and
execution over all forms of coins, which the improved state of the arts gave
reason to expect'. The detail of the heraldic reverse designs attracted criticism
but not as much as the choice of portraits of George III. The Gentleman's
Magazine reported the following views on the work of Pistrucci: 'as of course
this Artist could not have seen his Majesty, it is a reasonable conjecture, from the
discordancy of the heads on the different new Coins with each other, that we are
indebted to the fertility of his genius for these varieties of deformity which
disgrace the Coinage'.61
The debates in Parliament in 1817 did not address the reform of the currency
in any fundamental way and the discussion that took place on 5 March had about
it an air of frivolity Although conceding the work had been accomplished by the
Mint with celerity, the opposition spokesman in the House of Commons, Henry
Brougham, was on the whole disparaging. In view of comments about the
coinage to which he wanted a response from Pole, and observing that the Master
was seldom present other than when called upon to vote, he quipped that he
should prefer Pole in the House not by tale but by his weight in his seat.
Brougham thought the head of George III extremely ill-executed, and a poor
likeness, particularly on the half-crown. 62 The piece was indeed vilified; the
expression given to the king was thought somewhat troubled, presenting a
monstrous caricature rather than a regal portrait. The Examiner commented that
'surely the artist must have been a wag or a Jacobin! - perhaps both Jacobin and
wag' Within a matter of weeks of their issue the announcement was made that
another, more sympathetic, portrait of the King was in preparation. Pole, who
was probably more unhappy than anyone with the portrait on the half-crown, had
to suffer the following trivial verse:
61 The Tunes, 17 February 1817. Morning Chronicle, 4 February 1817. Manville,
Numismatic Guide, II, pt I, 96.
62 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., VOCV, cols 759-75 (27 February 1817); VOCV, cols 894-
901 (5 March 1817). The Gentleman's Magazine, LXXXVII, pt 11 (1817), 309-10.
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It is allowed throughout the town,
the head upon the new half-crown
Is not the George we so much prize:
the chin's not like, the nose, the eyes.
This may be true; but, on the whole,
the fault lies chiefly in the Pole.63
Pole emerged from the withering scorn of the sketch written by Thomas
Barnes (Chapter 4, pp. 73-74) as a man with a towering sense of his own self-
importance. His attitude to the silver coinage also revealed him to be something
of a self-publicist He was well within his rights, as specified in his indenture, to
insist on having his own privy mark on the coins struck under his mastership, but
the lengths to which he went to ensure the inclusion of this mark convey the
sense of a man wrapped in his own vanity. He wrote to Morrison in August
1817 reminding him of the importance of his initials, WWP, being included as
part of the reverse design of the crown piece, and before the end of October he
had reminded Morrison a further three times." He boasted about the matter to
Charles Bagot in July 1816, jokingly referring to the similarity his actions bore to
those of Archbishop of York, Thomas Wolsey, who in the sixteenth century had
put a Cardinal's hat on groats struck at the York mint. The presumption, Pole
remarked, formed one of the articles of Wolsey's impeachment. The actual
problem for Wolsey was more to do with his lack of any royal authority to strike
groats at York than with the use of a particular symbol.65
Pole's actions in this instance indicate how intimately he felt the recoinage to
be an undertaking upon which his personal reputation depended. To initial the
coins was a way of anchoring the association in people's minds. Including his
" Morning Chronicle, 19 February 1817. The Examiner, 16 February 1817. Parliamentary
Debates, 1st ser,
  XXXV, cols 894-901 (5 March 1817). Bagot, George Canning, II, 31.
64 PRO Mint 4 27, Pole to Morrison, 10 August, 11 and 20 September and 5 October 1817.
65 Bagot, George Canning, II, 32. C. E. Challis, The Tudor Coinage (Manchester, 1978),
pp. 76-77
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own mark may have seemed harmless enough to Pole but others saw it quite
differently. The press and his parliamentary colleagues, Brougham amongst
them, took great pleasure in chiding him on his weakness for self-promotion.
Pole's parliamentary opponents would have regarded the counterfeits of the new
currency as welcome in one respect if no other: their weak reproduction of the
designs meant the Master's initials were no longer visible. Perhaps, though, Pole
should have drawn comfort from attention being focused on questions of design,
in the sense that it demonstrated there was no disaster to pick over. In the midst
of the ribaldry there were those from whom he received support and one such
was moved to write the following poem:
Sure never the State had a Servant before
Who gave such complete satisfaction;
For Slander herself cannot find in her store
One fault as a theme for detraction.
She thought she had found one, but when it was shown,
There was not a mortal would mind it;
So puny it was, that no sight but her own
Unaided by glasses could find it.
Then success to the Mint! and its Master and all!
Such censures 1 we well may defy them;
May the State long have Servants whose faults are so small,
That microscopes only can spy them!66
66 Morning Chronicle, 3 March 1817. PRO Mint 18/25. The poem was written by B. Barton
who enclosed it in a letter to Mornson of March 1817. For the coverage the question of
Pole's initials generated in the regional press see The Manchester Mercury, 3 March 1817;
The Salisbury & Winchester Journal, 24 March 1817; Shropshire Chronicle, 7 March
1817.
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The old silver coinage
The documents held at the Public Record Office dealing with the silver exchange
include the accounts submitted by most of the exchange stations in England and
Wales; the records of the exchange in Scotland are held at the Bank of
Scotland's archives in Edinburgh. The accounts provide an insight, founded on
an extensive national sample, into the possible size of the silver circulation, its
distribution regionally and the extent to which it was tainted by base coin. In
Leeds, for example, £15,326 was accepted, in Ludlow £3,276, in Market Rasen
£929 and so on (Appendices 3 and 4). Throughout Britain £2,599,487 in old
silver was withdrawn: £2,176,087 in England, Wales, the Channel Islands and
£423,400 in Scotland (Table 14).
For all the detail that the returns contain they should be used with a certain
degree of caution Whether stations attempted to exchange all the old coin
available in a town or if they merely absorbed what they could with the quantities
of new that they were sent is not clear. There is evidence, however, that
suggests the totals for each town are probably a fair guide to the overall size of
the silver circulation After the exchange was over some stations found
themselves with more new coin than they needed, and upwards of £200,000 was
returned to the Mint unexchanged. This would suggest that in many areas most
of the old had a fair chance of being swept up. In addition, there are plenty of
instances of stations, having exhausted their supply of new coin, resorting to
banknotes or tokens to continue the exchange. Pole's judgement was that the
estimated amount of silver coin in circulation of £2.5 million, prepared prior to
the recoinage, appeared to have been nearly correct. 67 The attitude by and large
was to make an effort to gather in as much of the existing currency as possible,
even if that meant improvising. The amount of new silver available does not
67 PRO Mint 11 15, station number 13; Mint 11/29, station numbers 221 and 235; Mint
11/14, accounts relating to the exchange. Lords' Report on Resumption, 1819, Appendix
D. 10, pp 378-79
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then seem to have strictly dictated in advance the quantity of old that was
received.
As well as the distinct nature of the circulation in Scotland, the north of
England exhibited features uncommon in the rest of Britain that may have
affected the amount of currency withdrawn. The banker Lewis Lloyd, in his
evidence to the Commons' committee on the resumption of cash payments,
considered that there was a clear preference in the north west for paper currency
over coin. The circulation in that part of the country in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, especially in Lancashire, consisted to a very large
extent of bills of exchange and amounts for small denominations, such as 12,
might have been expected to take over something of the role of coins in the
settling of accounts As late as the 1820s, an estimated 90 per cent of the
business of Manchester was conducted in bills of exchange. The issue by local
banks of their own notes although not unheard of in Lancashire was nevertheless
seldom encountered and a preference instead developed for notes of the Bank of
England 68 The proportion of old coin recalled in Lancashire was by comparison
to other counties in Britain fairly large, indeed the only area in excess of it was
London (Tahle.s 14 and 15). If the assumption is correct that the circulation of
bills of exchange reduced the quantity of coin in use, then an even higher
proportion of coin might have been expected had the county's currency been
more typical Alternatively, the view that small denomination bills necessarily
displaced the use of silver coin may require revision.
The returns of the country stations can be related to population and used to
assess the extent to which a higher population actually determined a higher
incidence of coin The census of 1811 provides a rough guide to the population
of the country in 1817 and the number of inhabitants in each town. To achieve a
more accurate picture a compensating factor would have to be employed in
68 Ashton, 'The Bill of Exchange', in Ashton and Sayers, English Monetary History, pp. 37-
39, 45 J H Clapham, An Economic History of Modern Britain, The Railway Age, 1820-
/850. 2nd edition, (Cambridge, 1967), p. 265 note. Commons' Report on resumption,
1819, Minutes of Evidence, p. 165.
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order to accommodate increases over the intervening six years. There are,
however, problems with an analysis that would attempt to relate the amount of
silver in towns with exchange stations to the populations of those towns, largely
because it generates information that is too precise. The old coin was more than
likely drawn in from districts beyond the strict boundary of a town, which if then
associated with the population of that town would tend to inflate the figure for
the amount of coin per person. The difficulties in this regard that might be
encountered over a wider area would not disappear but would tend to be
reduced The amount of old coin received by each county might then offer a
more reliable guide to the relationship between population and the incidence of
old coin (Table 15)
Throughout England the expectation that more densely populated counties
had a larger circulation is not necessarily confirmed by the results. Out of the
forty counties of England, excluding London and including Monmouthshire, the
amount of old coin withdrawn increases progressively with advances in
population in only eleven instances. On eighteen occasions the next successive
increase in population reveals a fall rather than a rise. Looked at in the broadest
sense, the figures do show a relationship between sizeable populations and more
coin but the two are not anchored as an inevitability. There are a few notable
counties whose coin/population ratios diverge strongly. The circulation of old
silver in Gloucestershire at £78,857 was greater than that of five other counties
with higher populations, and Northumberland's 1,60,286 was in advance of
twelve other more populous regions. The value of coins per person in
Northumberland at 7s, being by far the highest of any English county, confirms
the sense of a disproportionately large number of coins in circulation in the north
east The county totals of coin withdrawn placed in relation to the overall
national amount of old silver, might also be employed as ratios to estimate very
roughly what the incidence of other centrally issued coinages, for example that of
gold, might look like
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The map of the distribution of old silver (Figure 13) reveals that the region
south of Rutland through Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire and down to Surrey
was one of fairly light coinage use, a feature shared by some areas in the north of
England, together with Monmouthshire and Herefordshire. The average figure
for coin per person for these areas of 2s 6d is fairly low compared to many other
English counties. The highest incidence of old silver occurs in the counties of
Devon, Gloucestershire, Lancashire, and the West Riding of Yorkshire all of
which contained major commercial or trading centres and the extent of coin
circulating at these places usually dominated the rest of the county. Almost
£38,000 was withdrawn in Bristol, which is over £31,000 more than the next
highest total for a town in Gloucestershire. Whether in industrialising or in
agricultural areas the presence in a county of a major town or port such as
Norwich, Maidstone, Canterbury, Birmingham or Coventry resulted in higher
volumes of coin As with London, the larger urban areas in the provinces
probably drew in currency from the surrounding region. The value of coin per
head of population in the capital was 12s, and such a large figure may in part
account for the seeming paucity of coin in Middlesex and Surrey.69
In five counties, Devon, Gloucestershire, Lancashire, Northumberland and
Yorkshire, o‘er £60,000 was withdrawn and they account for almost 30 per cent
of the total exchanged in England and Wales. Outside these pockets of higher
density there was a moderately even distribution of coin. Amounts within a
range of £20,000 to £40,000 account for seventeen out of the forty English
counties Traditionally the silver currency has been seen as not suffering, to the
same degree, the problems of being deficiently spread across Britain as was the
case with copper, and the records of the exchange stations confirm that the
coverage of silver was genuinely national. There is no question that the silver
coinage was attracted to London in larger quantities than any other part of the
country, it accounted for 28 per cent of the old coin withdrawn in England and
Wales, but the handful of regions that benefited from healthy supplies suggest
that silver was able to find its way to areas of higher demand.
9 The Population of Great Britain, 1811. Parliamentary Papers, 1812 (316), pp 510-11.
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The extent of wear of all the silver coinage withdrawn throughout Britain
was 26 per cent. The worst quality coin seems to have gravitated towards the
Bank of England; at 30.06 per cent the old silver presented at Threadneedle
Street had suffered a noticeably higher loss of weight than that presented
anywhere else in Britain. The figures recorded for the London stations, the
London bankers and the exchange stations throughout England, Scotland and
Wales range from 24.12 per cent to 26.36 per cent. Why the Bank should have
attracted more worn coin is not entirely clear."
A breakdown of the weight loss of old silver in terms of denomination was
not possible because mixed quantities of coin tended to be grouped together by
the country bankers for despatch to the Mint; the exchange stations in England
and Wales only rarely recorded in their accounts the weights of bags of silver by
denomination An experiment was however conducted at the Mint after the
exchange on the old silver on the basis of £24,000 split evenly between shillings
and sixpences a weight loss of 28.24 per cent was found to have afflicted
shillings, and a loss of 47.54 per cent applied to sixpences. In the six instances
where country stations provided similar figures, which amounted to a sample
size of £7,700, the wear rates for shillings tended to be between 28 and 30 per
cent, while the range for sixpences was largely between 45 and 50 per cent. For
Scotland a broadly similar picture was evident. Calculations based on tables of
weights drawn up by the Bank of Scotland on a sample of £23,000 reveal that
sixpences had suffered on average a diminution of 43.96 per cent, shillings 27.41
per cent, half-crowns 8 29 per cent and crowns 5.38 per cent.71
As far as fineness was concerned, the story is less straightforward.
Contemporary comments suggest that the circulation was littered with
counterfeits and the expectation would be that, because of the worn condition of
- PRO Mint 1 54. pp 584-85
.7 I PRO Mint 1 54, pp 500-02, Mint 11/20, station number 112, Mint 1122, station number
143, Mint 11 23, station number 176, Mint 11 24, station number 200, Mint 11/28. station
number 277 C. Mint 11/32, station number 346 	 BS Unsorted Siker Com Book
(Recomage) 1817, pp 30-34
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the coin and the liberal instructions given to inspectors, large quantities of base
money would have passed through the exchange stations. This, however, would
be to ignore the care that was taken over the choice of appropriate individuals to
act as inspectors. Sample meltings of the coins in 1817 did indeed reveal that
some of the silver was well below the sterling standard of 925, but taking
together all the old coin received, the fineness was a surprisingly respectable
911. Only £38,000 of absolutely base material would have been required to
lower the fineness of 12.6 million of old coin to that level and this works out at
just 1.5 per cent of the total value of old coins in circulation. Put another way,
out of every £1 of old silver handled about 31/2d was likely to have been base.
The judgement of the Birmingham magistrate Isaac Spooner in January 1817
that although base coins were numerous, the quantity would probably be found
less great than anticipated seems to have been sound.72
If the skill of the country station inspectors weeded out a majority of the
obviously counterfeit pieces, then what came to be accepted might present rather
too favourable an impression. The adoption, however, of a deliberately lenient
attitude would have meant a fair representation of the overall standard of silver
reached the Mint, and in that case the results suggest the old currency will have
contained very little adulterated material. On the basis of the figures the balance
of judgement ought to rest in favour of the withdrawn silver being a fair
reflection of the condition of the coin in common currency, and therefore in
favour of a modest number of counterfeit pieces.
The recoinage and exchange was designed to sweep away the improvised
arrangements and instability of the previous twenty years. But despite its
immediate success in retiring much of the old money, in March 1817 the
currency remained in a troubled state. Bank dollars were still circulating, as
were Bank tokens, together with a huge variety of country banknotes; the gold
coinage had been exported wholesale during the Napoleonic Wars and the
proposed new sovereigns were not yet on the scene; in addition, there must have
72 PRO. Mint 11 54, pp. 584-85; Mint 11/6, Spooner to Pole, 25 January 1817.
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been some ministerial anxiety about whether the new silver coinage could
survive future changes in bullion prices and, avoiding the melting pot, actually
remain in use. Much of the instability had been eased by 1825, but more than a
decade had to elapse before the settlement of 1816-17 became firmly established.
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CHAPTER 7
THE LEGACY OF CURRENCY REFORM
Concluding the design process
Although the initial recoinage and exchange at the end of George III's reign was
largely concluded within ten months, by the time the full complement of
denominations was finished, the whole exercise had lasted for almost four years.
While, therefore, the new shillings, sixpences and half-crowns were being
released into circulation, part of the substance of implementing the provisions of
the Coinage Act, the issue of crowns, sovereigns and half-sovereigns as well as
the larger gold coins, remained to be completed. Expressions from the Master
during 1816 and 1817 of the need for haste in completing and having ready for
issue as soon as possible the remaining coins ensured steady progress, but the
pressure to comply with the strict deadline set for the beginning of the exchange
gradually evaporated during the secondary wave of the recoinage (Table 16).
Of the denominations still being prepared during the spring of 1817, the
sovereign and the half-sovereign were reckoned more necessary for circulation
and were therefore put into production before the end of the year. The crown
piece, on the other hand, had fallen out of favour as a part of the circulating
medium and its decline in this respect was confirmed during the last four years of
George III's reign It was reborn, however, as a coin through which an ideal
could be expressed, identical to that propounded by Sir Joseph Banks several
years earlier, of striving for the highest standards of craftsmanship and taste At
the outset speed was urged but as the months went by the important point
ceased to be despatch and became rather the perfection of every aspect of the
coin Early encouragement came from Ennio Visconti, a member of L'Institut
Royal de France In response to having seen a cast of Pistrucci's St Geoi ge,
which was intended to be used on the reverse of the crown piece, he confetted
148
upon it praise in the most fulsome terms, referring to the excellence of its style
and composition as something which set it apart from other modern coins.'
Pistrucci may have had the Master of the Mint as a firm ally but hand in hand
with that went collaboration in the design process. In practical terms for the
Italian artist, this meant he had to endure Pole's dissection of the St George
composition in the form of a series of detailed amendments, from the type of
sword St George should carry to concern over a deficiency in the dragon's
ferocity. Towards the end of a three-month visit to Paris in the autumn of 1817,
Pole insisted Pistrucci join him, believing a few face to face meetings would
advance more swiftly the design of the crown than the conveying of his
directions through any number of letters. The same care was afforded to the
striking of the coin, the suggestion even being made at one stage that the only
way to secure the necessary quality was for Pistrucci to inspect personally each
of the three or four thousand coins from each day's production. Returns to the
Mint Office start recording deliveries of crowns on 11 September 1818, putting
the beginning of production therefore some days earlier. Once a sufficient
number of satisfactory pieces was available, the pride the Master of the Mint felt
in the coin was evident from the use he made of it as a presentation piece both to
his political colleagues and other members of the establishment, such as the
Speaker of the House of Commons and the Archbishop of Canterbury.2
The reaction to the second phase of the recoinage was, like that which
greeted the new coins in 1817, somewhat mixed. There were plenty of
compliments The Prince Regent judged the portrait on the crown to be the best
head of his father he had ever seen, and Pole was so taken with the flattering
notes from Banks and Lord Bathurst, again regarding the crown, that he insisted
the remarks be conveyed to the moneyers. The Gentleman's Magazine was very
PRO Mint 9 32, Account of gold monies coined, 4 June to 11 July 1817; 15 July 1817 to 13
June 1818, Mint 4 26, Pole to Morrison, 1 December 1816; Mint 1/54, Visconti to
Pistrucci, 13 NoN ember 1817, pp 335-39. DTC, XVIII, 199-225, paper by Sir Joseph
Banks on reform of the Mint.
2 PRO Mint 4 27, Pole to Morrison, 5 and 26 October 1817; 17 and 27 September 1818.
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complimentary about the crown, especially noting the technical competence of
its manufacture. It also read into the reverse design a good deal more than the
artist probably had in mind, seeing an obvious allegorical reference to the 'genius
and valour of Britain triumphing over the Demon of anarchy and
Despotism...The coin will transmit to posterity a record of the great and brilliant
events which, under Providence, have led to the restoration of peace and
happiness throughout the world.' There were other expressions, printed in The
Gentleman's Magazine, of praise for the reverses of the crown and the sovereign
on the basis of their presenting a welcome change from the monotonous
recurrence of royal arms.3
Detractors included the numismatist and antiquarian Richard Sainthill who
could see no discernible likeness between George III and Pistrucci's portraits of
him, describing the features of the crown effigy as conveying an aspect of
weakness and vacancy Subsequent generations have been more generous. The
numismatic aesthete Humphrey Sutherland described the head on the crown
piece as powerfully characterised, while the reverse he thought encapsulated the
whole essence of classical revivalism of the early nineteenth century. The
coinage as a whole is now regarded as having injected new life into the British
tradition of numismatic art that had suffered for many years at the hands of
mediocre late eighteenth-century engravers.4
Past-exchange traumas
The smooth transition over the period of the recoinage through the production
and issue of the new coins was of course important, but as was found at the
beginning of the eighteenth century, the operation of market forces could undo
PRO Mint 4 27, Pole to Momson, 28 August 1818; 22 and 27 September 1818. The
Gentkinan s Magazine, LXXXVIII, pt 11 (1818), 368; XC, Pt!, (1820), 227-28.
4 R Samthill, An 0/la Podrida, or Scraps, Num:mitotic, Antiquarian, and Literary (London,
1844 and 1853). I, 46-47. C. H. V. Sutherland, Art in Coinage: The Aesthetics of Money
from Greece to the PreAent Day (London, 1955), P. 196.
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the best laid plans. For the spring and summer of 1817, with the balance of trade
running in favour of Britain and the price of precious metals at par, the new
coinage was released into a sympathetic economic environment. The years
immediately following, however, suggested problems ahead: the price of silver
fell during 1816 to below 5s an ounce for the first time in over one hundred
years, (Appendix /) but from that level it rose on average each year up to 1819,
reaching a high point of 5s 7d in February. The very circumstance which had
obtained throughout most of the eighteenth century, of the market price being
higher than the Mint price, the situation government had sought to avoid by
raising silver to 5s 6d, was a reality. At the same time the foreign exchanges
turned against Britain, gold coins issued by the Bank of England a few months
after the silver exchange were exported to France in large numbers and the
possibility of major financial reform, in the shape of planning for the resumption
of cash payments, gave hope to those who in any case had reservations about the
settlement of 1816 To have argued that the reforms were beginning to acquire
the appearance of being something of a costly mistake would not have come as a
surprise 5
Such was the familiarity that had attached during the period of restriction to
the use of notes, that in response to the Bank's offer on 28 November 1816 to
pay certain of its notes in guineas in eleven days' time, very few demands were
received Striking sovereigns started towards the end of May 1817, that of half-
sovereigns beginning four months later, but as with the offer relating to guineas,
once the new gold was available in July the response from the public was not
overly enthusiastic The former Governor of the Bank Jeremiah Harman
commented in February 1819 that 'people seemed indifferent about gold; that
instead of coming to the bank for gold, they brought their gold to the bank'.
Resolutions passed by the Bank's Court of Directors on 17 April and 18
September 1817, by which notes issued prior to specified dates could be
redeemed in cash, meant a trial resumption of specie payments was under way.
Although the price of gold had fallen during 1816 to £3 18s 6d, it thereafter
6 Parliamentary Debates, 1st scr., )(XXVII, col. 1252(9 April 1818).
151
increased and sustained a level for the next two years above the Mint rate at
which the sovereigns and half-sovereigns were issued.6
As the gold price rose and profits began to be realised from dealing in
sovereigns, so the Bank encountered more demand. From July 1817 to the end
of July 1818 £4,459,716 was released in new gold coins, the first substantial
issue taking place in October. Sir John Newport, in the House of Commons on
10 April 1818, felt that although hardly any of these remained in circulation, only
a small number had gone abroad. They were, he believed, in the possession of
bankers who were amassing stocks in preparation for a return to cash payments.
On the other hand, Lord Bathurst's estimate in May 1818 was that all of the £3
million to £4 million in gold recently issued had been exported, and less than a
year later Robert Peel indicated that of the gold coined in France since October
1818, 75 per cent, or £5 million, was believed to have come from British gold
issued since the beginning of 1816. Witnesses called before the parliamentary
committees in 1819 on the resumption of cash payments testified in a similar
vein The prominent Whig politician Dudley North referred to the export of
struck gold to Europe as the 'twisting of straw for asses to ear.'
Given the financial context in which gold was finding difficulty remaining in
circulation, critics of the government's policy such as Lauderdale considered that
unless a change was made to the Mint's regulations, unless, in fact, the Coinage
Act was repealed, returning to a system of cash payments was an impractical
proposition Lauderdale wanted to begin afresh the process of discussion into
the metallic and paper currencies, justifying his arguments in favour of a silver
standard by pointing to Europe and the logic of being part of a currency system
employed throughout most of the continent. In indicating the pressure increases
6 PRO Mint 9 32, Account of gold monies coined, 4 June to 11 July 1817; 15 July 1817 to 13
June 1818 Commons' Report on resumption, 1819, Minutes of Evidence, p. 41; Appendix
2. pp 269-70
Lords Rcport on reAumption, 1819, Minutes of Evidence, p. 103; Appendix D. 3, p. 372.
W. Smart, Economic Annals of the Nineteenth Century, 1821-30 (London, 1917), p. 43.
Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., )00CVII, cols 1229-34 (9 April 1818); XXXVII,
cols 1284-85 (10 April 1818); )(XXVIII, col. 944 (26 May 1818); )0(XIX, cols 1398-1415
(5 April 1819)
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in the price of gold were putting on the new system, he was correct, but his
motions that committees of investigation be set up to examine the state of the
circulating medium received the same chilly reception as did his suggestions for
redrafting currency legislation in 1816.8
The rise in the price of silver to Ss 6d and the suspicion that is was likely to
go two or three pence higher, led Thomas Frankland Lewis in March 1818 to
speculate on the imminent disappearance from circulation of the new silver
coinage. Opposition leader George Tierney was worried that the change in the
ratio between gold and silver effected in 1816 was operating to raise the price of
gold Like Alexander Baring he saw merit in the French currency system, which
survived without the equivalent of £1 and 12 notes, the withdrawal of which he
thought would assist in the establishment of the new metallic currencies. William
Huskisson, on the other hand, had no truck with the idea of a token silver
coinage having any especial influence. While discussion of the change in the
ratio was a concern aired in the press in 1816, it was not an issue that had
engaged Parliament during debate of the Coinage Bill, but with two years'
reflection and one year of seeing the system in practice, the debate had moved
on But the trends of the bullion market and the course of the foreign exchanges
were yet only a cause for concern not alarm. The fundamental questioning of the
reforms of 1817 was therefore neither particularly long nor involved.9
By the beginning of 1819 the circumstances surrounding the new currency
were still unsettled and the temperature of the debate advanced, silver in the
market was at 5s 7d, one penny above the newly established Mint price - an ill
omen for the survival of the new coins. With fairly recent experience over the
Bank of England tokens denominated Ss having to be raised in value to Ss 6d
K Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser , XXXVIII, cols 187, 190-92, 206 (20 April 1818);
)(XXVIII, col 947 (26 May 1818); )(XXVIII, cols 971-75 (27 May 1818), xxxix,
cols 13-35 (21 January 1819) Lords' Report on re.sumption, 1819, Report, p 1
9 Parliamentary Debates, 1st, scr , )(XXVII, cols 710-13 (2 March 1818); )00(V111,
cols 443. 455, 490(1 May 1818). The Tunes, 11 and 13 June 1816
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several years after their original release in 1804 because of increases in the price
of silver, ministers should not have been surprised at being confronted by the
prospect of adjusting the rates of the new silver. Added to this there was the
decline in the Bank of England's reserves of gold, from 1111/2 million in August
1817 to less than 1.4 million in February 1819 largely on account of the exodus
of gold to France. Taunting expressions of uncertainty from Pascoe Grenfell in
January 1819 that the consequence of silver's continued rise in price, and the
prospect of its disappearance from circulation, was likely to be the introduction
of paper shillings, brought from the ministers speculative responses that the
recent increases in silver would probably not be sustained. The old spectre of
the over issue and depreciation of paper currency was fixed in some politicians'
minds as the villain in the advancing price of silver which, following through on
the government's reasoning, would have led to the circular argument that a new
metallic currency was judged essential before the ending of restriction and yet
the continuance of restriction, because of the pressures exerted by an excessive
paper currency, acted to deny any kind of stability. Whether or not change was
to be effected to the coinage as a result of the strain the new system was under,
the likelihood was that it would be as a consequence of attempts to resolve the
future of the paper currency and its relationship to gold. The Coinage Act was
not just about the mechanics of introducing a set of new coins. It was also
concerned with establishing gold as the standard of value and on the security of
gold in this role depended the future of the silver coinage. 10
Petitions were read in Parliament from merchants in Leeds and Halifax, from
bankers in Liverpool and from a range of financial and manufacturing interests in
Bristol, pleading the case for the continuation of restriction, at least for the time
being, on the grounds that resuming cash payments would cause too much
economic disruption and that the country would suffer a diminution in the
circulating medium In a series of letters to The Times during the first few
10 Ruding. Annals of the Coinage, II, 107. Feavearn car, The Pound Sterling, pp. 215-16.
Parliamentary Debates, 1st scr , )(XXIX, cols 130-31 (27 January 1819); )00(IX,
cols 149-55 (29 Januarn 1819).
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months of 1819, Richard Page, writing under the pseudonym Daniel Hardcastle,
commented on the absurd regulations of the Mint which had not observed the
correct value between gold and silver, making a return to specie payments highly
inexpedient. Little impetus towards a decisive course of action was evident.
Instead the Bank indicated its willingness for a parliamentary committee to be
appointed rather than leave the question unresolved, and early in February 1819
a Lords' and a Commons' committee - the one in the House of Commons
chaired by Robert Peel - were appointed to examine the state of the Bank of
England with reference to the expediency of resuming cash payments."
Parliamentary committees on resumption
The plan for the resumption of cash payments as detailed in the reports of the
two committees presented to Parliament during the first week of May was based
largely on David Ricardo's idea of a staged re-introduction of gold and was in its
recommendations in essence the same. At the beginning of 1819 gold was at £.4
3s, which represented a 5s '2d advance on the Mint price. Provision in the
resumption plan was made for a gradual return to the long-established gold price
over the course of four years by the Bank of England's redeeming its notes in
gold at a progressively lower rate. From 1 February 1820 to 1 May 1823, notes
were only to be exchanged for gold in the form of bullion and in quantities not
less than 60oz, the redemption of notes for gold coins and an end to restriction
was to be effected from 1 May 1823. The recommendation was also made from
the committees that the law prohibiting the export of coin of the realm be
repealed on the grounds that it had for many years been almost entirely
ineffectual The intention therefore was for Britain to remain on the gold
standard and the balance between silver and gold as established in 1816 to be left
II Parliamentary abates, 1st ser, , XXXIX, cols 188-89 (1 February 1819); xxxix,
cols 212-13 (2 February 1819); XXXIX, cols 276-80 (3 February 1819). Lords' Report on
resumption, 1819. Appendix A. 2, p. 300. D. Hardcastle, pseud., [R. Page], (cd.), The
Letters of Daniel Hardcastle to the Editor of The Times Journal on the subject of Bank
ReAfriction, of the Regulations of the Mint etc (London, 1819), pp. 11-13.
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intact. 12 Ricardo's ideas, as elaborated in his Proposals for an Economical and
Secure Currency, published in 1816, had been a little more extreme than the plan
in its final form, since he felt that to have gold coins circulating was a needless
expense; their place in the circulation he thought could be taken by small notes.
For him founding the currency system on a gold standard would only require
people in extreme cases to redeem their notes in gold bullion, which meant the
resulting circulation would have consisted of paper accompanied by silver and
copper.°
The deliberations of both committees centred on the workings of the major
credit instruments of the paper circulation, their impact on the economy and
what difficulties might be encountered in attempting to return to a circulating
gold currency Witnesses were nevertheless questioned, especially by the Lords'
committee, in relation to what influence had been exerted over the price of gold
and international payments by the recent changes to the silver coinage. Neither
Alexander Baring nor the economist Thomas Tooke saw any grounds for being
convinced of such an influence For those, however, who expressed reservations
from the point of view of there seeming to be an invitation to failure if the
existing Coinage Act were grafted onto a resumption plan, the fundamental point
was that the Mint regulations be changed on account of the adverse effects the
devaluation of silver had meted out to a range of economic indicators.14
Richard Page and Matthew Fletcher, both merchants with interests in
Europe, were the two most forthright in supporting this perspective. As well as
seeing in adjustments to the Mint price of silver the roots of increases in gold,
they maintained that under the present arrangements, with gold rated higher in
comparison to silver on the continent than it was in Britain, the tendency would
be to export gold and import silver. The whole edifice of the currency system
12 Common,s' Rcport on resumption, 1819, Report, p. 15. Lords. ' Report on resumption, 1819,
Minutes of Ex 'deuce, pp 86-87.
11 Ricardo, Proposals for an Economical and Secure Currency, pp 25-26
14 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XL, cols 706-07 (24 May 1819). Lords' Report on
resumption, 1819, Minutes of Evidence, pp. 121-24, 178, 188-89, 219.
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was therefore seen as being built on sand. They sustained the view that there
had been an effect on the value of sterling in international trade by pointing to
the coincidence between the devaluation of silver by 6 per cent in 1816 and the
fall in the value of British currency on foreign exchanges from 1817 by
approximately the same amount; the further deduction followed that there was in
this clear evidence of Britain's operating on a silver standard. For Fletcher,
especially, such a reality would have been desirable. Reducing the extent of
silver's devaluation, which would have entailed increasing the weights of silver
coins and thereby redefining the silver/gold ratio in favour of gold, was seized on
as essential if sovereigns were to be made less attractive for export. Page
suggested that if gold were to remain at £3 17s 101/2d then to obtain the same
ratio as existed in France the Mint price of silver ought to be brought down to Ss
per ounce Under the new Mint regulations the silver/gold ratio stood at 14.16
to 1, while in a majority of the markets of Europe it was over 15 to 1.' 5 Behind
their position was the air of legitimacy of there having been for many years no
coinage of gold in general circulation to any substantial amount and of silver
therefore occupying the role of principal coinage in daily use, a situation which
still obtained despite the recent production of gold.
In the Report of the Lords' committee the views of Fletcher and Page were
mentioned on one side and those of Robert Mushet, First Clerk of the Mint, on
the other The conclusion of the committee on this question was that it could
see no grounds to change the Mint regulations prior to a resumption of cash
payments Liverpool had argued against such reasoning as that of Page and
Fletcher in 1818 The changed status of silver he believed made it no longer
capable of commanding an influence over the flows of bullion abroad by
reference to its relative value as compared with gold. He commented at one
point, 'silver might with reference to the gold, be leather coin or counters', and
further, 'how it could be supposed that £27,000,000 of Bank of England paper,
and 23 millions of country bank paper could be representative of a silver coinage
15 Lords' Report On resumption, 1819, Minutes of Evidence, pp. 150-67, 237-40.
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not legal tender beyond 40s and in its total amount not exceeding 4 or 5 million,
was beyond his imagination to conceive'.16
The analysis of Page and Fletcher in relation to the international value of
sterling was flawed. The principal circulating coinage for several years prior to
1817 had indeed been silver but crucially it had then consisted of coins
deteriorated by a far larger degree than the six per cent of the revised Mint price.
Bearing in mind the old silver was worn to the extent of twenty or thirty per
cent, the Coinage Act might legitimately be seen as having represented an
appreciation of fifteen per cent or more. Had Britain actually been operating on
a silver standard, the foreign exchanges should have reflected something of this
appreciation after 1817 but the fact that they showed no signs of shadowing
silver is an indication of the weak position from which Page and Fletcher were
arguing Moreover, the fall in the exchange rate as well as the drain of gold can
be explained more satisfactorily, and was at the time, with reference to a
straightforward trade imbalance. The value of grain imported into Britain during
1818 was nearly six times that of the value imported in 1815 and 1816 and more
than double that of 1817, added to which there was a substantial export of
capital during 1817 and 1818 from Britain to France, Russia, Austria and
Prussia 17
As far as Pole was concerned, proof of the efficacy of the new Mint
regulations was negatively demonstrated. He commented that 'not a murmur
was now any where to be heard relative to the coinage' and 'there was now no
want of change' He was overstating matters somewhat, but he more modestly
maintained the same opinion in his written evidence to the Lords' committee,
judging the reforms of 1816 to have been administered efficiently and to be
working well In the three years since the Coinage Act had come into force he
16 Parhantentarj Debates, 1st ser., )(XXVIII, col. 192 (20 April 1818); XL, col. 627 (21 May
1819), XL. cols 1162-63 (15 June 1819). Lords' Report on resumption, 1819, Report,
p 23
Commons' Report on resumption, 1819, Minutes of Evidence, p. 118. Feavearyear, The
Pound Sterling, p. 217
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had not recognised in the market price of silver any immediate threat to the
settlement, and to the committee as well as in Parliament he echoed Liverpool's
sentiments as to the impotence of silver with reference to movements in the
exchanges and the price of gold. Silver was by virtue of its limited legal tender
status, and its now having to function more directly under the control of
government, no different from copper as to its influence.18
An increase in the number of pamphlets published on the currency question
from about twenty in 1818 to roughly seventy the following year is a reflection
of the heightened concern. The debate in Parliament in 1819 on resumption,
however, did not generate as much heat as did the report of the Bullion
Committee in 1810. Those who challenged the official position in 1819 on the
basis of establishing a silver standard, were ineffectual both in terms of
arguments presented to the parliamentary committees and their impact on the
floor of the House of Commons The bill was carried without a recorded vote.i°
The influence of John Locke was apparent in the debates of 1819. The
starting point for Peel, who leant especially heavily on Locke as an intellectual
support, was the resolution in his own mind of the definition of the pound
sterling as a specific quantity of metal, a belief he continued to champion many
years later in the debates on the Bank Charter Act of 1844. 20 He mentioned in
support of his view that Locke had entertained no abstract idea of a shilling or of
a standard of value Whatever its theoretical deficiencies and Peel's
unwillingness to acknowledge the strong fiduciary qualities of the currency over
the past fifty years, this perspective satisfied the determination of government to
turn its back on the policy adopted during the currency crisis of 1810-11. On
that occasion, in answer to the debates over the report of the Bullion Committee,
the wartime necessity of financial liquidity had determined a course in favour of
18 Lords Rcport on resumption, 1819, Appendix D. 10, pp. 378-79. Parliamentary Debates,
1st ser,
 , Xi. cols 720-21 (24 May 1819).
1 Fetter, British Monetary Orthodoxy, p. 99. Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., Xi, cols 604-
57 (21 Mli.) 1819), XL. cols 676-748 (24 May 1819); XL, cols 750-800, 802-04 (25 May
1819) 59 Geo III, cap 49.
20 Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser., LXXIV, col. 723 (6 May 1844).
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sustaining an unredeemable paper currency; in 1819 the official position was
reversed and gold was chosen over paper. Peel was the embodiment of this
change of mind, as he acknowledged in his presentation of the Resumption Bill
to Parliament, admitting that although he had voted against the resolutions of the
Bullion Committee in 1811 he would now support such resolutions or at least
the principles that underlay them. 21
 There is a sense, however, in which the
resumption plan was controverting Locke. It represented the confirmation of an
alteration to the standard - the adoption of gold - in acknowledgement of the
need to adapt to changes in the economy, and this was for Locke, who had
opposed any reform of the standard, the central issue at stake. Choosing gold
over silver as the standard was a concession to long-term inflationary pressures.
Survival of the gold .standard
The rise in the price of silver proved to be temporary, one explanation posited
being the unusually high demand, in particular from the East, at the beginning of
1819 for Spanish dollars From the end of 1817 through most of 1818 an
increased demand for dollars had, despite their inferior fineness, pushed their
price up on several occasions above that of sterling silver and this probably
accounts, to some degree, for the rise in sterling silver over that period. The
price of both types of silver began to fall rapidly by May 1819, standard silver in
bars reaching 5s 2d by July and remaining at that rate for the rest of the year
before dipping below 5s the following year, a rate at which it tended to stay well
into the mid nineteenth century. The idea that there was in operation a currency
system backed by silver did not enjoy much support after 1819, at least in the
arena of parliamentary debate. Gold also gradually fell in value. From L LI 3s in
January 1819 it declined to a par with the Mint price by August, and the Bank
21 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XL, cols 678, 679-80, 695-96 (24 May 1819).
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was able to administer an end to restriction by paying its notes in coin from 1
May 1821, two years before its express official obligation (Appendix 2).22
Discussion of the Coinage Act continued through the resolution of further
currency issues over a number of years, its merits and defects being examined
from the continually altering perspective of how the reform worked in practice.
A decisive factor in the preservation of the gold standard and therefore of the
Coinage Act, especially in the years immediately following the recoinage and
exchange, was the indefinite postponement of opening the Mint to the public for
the coinage of silver Had the necessary Proclamation been issued, as specified
in the legislation of 1816 granting the public access to bring silver to the Mint,
there would have existed the risk that a disproportionately large number of silver
coins could have found their way into circulation and thereby presented a
challenge to the position of gold.
Much was made by defenders of the resumption plan of the exclusive control
ministers now had over the quantities of silver being issued. Pole referred in the
House of Commons in May 1819 to the first Earl of Liverpool's
recommendation that management of the silver coinage, in order that it be
properly regulated, be lodged with the Bank of England and that in putting it in
the hands of the government the spirit of that sentiment had been followed. This
position contrasts sharply with the stated policy of the Mint in August 1816 of
there being a possibility that the public would be permitted access to have silver
coined in a matter of months. By March 1817 the Mint was still not ruling out
the option of opening to the public, the excuse for an expected further delay of a
'very considerable time' being the quantity of old coin received through the
exchange that was yet available for the production of new silver. No clear
statement was offered by ministers as to why the legislation that established
22 Parliamentary Debates. 1st ser., Xl„ col. 784 (25 May 1819). Craig, The Mint, p. 286.
1 and 2 Gco IV, cap 26. Royal Mint. 1st Annual Report, 1870 (London, 1871), p. 25. See
Lords.' Report on resumption, 1819, Minutes of Evidence, p. 45, for the former Bank
Director and foreign merchant William Haldimand's observation that in February 1819
there as a remarkable scarcity of dollars owing to substantial shipments to India.
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the gold standard contained a clause respecting the public's access to have silver
coined. Looking back at bullion prices, as the second Earl of Liverpool did in
presenting the Coinage Bill, since 1773 silver had averaged a price of 5s 4d per
ounce. The anticipation of a relatively high silver price and the expectation that
no profit would be made from the private import of silver to the Mint may
explain this matter. Alternatively, and more likely, the implications of including
the clause had probably not been properly thought through. There is enough
evidence of haste in the preparations for the recoinage for the suspicion to be
aroused that ministers were wanting in theoretical rigour. Less than two years
after the Coinage Bill became law, Lord Liverpool was defending the
establishment of a gold standard on the basis of there being no open access to
the Mint for the unlimited coinage of silver, suggesting, therefore, that the
prospect of a Proclamation being issued was by that stage no longer on the
agenda From 1816 all silver was coined on government account or with specific
Treasury authority and because it was bought at the market price - at some
points in that year falling below 5s per ounce - the Treasury stood to benefit over
and above any 4d seigniorage. Silver being now a token coinage, the Treasury
certainly saw advantage, through the fear of there being an excess, in controlling
its supply 2'
The provision in the Coinage Act dealing with the public's access to coin
silver was eventually dropped in 1870 following the efforts in that year of
Colonel George Tomline to have silver minted on his personal account. Without
the necessary legal backing his request could not be satisfied and soon after the
Mint was relieved of the potential obligation by legislation which consolidated
the existing coinage laws.24
23 Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XXXIV, cols 914, 962-63 (30 May 1816); XXXVIII,
col. 192 (20 April 1818); XL, col. 720 (25 May 1819). PRO. Mint 11/72, the Mint to
H. Holland, 17 March 1817. Challis, 'Mint Contracts', NHRM, p. 757. Craig, The Mint,
p. 286 Fetter, British Monetary Orthodoxy, pp. 66-67.
24 Fetter, British Monetary Orthodoxy, p. 198.
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Continuing challenges to the currency settlement
Debate over the return to cash payments and, by association, of the coinage
reforms continued for a number of years both in Parliament and in the pages of
economic pamphlets. Pointing to the stability of the French currency system,
Alexander Baring, who in 1816 had expressed reservations about the adoption of
a gold standard, in March 1821 raised the idea of adopting a bimetallic standard
and further suggested that in the place of notes there could circulate gold tokens.
Supported by Matthias Attwood, who had opposed the resumption plan in 1819,
he continued his criticism of the currency settlement later in the year, arguing
that because it had led to a fall in the quantity of notes in circulation and that to
the operation of the Act could be ascribed at least part of the distress of the
country, it ought to be reconsidered. On both these occasions his amendments
failed 25
There had been a contraction of money and credit, this happening at the same
time as a fall in prices, particularly evident in agricultural products. The total
note circulation of the Bank of England fell gradually after August 1819 from
£25 3 million to £.17 5 million by August 1822; the Bank's deposits also declined
as did the public securities it held. The effects of resuming cash payments, which
were seen in the country in unemployment and a depressed state of agriculture
and industry, turned what had been a general consensus in favour of official
policy into doubts concerning its efficacy 26 Charles Western, a leading
spokesman for the agricultural interest, in June 1822 called for a committee to
examine its impact The point for Western was that given the depreciation the
currency had suffered since the beginning of the 1790s, to resort to the gold
standard in 1819 as it had existed more than twenty years earlier inevitably
involved losses for people with long-term contracts. The appreciation of the
25 Catalogue oldie Goldsmiths' Library of Economic Literature (London, 1970), II, 1801-50,
pas.sim Parliamentary Debates, 2nd ser., IV, cols 1327-31 (19 March 1821); V, cols 91-
97, 112 (9 April 1821).
26 Clapham, The Bank of England, II, 72-74. Feavearyear, The Pound Sterling, pp. 224-29.
Parliamentary Debates, 2nd ser., VII, cols 342, 344 (6 May 1822); VII, col. 375 (7 May
1822)
163
currency since returning to cash payments meant that debts were having to be
honoured that were in real terms worth more in the 1820s than when contracted.
Ministers attempted to alleviate something of the distress of agriculture by
urging the Bank to cooperate in the issue between February and October 1822 of
£2 million in gold coin. The Bank agreed. The debate nevertheless continued
the following year with calls for a reduction in the standard and Western
submitted a further resolution that a committee be appointed to take into
consideration changes to the currency since 1793, together with their effects on
contracts and the income of the country. Opposition to Western focused by this
time on the feeling that the worst of the readjustment was over and that to
embark on alterations to the settlement would be more productive of disruption
than would continuing on the current basis. As in 1822, long debates were
followed by defeat for the proposed measures.27
A further inquisition into the currency settlement occurred in 1828 under the
Duke of Wellington's ministry when he and Henry Goulburn, his Chancellor,
sought the opinion of the Bank on a series of issues which called into question
the position of silver Baring and Huskisson had for some time been pressing the
claims of bimetallism and in April 1828 some movement in that direction was
made when Baring was called before the still functioning Committee on Coin to
give evidence on the advantages of altering the standard of the silver currency,
and the Bank was asked its opinion on a proposition to issue notes redeemable
only in silver The following month an enquiry was directed at ascertaining if the
Bank felt that changes respecting silver, either in altering the weight or the
fineness of the coins or restoring their unlimited legal tender status, would have a
positive impact on its ability to manage effectively the currency and the foreign
exchanges The response from the Bank in both instances was that the
arrangements as they stood were satisfactory and that reforming the silver
2 Parliamentary Debates, 2nd ser., VII, col. 896 (11 June 1822); VII, col. 1606 (10 July
1822); IX, cols 833-49, 898 (11 June 1823). BE. G4/44, 4 February 1822, pp. 253-56; 28
February 1822, pp 272-77. Thorne, House of Commons, 1790-1820, III, 98.
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currency in the manner suggested would in no way improve matters. Parliament
heard nothing of the initiative.28
The new silver coinage therefore escaped post-war recession, the serious
reservations entertained over the workings of the gold standard and the practical
implications of Peel's resumption plan. Challenges resurfaced in 1830 and 1833
but they fared no better than those of the 1820s. 29 Banking and the regulation of
banknotes aside, the currency survived for several decades after 1819 fairly
unscathed by fundamental change, which suggests either a further instance of
official neglect comparable to the eighteenth century or a system that was
working reasonably well. During the greater part of the nineteenth century
circumstances approximated more closely to the latter.
Managing the silver currency
After the exchange of silver in February and March 1817, many of the bankers
who had been charged with the responsibility of issuing the new coins requested
of the Mint information on when the exchange of the guineas would be put in
hand On asking in May 1817 if the nominal value of existing gold was to be
allowed in exchange for the new, one enquirer was told by the Mint that the
sovereigns, which were about to be issued, were to pass into circulation
alongside the guineas and that no exchange should therefore be anticipated.
There was reflected in such questions a concern over the deficiency in weight of
many of the guineas and whether the same terms as had applied to light silver
would be repeated A large number of complaints was received at the Mint from
May through to July expressing anxiety over the refusal of light gold. Those
who wrote in were reminded very often of the legal restraints on the passing of
worn coin and of the least current weight of a guinea, 5dwt 8grs. The new
28 BE G4 51. 15 May 1828, pp. 52-59. Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee for
Coin Parliamentary Papers, 1830 (31). Fetter, Briti.sh Monetary Orthodoxy, pp. 125-26.
29 Fetter, British Monetary Orthodoxy, pp. 127-28. Smart, Economic Annals, pp. 519-33.
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sovereigns were lighter than the guineas by one twenty-first part, so that in effect
there was no difference in the standard to which the two were struck and
therefore not the same unease as surrounded the circulation side by side of old
and new silver (Table 9).30
There was a good deal of discussion during the deliberations of the
parliamentary committees into resumption of what number of gold coins would
be necessary under a restored system of specie payments. Ricardo reflected that
'the taste of the public for paper is now so confirmed, that they would have little
inducement to demand gold coin, and in that case a very small quantity would be
sufficient for all purposes of circulation'. Lewis Lloyd agreed that less coin than
before restriction was likely to be required if notes continued in use. Whatever
familiarity had attached to notes and whatever initial reluctance was abroad
regarding a renewed use of gold, output levels from the Mint suggest sovereigns
and half-sovereigns were fairly well rehabilitated into the circulation by the early
1820s In the ten years after their first issue, £38,270,553 were struck, as
compared with a gold output of £19,051,886 in the ten years prior to 1798 and
the falling off in gold production during the Napoleonic Wars. In one year,
1821, over £9 5 million were coined, 98 8 per cent of which comprised
sovereigns The judgement that a smaller quantity of gold would suffice proved
to be mistaken, but that prediction was made on the assumption of a sizeable
number of notes remaining in circulation. The Bank, however, chose to retire
many of its notes below the value of £5, their quantity falling from £6,692,050
on 5 May 1821 to £925,180 by 6 July 1822. The fall in the quantity of small
Bank of England notes was offset somewhat by increases in the number of small
notes issued between 1821 and 1825 by country banks 31
Unlike the tribulations the gold coins suffered during the first years after their
PRO Mint 11 72, the Mint to J. C Wilson, 13 Ma) 1817; the Mint to Grylls & Co, 13 June
1817, the Mint to W Rea, 15 July 1817
11 CommonA Report on reAumption, 1819, Minutes of Evidence, pp 229, 165 Challis, Mint
Output', NHR;11, pp 693-94 Mint Report, 1837, Appendix No 35, p 224 Fetter, British
Monetary Orthodoxy, p 107.
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issue, the new silver stayed within Britain and the impression is that, after the
ripples of hostility that tend to greet the introduction of any new coinage had
been calmed by familiarity, they were readily accepted. Their position in the
circulation having been established, the problem became one of management, of
ensuring that all the efforts of 1816 and 1817 were not ruined through
inattention to the condition of the coins once in use, or through a failure to keep
pace with the levels of demand that the expanding economy of early nineteenth-
century Britain required.
After the old coin received by the Mint during the exchange was exhausted
fresh supplies of bullion were required and Britain's trading contacts with South
America ensured a healthy supply. By May 1819 over 15 million in new silver
coin had been issued but some of the industrial regions of Britain were still
demanding further supplies That the recoinage had not absolved the country of
all the currency ills and ad hoc arrangements developed during the eighteenth
century is indicated by the view expressed in the Matiche.sier Herald in April
1818 'it has long been a matter of surprise that the Government has not
proposed some remedy to the mischiefs which the public has experienced from
little shopkeepers in provincial towns, and indeed in many a paltry village,
issuing cash notes upon the faith of a single, and too often obscure name'. 32 By
the end of 1821 the economy had taken on board over £7 million and with a
sense that the country's demands were now probably sated production thereafter
calmed dov.n More silver was coined up to and including 1821 than in the next
thirty years (Table 17 and Figure 14) The approach was to build up a critical
mass of coin in order to gratify demand and from then on sustain a more modest
profile of supply The quantity made available to absorb the stock of old silver
was never meant to represent an estimate of what would be adequate, and in any
case for more than two years after February 1817 the burden of circulation for
the new silver was eased by the presence of the Bank dollars and tokens The
- .1 D A Thomps n 'Bntish Currenc) and the Importation of Bullion, 1793-1840 , BV, 27
(1952-54), 76 Ashton The Bill of Exchange' in Ashton and Sa n ers, Pnglish Monetary
History p 42
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objections raised in Parliament in 1816 to their continued presence alongside the
new coins because of the apprehension that the different standards to which they
were struck - the coins at 5s 6d per ounce, the Bank tokens at 6s 8d - would lead
to the new silver being driven out of circulation, proved groundless. They both
remained in circulation through to the end of December 1818, by which time
nearly all the tokens had been withdrawn, suggesting that there was more
interest taken in their face value than their intrinsic value.33
From the end of March 1819, sporadically through to the end of June 1821,
there was in production a full complement of circulating silver coin
denominations, from crown through to sixpence, for the first time in almost
seventy years The eighteenth-century practice of dividing a given quantity of
silver into specified amounts of the various denominations (Chapter 5, p. 108)
was not officially revived once building up the stockpile of new silver was
completed, but through the first half of the nineteenth century a balance of
output was confirmed that nevertheless approximated very closely to those
proportions With half-crowns at 35.5 per cent, shillings at 43.7 per cent and
sixpences at 13 8 per cent of the total silver coined, the levels of production
were at most only about 5 per cent adrift from the proportions employed during
the first half of the eighteenth century. Crowns at 4.19 per cent had, however,
declined markedly from the 20 per cent proportion they had represented of silver
output 100 years earlier 34
The banking system, and in particular the Bank of England, played a central
role in distribution of new silver throughout the country. The Mint was in all but
theory closed to the striking of silver coin on private account, and the Bank
therefore became the primary conduit through which issues into circulation were
11 Lords' Report on resumption, 1819, Appendix D. 10, p. 378. Challis, 'Mint Output',
NHRM, pp 694-95 BE. G23/51, Governor to Morrison, 26 December 1818, p. 88.
Parliamentary Debates, 1st ser., XXXIV, cols 912-23 (30 May 1816).
34 PRO. Mint 9 33, Account of silver monies coined, 21 May 1818 to 31 December 1821.
Accounts of gold, silver, and copper monies coined at the Mint. Parliamentary Papers,
1847-48 (601), 1854 (2)
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directed." Discussions between the Mint, the Bank and the bankers of London
regulated the quantities of silver required. On 12 March 1818 the Bank issued a
notice to the effect that for a period of roughly four months from 19 March it
would be in a position to issue to each of the London banks current silver coin of
the realm to the amount of £20,000 in exchange for banknotes. This type of
arrangement the Bank subsequently advertised on a number of occasions. A
similar resolution, for example, passed on 13 July 1820, indicated that in view of
London bankers' demands for silver, £1 million, in proportions to be agreed, was
to be made available from 18 July. The scheme of distribution worked on the
basis of the bankers of London receiving the coin from the Bank of England and
thereafter, through their country bank clients, the coin was sent out across the
country The fear in official circles was not of there being a shortage but rather a
superabundance, a fear that it was hoped would be nullified through
collaboration with the banking community. Ricardo did not share such worries
concerning an excess of coin; his reading of the situation was to view with
extreme scepticism the prospect of the Bank's being saddled with a stock of
coins for which there was no demand. The Bank, however, had to suffer
precisely that inconvenience 36
In view of the public's being permitted to pay into the Bank of England silver
coin to an unlimited amount in exchange for notes or gold, a crude impression of
an excess of coin in circulation could be judged by the stock of silver held by the
Bank Adequate supplies to all parts of Britain, however, could never be
guaranteed regardless of the improvements in the system of distribution since the
eighteenth century, and complaints from the Bank respecting their holdings of
silver coin should be judged against the Old Lady's performing an at times too
burdensome public duty from which she was receiving little return. During the
1820s the Bank had expressed on a number of occasions anxiety that it be
FeilN car)ear, The Pound Sterling, p. 227.
36 Lords' Report on reminiption, 1819, Appendix D. 10, pp. 378-79. BE. G4 40, 19 March
1818, pp 229-30, BE. G4 43, 13 July 1820, pp. 102-03. Commons' Report on resumption,
1819, Appendix No 2, p. 270. Parliamentary Debates, 2nd ser., IV, col. 1332 (19 March
1821)
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protected against the occasional overflowing of silver currency. Whatever else
might be happening to the circulating medium, the sense from the Bank was that
both silver and gold were not in short supply.
It had faithfully distributed coin through the banking system but by 1831 a
pattern of receiving more coin than it was issuing resulted in the accumulation of
roughly £1 million in silver coin, a quantity it described as 'a large and
unquestionable excess'. Coinciding with this reported surplus of silver, and
possibly a reflection of it, was a distinct decline from 1827 through to 1833 in
the amount of silver coined. During those seven years less than £200,000 was
minted, which represented a conspicuous fall given that between 1816 and 1850
on only four occasions, outside this seven-year period, did annual production fall
below £100,000 In disposing of part of this excess, questions arose that
challenged the Bank's role in helping to manage the currency. The decision was
made to send to the Mint £600,000 of coin, out of the £1 million, to be melted
but as a consequence the Bank found that it sustained a loss in the order of 10
per cent on the seigniorage charge - the difference between the face value and
the intrinsic value of the coin A request was made for indemnity against the loss
by allowing the Bank to receive subsequently from the Mint £600,000 in silver
coin free of seigniorage The Bank made the point that 'it is not upon the
amount of silver coin issued from the Mint, but upon the quantity required for
general circulation that the government can expect ultimately to retain a
seigniorage' Moreover, in order to protect itself from the recurrence of such an
accumulation, the Bank specified a sum of £250,000 as a maximum stock that it
would be happy to carry but amounts of coin above this sum it wanted to be a
liberty to return to the Mint The resolution of this matter continued for some
time Initially the Chancellor, Lord Althorp, was less than keen on the
suggestion that government be obliged to accept any excess over £250,000 and
the idea that there might be some public liability for losses the Bank sustained in
1831 also received a lukewarm reception. He acquiesced in January 1834 to an
agreement along the lines proposed regarding the claims over the losses, but the
question of arrangements being made for the receipt of surpluses of silver
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continued to generate tensions for several years to come. There were occasions
when the Bank reported its stocks of silver to be lower than was desirable for the
accommodation of the public, for example, in December 1833, only two years
after it indicated a surplus, but in March 1841 an over-abundance of silver
currency was again complained of by the Bank.37
There was a system for the supply of coin throughout the country that by the
description in January 1871 of George Forbes, the Chief Cashier of the Bank,
was well-founded and when managed properly worked to supply deficiencies and
relieve excesses Warming to his subject he commented 'the Bank of England
has its finger on the pulse of the whole kingdom, and through the Bank the Mint
is always kept informed, and is always ready to supply whatever coin may be
required'. From the Bank's point of view the difficulties seemed to arise less in
identifying demand than they did in managing surpluses. The system clearly did
not always work to everyone's satisfaction but neither did it generate crises so
severe as to warrant its abolition 38
During the fifty years after the recoinage the silver currency was not without
its troubles In 1844 complaints were raised about the condition of the coinage,
the collector Sir George Chetwynd feeling that its wear was as bad as when the
old silver was exchanged in 1817; despite the technical advances in production
areas at the Mint, the recoinage issues were amongst the most widely
counterfeited of any of the first half of the nineteenth century; that gold and
silver could not be processed by the Mint at the same time - a problem that
centred on rolling the metal which was not resolved until the early 1880s - led to
interruptions in the consistent supply of coinage; and although up to 1870 the
bullion price of silver did not create tensions, towards the end of the century a
marked fall in silver acted as an invitation to coiners to practise their arts. There
had, however, been put in place systems to deal with some of these difficulties.
17 Challis, 'Mint Output', NHILlf, pp. 694-95. BE. G4/51, 15 May 1828, pp. 56-59; BE.
G4156, 5 December 1833, p 218; 2 January 1834, pp. 252-61; BE. G4/63, 3 March 1841,
pp 310-11
38 Royal Alint Ict Annual Report, pp. 72-73.
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The Bank agreed to withdraw from circulation and return to the Mint worn
silver, and a provision was made in the Mint accounts for the loss arising out of
the silver being recoined. There were, also, what might be regarded as symbols
of success. Britain in 1825 began deliberately to export its currency to those
parts of the world over which it had a controlling interest - it established an
imperial currency. Of coins struck by the Mint, proportions were thereafter set
aside for shipment overseas; between 1825 and 1832 11,323,192 were allocated
in this way. Ministers' regarding the silver currency as ripe for export speaks
well of the reforms of 1816-17.39
Having endured decades of a currency worn to the point of illegibility, the
public's first sight of the new silver coins in February 1817 must have been a
revelation But the reforms of 1816-17 carried a significance beyond the much
needed supply of shillings, sixpences and half-crowns. In the 120 years after the
Great Recoinage of 1696-99 the system of currency founded on gold and silver
was transformed into one founded on gold, silver and paper, with silver
becoming, in terms of its influence over the primary economic concerns of the
country, a progressively less important element When economists talked of a
shortage of currency in 1819 they were not referring to silver coins but rather to
the paper circulation of the Bank of England and of the country banks. The
silver coinage did not therefore wield the same influence that it did in former
centuries, but the Coinage Bill of 1816 was nevertheless one of the building
blocks of monetary policy in the nineteenth century. The bimetallic imbalance of
the previous 100 years and the monetary instability of the restriction period
found resolution in the adoption of the gold standard - a settlement that provided
the framework for managing the British economy until the outbreak of the First
World War
39 PRO. Mint 4 40, George Chetwynd to the Master of the Mint, 21 September 1844. Royal
Mint. 1st Annual Report, p. 25; Royal Mint 23rd Annual Report, 1892 (London, 1893),
p 27; Rotal Ahnt 24th Annual Report, 1893 (London, 1894), p. 35. Dyer, 'Quarter-
SON ereigns% BA7,1, 67 (1997), 75-76. Craig, The Mint, p.311. For figures on the quantities
of silver coin issued overseas see RM. Library file, Imperial Currency.
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Appendix 1
Prices of standard silver, 1697-1820
(Price of silver per ounce)
Market prices of standard silver,
1697-1820
Lowest	 Highest
s	 d	 s	 d
Prices paid by the Bank of England
for silver bullion, 1697-1811
Lowest	 Highest
s	 d	 s	 d
1697 5 11/2 5 23/4
1698 5 21/2 5 21/2
1699
1700 52 5 2
1701 5 13/4 5 2
1702-1709
1710 53 5 3
1711-1717 -
-
1718 5 5 5 534 -
1719 5 3'2 5 534
1720 5 4'2 5 8 50 5 4
1721 5 4 5 6
1722 5 4 5 434 -
1723 5 3 1 4 5 434 -
1724 5 3 1 2 5 3'2 52 5 2
1725 5 3'2 5 3'2
1726 5 4 5 6
1727 5 3'4 5 4
1728 5 3'4 5 5'2 5 534 5 53/4
1729 5 5'2 5 512 52 5 2
1730 5 4'2 5 5'2 52 5 2
1731 5 3'2 5 5 5 4'2 5 5
1732 5 358 5 434 54 5 458
1733 5 4 5 434 52 5 41/4
1734 5 2'2 5 314 5 178 5 3
1735 5 258 5 314 5 2'4 5 21/4
1736 5 3 5 4 52 5 3'4
1737 5 3'2 5 45/8
1738 52 5 4
1739 5 512 5 512
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Market prices of standard silver, 	 Prices
1697-1820
Lowest	 Highest
s	 d	 s	 d
paid by the Bank of England
for silver bullion, 1697-1811
Lowest	 Highest
s	 d	 s	 d
1740 54 5 7
1741 5 738 5 8
1742 52 5 2
1743 52 5 2
1744 52 5 2
1745 50 5 2
1746 53 5 5'/2 52 5 2
1747 5 5 5 51/2 5 3% 5 33/4
1748 5 4 5 51/2 5 31/2 5 31/2
1749 5 4 5 51/4 5 31/2 5 31/2
1750 5 4 5 61/4 5 5 5 5
1751 5 45 8 5 5% 5 43/4 5 43/4
1752 5 5 3 4 5 658 5 5 5 5
1753 5 6 3 4 5 71/4 5 6 5 6
1754 5 5'2 5 7 5 5 5 5
1755 5 418 5 5 5 338 5 338
1756 5 3'2 5 5 5 2% 5 23/4
1757 5 3 1 4 5 538 5 21/2 5 21/2
1758 5 43 4 5 8 5 7 5 7
1759 5 618 5 8'2 5 0 5 0
1760 5 6 5 9 5 53/4 5 53/4
1761 5 6' 4 5 9'2 5 8 5 8
1762 5 438 5 8'2 5 5 5 5
1763 5 4 1 2 5 8 5 4 5 4
1764 5 338 5 4'2 5 2 5 2
1765 5 3'2 5 5 3 4 5 3 5 3
1766 5 5 3 4 5 7 1 2 5 43 4 5 434
1767 5 6'4 5 7'2 - -
1768 5 512 5 63 4 5 418 5 512
1769 5 6 3 4 5 73 4 5 5'2 5 6'4
1770 5 6'2 5 8'4 5 6'4 5 714
1771 5 7 5 8 5 5 3 4 5 714
1772 5 4'2 5 814 5 6 1 4 5 61/4
1773 5 23 4 5 43 4 -
1774 5 2'4 5 4 -
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Market prices of standard silver,
1697-1820
Lowest	 Highest
s	 d	 s	 d
Prices paid by the Bank of England
for silver bullion, 1697-1811
Lowest	 Highest
s	 d	 s	 d
1775 5 3'A 5 51/4 5 21/4 5 21/2
1776 5 31/2 5 6'A 5 21/4 5 31/2
1777 5 61/4 5 9 5 4 5 41/2
1778 5 2 5 9 5 01/2 5 3
1779 5 2 5 41/2 5 0 5 01/2
1780 5 21/2 5 6 5 0 5 0
1781 5 51/2 5 101/4 - -
1782 5 8 5 111/2 -
1783 5 6 5 10 1/4 -
1784 5 2% 5 51/2 4 111/2 5 31/2
1785 5 1'2 5 23/4 4 11 5 13/4
1786 5 23 4 5 3% 5 01/2 5 2
1787 5 2 3 4 5 4 5 03/4 5 13/4
1788 5 3 3 4 5 3 3 4 5 1 5 1
1789 5 2'2 5 3 3 4 4 111/2 5 1
1790 5 2'2 5 3 3 4 4 111/2 5 0'A
1791 5 2'4 5 3'2 4 111/2 5 2
1792 5 4 5 6 5 1 5 11/2
1793 5 1 5 5 4 101/2 5 0
1794 5 1 5 2 4 101/2 5 1
1795 5 1 5 5'2 4 10'2 5 1
1796 5 3'2 5 6 5 1 5 31/2
1797 5 0'2 5 6'2 4 10 5 51/2
1798 5 0 5 1'2 4 11 5 1
1799 5 2 5 8 5 1 5 6
1800 5 4 5 71/2
1801 5 9 5 11
1802 5 6 5 11'2 5 9 5 11
1803 5 6 5 8 5 2'2 5 81/4
1804 5 5 5 8'2 5 0 5 10
1805 5 1 5 6
1806 5 5 5 7
1807 5 6 5 8 5 3 5 6
1808 - 5 3 5 6
1809 5 3 5 7
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Market prices of standard silver,
1697-1820
Lowest
	 Highest
s	 d	 s	 d
Prices paid by the Bank of England
for silver bullion, 1697-1811
Lowest	 Highest
s	 d	 s	 d
1810
1811
1812
1813
1814
1815
1816
1817
1818
1819
1820
5
6
6
6
5
4
5
5
4
52
111/2
31/2
71/2
111/2
41/2
1l'/
01/2
3'A
11'2
6
6
6
5
5
64
67
56
57
52
11
111/2
91/2
41/2
31/2
55
5 81/2
5
5
101/2
10
Note
Source
In virtually every year for which both sets of prices are quoted the Bank paid
less than the market price for its silver.
Account of Market prices of gold and silver bullion. Parliamentary Papers,
1810-11(43), 1812-13 (131); 1813-14 (101); 1818 (30, 216); 1819 (18, 354);
1821 (350) Account of prices paid by the Bank of England for gold and
.silver bullion. Parliamentary Papers, 1810-11 (69).
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Appendix 2
Market prices of standard gold, 1710-1820
(Price of per ounce)
Lowest
£	 s d
Highest
£	 s	 d
1710 4.	 0.	 0 4.	 0.	 0
1711 4.	 0.	 0 4.	 0.	 0
1712 3.19.10 3.19.10
1713 3.19.10 3.19.10
1714 4.	 0.	 0 4.	 0.	 0
1715 3.19.10 3.19.10
1716 3 19 11 3.19.11
1717 3 19 11 3.19.11
1718 3 18.	 1 3.19.10
1719 3 17	 9 3.18.	 3
1720 318	 0 4.	 1.	 6
1721 3.17.10 3.18.	 9
1722 3 17.10 3.18.	 0
1723 3 17.10 3.18.	 9
1724 3 17 11 3.18.	 1
1725 3 17 11 3.17.11
1726 3 17 10 3.17.11
1727 3 17 10 3.17.10
1728 3 17.10 3.19.	 0
1729 3 18	 2 3.19.	 1
1730 3 18	 2 3.19.	 0
1731 3 18.	 0 3.18.	 4
1732 3 18.	 0 3.18.	 3
1733 3 18	 1 3.18.	 4
1734 3.18.	 0 3.18.	 2
1735 3.18.	 1 3.18.	 8
1736 3.18.	 1 3.18.	 2
1737 3.18.	 0 3.18.	 0
1738 3.18.	 0 3.18	 0
1739 3.17.10'2 3.18.	 0
Lowest
s	 d
Highest
£s	 d
1740 3.17.101/2 3.17.101/2
1741 3.17.101/2 3.18.	 0
1742 3.17.101/2 3.17.101/2
1743 3.17.101/2 3.17.101/2
1744 3.17.101/2 3.17.101/2
1745 3.18.	 0 3.18.	 0
1746 3.17.11 3.17.11
1747 3.17.11 3.18.	 8
1748 3.17.101/2 3.18.	 6
1749 3.17.101/2 3.17.101/2
1750 3.17.101/2 3.18.	 8
1751 3.17.10 3.17.11
1752 3 17.101/2 3.18.	 3
1753 3 18	 0 3.18.	 6
1754 3 17 10 3.18.	 5
1755 3 17 10 3.17.11
1756 3 17 10'2 3.17.11
1757 3 17 10'2 3.18.
	 0
1758 3 17 11 3.19. 21/2
1759 3 18	 6 4.	 0.	 3
1760 3 18.
	 5 3.19.	 6
1761 3 18	 2 4.	 0.	 8
1762 3 18	 9 4.	 0.	 0
1763 3 18	 3 4.	 1.	 6
1764 3 18	 0 3.18.	 3
1765 3 18	 0 3.18.	 8
1766 3184 4.00
1767 3 19	 3 4.	 0.	 0
1768 3 18	 8 3.19.
	 7
1769 3 19.	 7 4.	 0.	 8
1770 3194
 4.	 0.	 6
1771 3 18	 9 4.	 0.10
1772 3 18.	 0 4.	 1.	 3
1773 3.17	 9 3.18.	 0
1774 3 17.	 7 3.17.	 9
Lowest
£	 s	 d
Highest
£s
	 d
1775 3.17.
	 7 3.17.	 7
1776 3.17.	 0 3.17.
	 7
1777 3.17.
	 7 3.17.	 7
1778 3.17.
	 7 3.17.	 7
1779 3.17.	 6 3.17.
	 7
1780 3.17.
	 6 3.17.
	 6
1781 3.17.	 6 3.17.	 6
1782 3.17.
	 6 3.17.	 9
1783 3.17.	 9 3.18.	 0
1784 3.17.101/2 3.18.	 0
1785 3.17.
	 6 3.17.101/2
1786 3.17.
	 6 3.17.
	 6
1787 3 17.	 6 3.17.
	 6
1788 3.17.	 6 3.17.	 6
1789 3.17.
	 6 3.17.	 6
1790 3 17.
	 6 3.17.	 6
1791 3 17	 6 3.17.
	 6
1792 3 17	 6 3.17.	 6
1793 3 17	 6 3.17.	 6
1794 3 17	 6 3.17.	 6
1795 3 17.	 6 3.17.	 6
1796 3 17.	 6 3.17.	 6
1797 3 17	 6 3.17.10'2
1798 3 17	 9 3.17.10'2
1799 3 17.
	 9 3.17.
	 9
1800 3 17	 9 3.17.
	 9
1801
1802 .1.
1803 -
1804 4	 0. 0 4.	 0.	 0
1805 4.	 0.	 0 4.	 0.	 0
1806 4.	 0.	 0 4.	 0.	 0
1807 4.	 0.	 0 4.	 0.	 0
1808 4.	 0.	 0 4.	 0.	 0
1809 4.	 0.	 0 4.	 0.	 0
Lowest
s	 d
Highest
£s
	 d
1810 4.	 4.	 0 4.	 5.	 0
1811 4.11.	 0 4.19.	 6
1812 4.15.	 0 5.	 7.	 0
1813 4.17.	 0 5.10.	 0
1814 5.	 8.	 0 5.	 8.	 0
1815 4	 2.	 0 5.	 7.	 0
1816 3.18.	 6 4.	 2.	 0
1817 3.18.	 6 4.	 0.	 6
1818 4.	 0.	 0 4.	 3.	 0
1819 3.17.101/2 4.	 3.	 0
1820 3 17 10 1 2 31710½
Source Account of Market prices of gold and silver bullion.
Parliamentary Papers, 1810-11 (43); 1812-13 (131); 1813-
14 (101), 1818 (30, 216); 1819 (18); 1821 (350).
Appendix 3
Silver coin withdrawn in England, Wales,
the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, 1817
England
Town/City Exchange station agent New silver
coin available
for exchange
£	 s	 d
Silver coin
withdrawn
£	 s	 d
Bedfordshire
Ampthill S May 1,200. 0. 0 1,228.12. 6
Bedford Barnard & Co 3,000. 0. 0 3,114.	 7. 0
Biggleswade Hogg & Co 1 200. 2. 0 1,205.	 8. 6
Leighton Bassett, Grant & Co 3,000. 0. 0 3,064.	 6. 6
Buzzard
Luton/Dunstable Hampson & Co 1,200. 0. 0 1,267.	 5. 0
Berkshire
Abingdon Spenlove & Co
and Knapp & Co
3,600. 0. 0 3,281.13. 0
Farringdon Ward & Co 2,400. 0. 0 3,042.14. 0
Maidenhead G W Wetton 16.10. 0
Newbury Bunny & Co 4,800. 0. 0 5,027.	 1. 0
Reading Stephens, Harris & 4,800. 0. 0 5,857.	 3. 0
Stephens
J C &H Simonds 4,200. 0. 0 5,8i1.14. 6
Wallingford Wells, Allnot & Co 3,000. 0. 0 3,433.11. 0
Windsor Ramsbottom & Co 2,400. 0. 0 2,498.	 9. 0
Buckinghamshire
Aylesbury Rickford & Son 4,200. 0. 0 5,044.	 0. 6
Buckingham Bartlett & Nelson 2,700. 0. 0 3,577.	 9. 6
Box & Parrott 900. 0. 0 958.14. 6
High Wycombe J Gomme 3,600. 0. 0 3,263.	 8. 6
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Town/City Exchange station agent New silver
coin available
for exchange
£	 s	 d
Silver coin
withdrawn
I	 s	 d
Buckinghamshire (continued)
Stony Stratford/ Olivers & Co 3,000. 0. 0 3,370.	 0. 0
Newport Pagnell
Cambridgeshire
Cambridge Mortlock & Sons,
Fisher & Son and
9,000. 0. 0 10,582.	 2. 0
Foster & Co
Chatteris Gurney & Co 1,500. 0. 0 1,245.18. 0
Ely Mortlock & Sons 2,400. 0. 0 2,177.19. 0
Newmarket Eaton, Hammond & 3,000. 0. 0 2,413.15. 0
Co
Wisbech Gurney, Buckbeck & 5,100. 0. 0 5,811.	 2. 0
Peckovers
Cheshire
Chester Williams & Co 12,000. 0. 0 7,279.14. 6
Dixon & Chilton 9,600. 0. 0 6,095.	 1. 0
Congleton Johnson & Co 2,400. 0. 0 2,100.	 0. 0
Macclesfield Daintry & Ryle 2,400. 0. 0 2,486.	 4. 6
Brockelhurst & Co 1,800. 0. 0 1,859.	 6. 0
Nantwich Broughton & Co 1,800. 0. 0 3,220.14. 0
Northwich T. W. Williams 3,000. 0. 0 2,480.	 8. 6
Cornwall
Bodmin Glyn & Co 3,600. 0. 0 3,133.14. 6
Falmouth Banfield & Co 1,800. 0. 0 1,794.	 0. 0
Praed, Rogers & Co 2,027. 2. 0 2,128.	 2. 6
Helston Grylls & Co 2,400. 0. 0 3,747.11. 0
Launceston Glyn & Co 1,800. 0. 0 1,095.	 9. 6
Harvey & Son 1,800. 0. 0 1,471.	 1. 0
Liskeard Robins & Co 2,400. 0. 0 2,599.15. 6
Mevagissey Ball & Son 1,800. 0. 0 1,210.	 9. 0
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Town/City Exchange station agent New silver
coin available
for exchange
i	 s	 d
Silver coin
withdrawn
£	 s	 d
Cornwall (continued)
Padstow Rawlings & Son 1,200. 0. 0 758.16.	 0
Penzance Batten, Came & Boase 4,800. 0. 0 6,531.	 0.	 0
Redruth Pryce & Co 1,800. 0. 0 1,587.	 0.	 0
St Columb Norway, Mager & Co 1,200. 0. 0 1,203.	 7.	 0
Truro Praed, Rogers & Co 3,972.18. 0 3,948.14.	 6
Daniell, Willyams & 1,200. 0. 0 1,661.16.	 6
Co
Cumberland
Carlisle Elliott, Forster & Co 3,600 0. 0 3,418.11.	 0
Forster & Co 8,400. 0. 0 8,385.13.	 6
Graham & Co 3,000. 0. 0 2,909.18.	 0
Carrick & Sons 3,000. 0. 0 3,000.	 0.	 0
Penrith Atkinson, Craig & Co 4,070. 0. 0 3,152.	 6.	 6
W James 1,199.19. 0 599.19.	 0
Whitehaven Johnston, Raney & Co 4,200. 0. 0 4,000.	 0. 0
Hartley & Co 5,400. 0. 0 5,398.11.	 0
Harrison & Co 4,200. 0. 0 2,672.	 8.	 0
Workington W Swinborn 2,400. 0. 0 858.	 6.	 6
Derbyshire
Chesterfield Abney & Maltby 5,400. 0. 0 4,682.	 7.	 6
Derby Smith & Co 6,600. 0. 0 6,599.	 6.	 6
Crompton, Newton & 5,400. 0. 0 4,973.	 8.	 6
Co
Wirksworth Arkwright, Toplis & 4,200. 0. 0 4,336.16.	 0
Co
Devon
Ashburton Brown & Co 3,600. 0. 0 2,900.	 0.	 0
Barnstaple Bury, Pike & Co 5,400. 0. 0 6,633.	 3.	 6
Bideford Burnard & Co 2,300. 0. 0 1,811.	 0.	 6
Ley & Co 1,200. 0. 0 1,311.	 0.	 0
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Town/City Exchange station agent New silver
coin available
for exchange
£	 s	 d
Silver coin
withdrawn
£	 s	 d
Devon (continued)
Brixham Hine, Holdsworth & 1,200. 0. 0 966.	 4. 6
Co
Cullompton Skinner, Brown & Co 2,000. 0. 0 1,821.	 7. 6
Dartmouth Hine & Holdsworth 1,400. 0. 0 1,045.	 4. 0
Harris, Longhorn & 1,200. 0. 0 1,167.	 9. 0
Co
Exeter Williams, Sparkes & 11,600. 0. 0 11,851.18. 0
Co
Sanders & Co 6,442.19. 6 5,685.19. 0
Milford, Nation Sz. Co 6,600. 0. 0 6,370.	 7. 6
Holsworthy Fry & Bassett 1,200. 0. 0 957.	 8. 0
Honiton Flood, Lott & Co 2,500. 0. 0 2,387.11. 6
Smith & Co 1,700. 0. 0 1,560.	 0. 0
Ilfracombe Lee, Locke & Co 600. 0. 0 441.19. 0
Kingsbridge Prideaux, Square & 3,000. 0. 0 1,866.12. 6
Co
Modbury R Perring 1,200. 0. 0 805.14. 0
Newton Abbot Wise, Farwell & Co 2,400. 0. 0 2,411.	 4. 6
Okehampton R Dymond 1,800. 0. 0 1,800.	 0. 0
Plymouth Elford & Co 4,800. 0. 0 6,140.	 8. 0
Glencross, Hodge & 3,000. 0. 0 2,623.	 1. 0
Norman
St Aubyn, Shiells & 3,000. 0. 0 2,540.18. 6
Co
Husband & Son 3,600. 0. 0 3,363.	 4. 0
Harris, Rosden & Co 3,600. 0. 0 3,613.	 2. 6
Tavistock Gill, Rundle & Co 1,800. 0. 0 1,940.19. 0
Teignmouth Langmead, Holland & 1,200. 0. 0 1,100.	 0. 0
Jordan
Tiverton Dunsford, Barne & 2,400. 0. 0 2,543.	 5. 0
Boase
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Town/City Exchange station agent New silver
coin available
for exchange
£s	 d
Silver coin
withdrawn
£s	 d
Devon (continued)
Torrington Cooke, Kingdon & Co 1,300.	 0.	 0 1,191.11.	 0
Totnes Wise & Co and 2,557.	 0.	 6 2,517.12.	 6
Prideaux & Co
Dorset
Blandford Fryer, Andrews & Co 1,900.10.	 0 1,770.	 8.	 6
Dansey & Co 999.10.	 0 1,108.	 5.	 0
Bridport Gundry & Co 3,600.	 0.	 0 3,245.	 9.	 6
Dorchester Cox, Merle & Pattison 4,800.	 0.	 0 3,964.17.	 6
Beaminster
Shaftesbury Story & Co 3,000.	 0.	 0 4,279.	 8.	 0
Sherborne Praetor & Co 2,400.	 0.	 0 2,234.	 8.	 0
Thorn & Co 1,100.	 0.	 0 864.	 7.	 0
Sturminster Warry & Co 1,200.	 0.	 0 1,200.	 0.	 0
Weymouth W. Bower 2,400.	 0.	 0 1,481'16.	 0
Henning, Bower & Co 1,200.	 0.	 0 961.	 3.	 0
Wimborne Poole Fryer, Andrews & Co 6,700.	 0.	 0 5,021.	 0.	 0
Durham
Darlington Backhouse & Co 6,877.18.	 6 6,029. 0. 0
Durham Backhouse & Co 5,122.	 1.	 6 5,047.19.	 6
Stockton Hutchinson & Place
and Skinner & Co
8,400.	 0.	 0 6,668.16.
	 0
Sunderland Backhouse & Co 10,800.	 0.	 0 8,159.16.	 6
Essex
Bishop's Mortlock & Sons 3,000.	 0.	 0 2,575.	 7.	 6
Stortford
Braintree Sparrow, Brown & Co 6,600.	 0.	 0 5,839.	 2.	 0
Chelmsford Crickett, Russell & Co 3,600.	 0.	 0 2,964.16.	 0
Sparrow, Brown & Co 4,800.	 0.	 0 3,520.19.	 0
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Gloucestershire
Commissary T
	 38,800.
Osborne
Bristol 0. 0	 37,892.13. 0
Cheltenham
Cirencester
England
Town/City	 Exchange station agent New silver coin	 Silver coin
	
available for	 withdrawn
exchange
	
£s d
	
£s d
Essex (continued)
Coggeshall
Colchester
Grays/Rayleigh
Harwich
Maldon
Manningtree
Romford
Brentwood
Rochford
Saffron Walden
Snaresbrook
Witham
Sparrow, Brown & Co
Crickett, Round & Co
Attersole & Co
Cox & Nunn
Crickett, Russell & Co
Alexanders & Co
Nunn, Mills & Co
Joyner, Surridge & Co
Searle, Low & Co
J & E Clarke
Sparrow, Brown & Co
2,400. 0. 0
10,300. 0. 0
600. 0. 0
1,800. 0. 0
2,400. 0. 0
1,800. 0. 0
2,400. 0. 0
3,600. 0. 0
3,600. 0. 0
1,200. 0. 0
2,300. 0. 0
2,211. 3. 6
10,794.11. 6
510. 0. 0
1,179.13. 0
2,400. 9. 6
1,637. 4. 0
1,588. 8. 0
4,093. 3. 0
3,363. 2. 6
851. 9. 0
1,605.10. 6
Dursley
Fisher, Wells & Co
	
2,700.
Pitt, Croame & Co and
	
4,346
Cripps & Co
Bloxsome & Co
Commissary A
Trotter
	
0. 0	 2,472. 8. 0
	
6. 0	 5,629.14. 6
1,823. 9. 0
1,761.14. 0
1,264 9 0
1,800. 0. 0
Gloucester	 J Wood
	 4,800. 0. 0
	
4,116. 7. 0
Turner, Morris & Co	 7,200. 0. 0
	
5,972. 6. 6
Marshfield
	
Baldwin & Co	 600. 0 0
	
600. 0. 0
Stow-on-the-	 J E. & C. Cripps	 3,453 14 0	 3,373. 0. 0
Wold
Stroudwater	 Martin, Mills & Co	 5,400. 0 0
	
4,625 0. 0
Tetbury	 Wood, Pitt & Co	 4,000. 0 0	 4,401. 1. 0
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Town/City Exchange station agent	 New silver coin
available for
exchange
£	 s	 d
Silver coin
withdrawn
£	 s	 d
Gloucestershire (continued)
Tewkesbury/ Lechmere & Co 2,400. 0. 0 2,112.10. 6
Upton
Tewkesbury Hartland & Co 2,400. 0. 0 2,592.16. 6
Thornbury Yates, Watkins & Co 600. 0. 0 600	 0. 0
Winchcombe Fisher, Ashmore & Co 900. 0. 0 751.18. 0
Wotton-under- Le Chevalier & Potter 135.11. 0 132.	 0. 0
Edge
Hampshire
Alresford Knapp & Co 1,200. 0. 0 1,031.17 6
Andover Heath & Co 1,500. 0 0 1,904	 5 6
Wakeford & Son 900 0 0 1,070 19. 6
Basingstoke Ruggett, Graham & 3,000 0 0 2,270	 3. 0
Co
Bishop's Fox, Seymour & 600 0 0 837 16 6
Waltham Gunner
Christchurch Dean, Castlemann & 600 0 0 572. 4 6
Adams
Sleat, Aldridge & 600 0 0 634	 7 6
Elliott
Gosport/Fareham Goodeve & Co 1,800 0 0 1,871	 19 6
Isle of Wight Kirkpatrick & Co 802 14 0 600	 0 0
Lymington St Barbe & Son 2,400 0 0 2 255 13 0
Newport (Isle of Bassett, Clarke & Roe 4,200 0 0 3,600	 0 0
Wight) Commissary E 397 0 6 397	 0 6
Robinson
Petersfield Patrick & Co 1,200 0 0 2 055 14 0
Portsmouth/ Grant, Durby & Co 6 300 0 0 5,978	 1 0
Portsea
Portsmouth/ Godwin & Co 9,900 0 0 9 497 19 6
Portsea/Gosport
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Town/City Exchange station agent 	 New silver coin
available for
exchange
£	 s	 d
Silver coin
withdrawn
£	 s	 d
Hampshire (continued)
Ringwood Hicks & White
	
3,000. 0. 0 1,644.	 0. 0
Romsey Sharpe & Son	 900. 0. 0 1,112.14. 6
Warner, Newman &
	
900. 0. 0 1,262.16. 0
Co
Southampton Harrison & Maddisons	 3,000. 0. 0 2,304.16. 0
Hilgrove & Atherley	 3,000. 0. 0 3,387.	 6. 6
Smith & Sons
	
2,400. 0. 0 2,227.	 2. 0
Winchester Knapp & Co	 4,800. 0. 0 3,169.16. 6
Herefordshire
Hereford Matthews, Holloway	 3,600. 0. 0 2,200.	 0. 0
& Co
Bodenham & Co	 3,600. 0. 0 2,596.	 7. 0
Kington Harris & Co	 3,000. 0. 0 589.	 3. 6
Ledbury Webb & Co	 1,800. 0. 0 1,585.	 0. 0
Leominster Coleman, Smith & Co	 2,395. 0. 0 2,341 17. 6
Ross Newman & Prichard	 2,400. 0. 0 1,722.14. 6
Hertfordshire
Cheshunt Raikes & Armstrong	 600. 0. 0 436	 5. 0
Hemel Grover & Pollard	 2,400 0. 0 2,139	 3. 6
Hempstead
Hertford S & T. Adams	 3,000. 0. 0 1,912.10. 0
Hitchin Chapman, Pierson &
	 2,400. 0 0 2,181.	 1 6
Co
Royston Fordham & Co	 2,400. 0 0 2,464	 6 0
St Albans Commissary G
	 3,000 0 0 2,427	 9 6
Maddox
Ware S &T Adams	 1,200 0 0 1,168 10. 0
Jones & Cobham
	 1,200 0 0 1,444 15 0
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Town/City	 Exchange station agent New silver coin
available for
exchange
£	 s	 d
Silver coin
withdrawn
£	 s	 d
Watford
Hertfordshire (continued)
E. Wharmby
	
1,200. 0. 0
Huntingdon
575.13.	 0
Huntingdon Pasheller & Co
	
4,200. 0. 0 3,680.19.	 0
St Neots Rix, Gorham & Co 3,000.	 0.	 0 2,055.18.	 0
Kent
Ashford Haffenden & Co 1,500.	 0.	 0 998.19.	 6
G & W Jemmett 2,100.	 0.	 0 2,256.17.	 6
Canterbury Hammond & Co and 11,400.	 0.	 0 11,366.12.	 6
Baker & Co
Chatham/ Jeffreys & Gurr 9,000.	 0.	 0 4,254.	 3.	 0
Rochester
Dartford Budgen & Co 1,800.	 0.	 0 1,455.	 7.	 6
Deal May, Wyborn & Co 3,500.	 0.	 0 3,283.15.	 0
Hulke, Sampson & 1,300.	 0.	 0 1,299.12.	 0
Co
Dover/Folkestone Minett, Fector & Co 3,600.	 0.	 0 3,431.10.	 0
Dover Latham, Rice & Co 2,400.	 0.	 0 2,400.	 0.	 0
Faversham Watson & Martin 2,400.	 0.	 0 1,894.	 2.	 6
Gravesend Brenchley & Co 1,800.	 0	 0 987.16.	 6
Miller & Co 1,200.	 0.	 0 928. 9. 6
Maidstone Edmeads, Atkins & 9,000.	 0.	 0 9,153.	 4.	 0
Tyrrell
Margate Cobb & Son 1,800.	 0.	 0 1,533.	 4.	 6
Ramsgate Austins & Co 1,500.	 0	 0 803.	 6.	 6
Burgess & Son 900. 0. 0 794.	 0. 0
Sandwich Emmerson & Co 1,800.	 0.	 0 1,848.	 0.	 0
Sevenoaks E. Jardine 3,200.	 0.	 0 3,061.	 2.	 0
Sheerness Chalk & Co 1,800.	 0.	 0 1,701.	 6.	 6
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Town/City Exchange station agent New silver coin
available for
exchange
£	 s	 d
Silver coin
withdrawn
2,	 s	 d
Kent (continued)
Sittingbourne Bradley & Co 1,200. 0. 0 925.14. 0
Tenterden/ Mace & Co 1,200. 0. 0 1,495.18. 6
Cranbrook
Tonbridge Beeching & Son 2,200. 0. 0 2,036.	 0. 6
Woolwich Commissary T. F. 2,400. 0. 0 1,778.16. 6
Winter
Lancashire
Blackburn Cunliffes, Brooks & 6,000. 0. 0 3,867.	 9. 0
Co
Bolton Woods & Co 1,148.15. 0 370.	 4. 6
Bury Burnley Howarth, Hardman & 6,200. 0. 0 5,261.12. 6
Co
Lancaster Worswick & Co 9,000. 0. 0 2,593.	 1. 0
Dilworth & Co 9,000. 0. 0 2,900.16. 6
Liverpool Commissary C. Purcell 6,820. 5. 0 6,698.10. 6
Moss, Dale & Co 2,450. 1. 0 2,450.	 1. 0
Roscoe & Co 7,913.13. 0 7,913.13. 0
Heywood & Sons 12,816. 1. 0 8,150.	 0. 0
Leyland & Bullins 3,600. 0. 0 2,717.	 5. 6
Hadwin & Co 4,200. 0. 0 4,200.	 0. 0
Manchester Geaves & Co 6,000. 0. 0 6,000.	 0. 0
Heywood & Co 17,400. 0. 0 17,400.	 0. 0
Jones, Lloyd & Co 30,000. 0. 0 22,416.	 1. 0
T Mottram 9,600. 0. 0 9,600.	 0. 0
Preston/Bolton Commissary P. 2,051.15. 0 2,020.	 5. 0
Roberts
Preston Pedders & Co 6,200. 0. 0 2,348.14. 6
Claytons & Wilson 9,000. 0. 0 6,291.	 0. 0
Warrington Parr, Lyon & Co 3,600. 0. 0 4,778.	 6. 0
Wigan Thicknesse & 5,400. 0. 0 4,276.	 2. 6
Hoodcock
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Town/City Exchange station agent	 New silver coin
available for
exchange
£	 s	 d
Silver coin
withdrawn
£	 s	 d
Leicestershire
Ashby-de-la Fisher & Co 3,000.	 0.	 0 4,609.16.	 6
Zouch
Hinckley Jarvis & Lane 2,400.	 0.	 0 2,559.	 4.	 6
Leicester Mansfield & 9,600.	 0.	 0 12,553.16.	 0
Babingtons
Loughborough Thorp & Middleton 3,600.	 0.	 0 3,968.18.	 6
Lutterworth Goodacre & Buzzard 2,400.	 0.	 0 2,375.13.	 6
Market Inkersole , Goddard & 3,600.	 0.	 0 3,396.19.	 0
Harborough Goddard
Melton Mowbray R Norman 2,400.	 0.	 0 2,429.14.	 6
Lincolnshire
Boston Gee, Clarke & Co 12,000.	 0.	 0 12,000.	 0.	 0
Boston/Spalding Claypon & Sons 9,242.	 1.	 6 4,198.11.	 6
Brigg W Owston 1,800.	 0.	 0 1,620.15.	 6
Folkingham Smith, Hall & Co 1,800.	 0.	 0 1,360.17.	 0
Gainsborough Smith, Ellison & Co 5,400.	 0.	 0 4,714.	 0.	 6
Grantham Holt, King & Co 3,600.	 0.	 0 5,400.	 2.	 0
Holbeach Gurney & Co 1,200.	 0.	 0 1,370.10.	 0
Lincoln Smith, Ellison & Co 6,600.	 0.	 0 5,681.16.	 0
Louth Commissary E. Pitman 4,557.18.	 6 4,478.10.	 6
Market Rasen Clarke & Son 1,200.	 0.	 0 928.10.	 0
Sleaford Peacock, Handley & 2,800.	 0.	 0 2,808.	 3.	 0
Co
Stamford Commissary W. B. 7,800.	 0.	 0 6,834.11.	 0
More
Middlesex
Brentford W Nicholls 3,000.	 0.	 0 2,870.	 7.	 0
P. Norbury 2,400.	 0.	 0 2,319.12.	 0
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I	 s
Middlesex (continued)
Staines Ashby & Co 2,400. 0. 0 2,394. 5. 6
Uxbridge Commissary J. Slade 3,000. 0. 0 2,758. 9. 0
Monmouthshire
Abergavenny Commissary T. T. 2,400. 0. 0 2,412.17. 0
Smith
Commissary T. 1,200. 0. 0 931. 4. 0
Osborne
Chepstow Buckle, Thompson & 1,800. 0. 0 1,715. 5. 0
Proctor
Monmouth Commissary J. 3,000. 0. 0 2,609. 7. 0
Lawrence
Newport Forman, Fothergill & 3,000. 0. 0 3,727.13. 0
Co
Norfolk
Diss Fincham & Sons 2,600. 0. 0 2,403.	 6. 6
Taylor, Dyson & 1,600. 0. 0 1,402.	 0. 6
Brown
Fakenham Gurney, Birkbeck & 3,000. 0. 0 3,144.
	 0. 0
Buxton
Harleston Gurney, Turners & 600. 0. 0 600.	 0. 0
Brightwen
Holt Gurney & Co 600. 0. 0 600.	 0. 0
King's Lynn Bagge & Bacon 3,000. 0. 0 3,001.15. 6
Gurney, Birkbeck & 3,000. 0. 0 3,200.10. 6
Co
North Walsham R Baker - 20.16. 0
Norwich Kett & Back 6,000. 0. 0 6,000.	 0. 0
Day & Sons 4,800. 0. 0 4,800.	 0. 0
Bignold & Co 3,600 0. 0 3,588.	 2. 0
Harvey & Hudsons 4,800. 0. 0 4,018.	 5. 6
Gurney & Co 6,000. 0. 0 6,648.13. 6
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Norfolk (continued)
Swaffham Gurney & Co 600.	 0. 0 600.	 0.	 0
Day & Sons 600. 0. 0 711.	 9.	 0
Thetford Willett & Co 2,411.13.	 0 2,221.19.	 6
Yarmouth Lacon & Co 9,600.	 0.	 0 6,176.	 4.	 6
Northamptonshire
Daventry Hall & Morgan 1,200.	 0.	 0 1,482.	 7.	 6
Kettering Keep & Co 1,800.	 0.	 0 1,763.17.	 0
Northampton Percival & Sons 6,000.	 0.	 0 4,861.13.	 6
Smith, Hall & Co 6,000.	 0.	 0 5,465.	 1.	 6
Oundle Smith & Co 2,400.	 0.	 0 1,877.17.	 0
Peterborough Squire & Co 2,400.	 0.	 0 2,339.	 6.	 0
Boultbee & Cole 2,400.	 0.	 0 2,297.17.	 0
Thrapston Johnson, Eaton & 2,400.	 0.	 0 1,518.	 5.	 0
Eland
Wellingborough Morton, Rodick & Co 3,000.	 0.	 0 2,773.12.	 0
Northumberland
Alnwick E Stamp 3,124.15.	 6 3,098.
	 7.	 6
Berwick-upon- Batson, Reed & Co 12,000.	 0.	 0 9,282.	 3.	 6
Tweed
Hexham Commissary G 3,073.	 8.	 6 3,000.	 0.	 0
Hayward
Morpeth Reed, Batson & Co 2,593.	 0.	 2 2,564.11.	 6
Newcastle Reed, Batson & Co 15,602.16	 3 14,026	 6. 6
Lambton & Co 11,400.	 0.	 0 11,400	 0.	 0
Ridley & Co 12,000.	 0.	 0 12,000.	 0.	 0
North Shields Reed, Batson & Co 5,005 19	 7 4,914.	 5.	 0
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Nottinghamshire
Mansfield Abney & Maltby	 6,600. 0. 0 4,447.12. 0
Newark Godfrey & Hutton 1,800. 0. 0 4,541.	 0. 0
Handleys, Peacock & 2,000. 0. 0 2,464.10. 6
Co
Nottingham Moore, Maltby & 6,438. 8. 6 6,429.	 2. 6
Robinson
Retford Yarborough & Co 3,326. 0. 0 3,511.17. 6
Southwell Wylde & Bolger 600. 0. 0 600.	 0. 0
Worksop Yarborough & Co 1,474. 0. 0 1,461.19. 0
Oxfordshire
Banbury Haydon, Wyatt & Co 2,700. 0. 0 3,297.15. 0
Cobb, Wheatley & Co 3,300. 0. 0 4,240.	 8. 0
Bicester Tubb, Wootten & Co 2,400. 0. 0 2,300.	 8. 0
Chipping Norton Commissary W. 2,400. 0. 0 214.	 4. 6
Fletcher
Henley Hewitt & Cooper 2,400. 0. 0 2,112.15. 0
Oxford Cox, Morrell & Co,
Fletcher, Parsons &
10,800. 0. 0 8,910.	 4. 0
Co, Tubb & Co and
Walker & Co
Thame Seymour & Co 2,400. 0. 0 2,400.	 0. 0
Witney Clinch & Son 1,800. 0. 0 3,739.	 3. 0
Woodstock W. Carter 1,200. 0. 0 993.	 8. 0
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Rutland
Oakham T. Hawker 1,200. 0. 0 404.16. 0
Commissary W. C. 600. 0. 0 569.13. 0
Heydinger
Shropshire
Broseley/ Vickers & Pritchard 4,200. 0. 0 3,820.15. 6
Bridgnorth
Ludlow Coleman & Wellings 3,000. 0. 0 2,676.	 2. 6
Prodgers & Co 600. 0. 0 600.	 0. 0
Market Drayton Jarvis, Dicken & Co 1,400. 0. 0 1,463.16. 6
Newport Parsons & Co 1,200. 0. 0 1,425.	 8. 0
Oswestry Croxen & Co 3,600. 0. 0 4,208.	 3. 0
Shifnal Botfield & Co 1,300. 0. 0 1,346.	 5. 0
Shrewsbury Rocke, Eyton & Co 4,200. 0. 0 4,512.11. 6
Scott, Burton & Co 3,600. 0. 0 3,900.	 0. 0
Beck, Dodson & Co 4,200. 0. 0 4,807.	 0. 0
Wellington Reynolds, Charlton & 3,000. 0. 0 1,290.	 0. 0
Shakeshaft
Wenlock Collins, Pitt & Howells 600. 0. 0 599.16. 6
Somerset
Bath Tuffnell, Collett & Co 3,600. 0. 0 3,184.13. 0
Hobhouse & Co 3,000. 0. 0 2,378.10. 0
Clement & Co 6,000. 0. 0 5,458.	 0. 0
Cavenagh, Browne & 4,200. 0. 0 3,603.	 4. 6
Co
Bridgwater Sealy & Sons 3,600. 0. 0 4,915.11. 0
Stuckey & Woodlands 3,000. 0. 0 3,388.19. 0
Bruton Prince & Co 1,200. 0. 0 1,230.18. 6
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Somerset (continued)
Chard	 Sparks & Co 1,724.10.	 0 1,707.	 4.	 0
Crewkerne	 Gray, Slade & Co 800.	 0. 679.18.	 0
Sparks & Co 1,475.10. 1,178.	 2.	 0
Perham, Phelps & Co 800.	 0. 763.16.	 6
Frome	 H. G. & W. Sheppard 6,000.	 0.	 0 4,752.	 9.	 0
Glastonbury	 Lilly, Brown & Reeves 600.	 0.	 0 599.17.	 6
Ilminster	 W. Henning 600.	 0.	 0 285.	 0.	 0
Langport	 G & V. Stuckey 1,800.	 0.	 0 1,760.	 0.	 0
Shepton Mallet	 Lilly, Brown & Reeves 3,000.	 0.	 0 1,440.15.	 6
Taunton	 Woodford & Co 3,900.	 0.	 0 3,740.10.	 6
J & D Badcock 4,300.	 0.	 0 4,765.17.	 0
Wellington	 Commissary H. 3,600.	 0.	 0 2,650.	 6.	 6
Basnett
Wells	 Payne, Tufnell & Co 4,800.	 0.	 0 2,941.19.	 0
Wincanton	 Messiter & Co 1,200.	 0.	 0 1,259.15.	 6
Musgrave & Co 1,200.	 0.	 0 1,200.	 0.	 0
Wiveliscombe	 P & W Hancock 2,000.	 0.	 0 2,268.12.	 6
Yeovil	 Daniell, Hutchings & 1,000.	 0.	 0 1,137.	 4.	 6
Co
Whitmarsh & White 900.	 0.	 0 900. 0.	 0
Staffordshire
Burton upon	 Blunton, Webb & Co 3,600	 0. 0 2,220 19.	 0
Trent	 Harding & Co 1,200.	 0.	 0 1,100.	 0.	 6
Lichfield	 Scott & Co 4,800. 0
	 0 2,673 13.	 0
Newcastle-under-Sparrow & Co 5,200.	 0.	 0 2,980.17.	 6
Lyme	 Kinnersley & Co 5,400	 0	 0 4,856 18.	 0
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Staffordshire (continued)
Stafford Stevenson, Webb & 1,800. 0.	 0
Co
Birch, Moore & Yates 7,200. 0.	 0 3,033.	 2.	 0
Stone Birch & Moore 1,200. 0.	 0 1,068.15.	 6
Tamworth Harding, Oakes & Co 3,000. 0.	 0 2,723.	 7.	 0
Uttoxeter T. Hart 1,200. 0.	 0 1,200.	 0.	 0
J Bell 2,400. 0.	 0 3,352.	 9.	 0
Walsall Foster & Co 3,000. 0.	 0 1,700.	 0.	 0
Barber, Marshall & Co 2,188.18.	 6 1,170.13.	 0
Wednesbury S. & W Addison 6,000. 0.	 0 1,247.	 1.	 0
Wolverhampton Hordern, Molineux & 3,000. 0.	 0 1,826.	 1.	 6
Co
R Fryer 3,000. 0.	 0 1,810.	 3.	 0
Wrottesley & Co 2,900. 0.	 0 1,942.	 6.	 6
Suffolk
Brandon Willett & Sons 1,200. 0.	 0 1,200.	 0.	 0
Bungay Gurney & Co 2,400. 0.	 0 1,935.13.	 0
Bury St Edmunds Oakes & Son 5,400 0.	 0 4,349.	 2.	 6
Sparrow, Brown & Co 6,000. 0.	 0 4,137.	 6.	 0
Clare Ray & Son 3,000. 0	 0 2,328.	 5.	 0
Eye E. Lingwood 1,200. 0.	 0 857.	 6.	 6
Hadleigh Alexanders & Co 3,600. 0.	 0 2,930.	 7.	 6
Halesworth Gurney & Co 4,200. 0.	 0 3,893	 9.	 0
Ipswich Crickett & Bacon 3,600 0	 0 3,074 10	 6
Alexanders, Spooner 6,600 0.	 0 6,440 19.	 6
& Co
Mildenhall Willett & Sons 1,200 0	 0 1,188	 7	 0
Needham Market Alexanders, Spooner 1,200 0.	 0 1,080.18	 0
& Co
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Suffolk (continued)
Stowmarket Sparrow, Hanbury & 2,400. 0. 0 1,377.15. 6
Brown
Oakes & Son 1,200. 0. 0 974.18. 0
Sudbury Fenn & Addison 2,400. 0. 0 2,250.15. 6
Woodbridge Alexanders & Collett 6,600. 0. 0 5,220.19. 6
Surrey
Chertsey T. & G La Coste 1,200. 0. 0 1,160.	 0. 6
Croydon Commissary J. Cooper 3,000. 0. 0 1,405.	 6. 0
Dorking Piper, Dewdney & Co 2,400. 0. 0 1,937.	 1. 6
Farnham Cock & Co 9,000. 0. 0 2,499.11. 6
Godalming Moline & Weale 1,800. 0. 0 1,313.	 0. 0
Mellersh, Kidd & Co 1,200. 0. 0 929.16. 0
Guildford W T & J Haydon 3,600. 0. 0 1,761.18. 6
Sparks & French 1,800. 0. 0 1,323.	 2. 0
Kingston Shrubsole & Lambert 1,800. 0. 0 2,034.18. 0
Reigate Piper, Gale & Co 3,000. 0. 0 1,245.	 5. 0
Piper, Dewdney & Co 1,200. 0. 0 712.	 1. 0
Sussex
Arundel Henty & Co 3,000. 0. 0 2,325.16. 6
Brighton Wigney, Hanford & 2,100. 0. 0 1,800.	 0. 0
Co
Hall, Lashmar & Co 2,450. 0. 0 1,909.	 6. 6
Mitchell, Mills & Co 1,450. 0. 0 1,242.12. 6
Chichester Ridge, Murray & 3,600. 0. 0 4,100.	 0. 0
Ridge
Hack, Dendy & Co 2,400. 0. 0 2,250.16. 6
Eastbourne Michell & Co 2,400. 0. 0 2,076.12. 6
Hailsham
Hastings/Battle Smith, Gill & Co 3,600. 0. 0 3,146.14. 0
Robertsbridge
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Sussex (continued)
Horsham Piper, Dewdney & Co 3,000.	 0. 0 2,125.	 0.	 6
Lewes/East Hurley & Co 5,127.	 1. 6 5,011.18.
	 0
Grinstead
Lewes Wood, Hall & Co 1,472.18. 6 1,392.12.	 0
Petworth Stoveld & Upperton 2,400.	 0. 0 1,881.14.	 0
Rye Curties & Co 3,000.	 0. 0 3,093.15.	 6
Worthing Henty & Co 1,800.	 0. 0 1,777.13.	 0
Warwickshire
Atherstone Chapman & Co 1,200.	 0. 0 852.15.
	 6
Willday & Co 600.	 0. 0 600.	 0.	 0
Birmingham Woolley, Gordon & 4,200. 0 0 4,200.	 0.	 0
Co
Taylor & Lloyd 4,200.	 0. 0 4,196.15.	 0
Freer & Co 4,200.	 0. 0 4,171.	 7.	 6
Smith, Gray & Co 4,200.	 0. 0 4,468.10.
	 0
Attwoods, Spooner & 4,411.	 1. 6 4,411.	 1.	 6
Co
Galton, James & Co 3,600.	 0. 0 3,623.	 8.	 0
Coventry Troughton & Co 1,800.	 0. 0 1,800.	 0.	 0
Beck & Adams 1,799.	 9. 0 1,798.17.	 6
Little, Woodcock & 1,800.	 0. 0 1,833.10.	 6
Son
Eagle, Goodall & Co 2,400.17. 0 2,213.	 4.	 0
Lant & Co 1,800.	 0. 0 1,800.	 0.	 0
Nuneaton Craddock & Bull 1,800.	 0. 0 1,200.	 0.	 0
Rugby Butlin & Son 1,200.	 0. 0 1,091.19.	 6
Stratford-upon- Whitehead, Weston & 3,600.	 0. 0 2,741.13.	 6
Avon Co
Warwick Tomes, Russell & Co 5,400.	 0. 0 6,936.	 0.	 0
199
England
Town/City Exchange station agent New silver coin
available for
exchange
£	 s	 d
Silver coin
withdrawn
£	 s	 d
Westmorland
Appleby Briggs & Co 1,800. 0. 0 1,575.17. 0
Burton Rev. H Sill 1,200. 0. 0 873.	 9. 6
Kendal Wilson & Co and 11,400. 0. 0 4,626.	 5. 0
Wakefield & Co
Kirkby Lonsdale Gibson, Moore & Co 1,800. 0. 0 1,201.	 1. 0
Westmorland Commissary Le Fevre 130. 0. 0 26.16. 0
Wiltshire
Bradford Hobhouse & Co 1,200. 0. 0 487.	 0. 0
Chippenham Gundry & Co 1,800. 0. 0 2,280.	 0. 0
Devizes Tyler, Salmon & Co 4,800. 0 0 5,460.	 3. 0
Malmesbury Robins, Young & Co 600 0. 0 1,382	 6. 0
Marlborough King, Gosling & 2,400. 0. 0 3,175.14. 0
Tanner
Ward, Brown & Co 2,400. 0. 0 2,980 19. 0
Melksham Freeman & Co 1,200. 0. 0 985.	 7. 0
Salisbury Everett & Co 4,200 0 0 3,183.13 0
Brodie & Co 6,000 0 0 5,727 11 0
Swindon Strange & Co 2,145 0 0 2,128 10. 0
Trowbridge Ludlow & Co 1,200 0 0 997 14. 0
Warminster Everett, Thring & Co 2,400. 0 0 2,112 18 0
Heytesbury
Warminster Phipps, Biggs & Co 1,200 0 0 1,200	 0 0
Wootton Bassett Commissary J 855 0 0 850	 3 6
Radford
Worcestershire
Bewdley Roberts, Baker & Co 1,000 0 0 842	 8 0
Pardoe & Co 1,530 0 0 1,505 19 6
Bromsgrove Rufford & Co 2,400 0 0 2,071	 9 0
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Worcestershire (continued)
Dudley Hordern & Co 3,600.	 0.	 0 2,236.	 0.	 0
Evesham Oldaker, Day & Co 3,600.	 0.	 0 4,072.13.	 6
Hartland & Co 1,200.	 0.	 0 1,900.	 0.	 0
Kidderminster Wakeman & Co 3,470.	 0.	 0 2,528.11.	 6
Stourbridge Rufford & Co 3,600.	 0.	 0 3,262.	 4.	 0
Worcester Berwick & Co 7,500.	 0.	 0 8,300.	 0.	 0
Farley, Johnson & 3,300.	 0.	 0 3,627.	 0.	 0
Turner
Attwood, Spooner & Co 1,200.	 0.	 0 1,200.	 0.	 0
Yorkshire
Barnsley Beckett, Birks & Co 4,800.	 0.	 0 2,187.19.	 0
Beverley Machell, Pease & Co
and Bower
3,000.	 0.	 0 2,588.	 8.	 0
Boroughbridge Fletcher, Stubbs & Co 1,800.	 0.	 0 910.	 6.	 0
Bradford Commissary W. Miller
and Commissary G
7,800.	 0.	 0 6,167.	 3.	 6
Bodley
Burlington Thompson, Harding & 1,200.	 0.	 0 1,270.16.	 0
Holtby
Dewsbury Hagues, Cook & Co 600.	 0. 0 600. 0.	 0
Doncaster Lathams, Jackson & Co 9,000.	 0.	 0 5,009.15.	 0
Halifax J William and C. Rawson 3,521.15.	 6 2,660. 0.	 0
Rhodes, Briggs & Co 3,678.	 4.	 6 3,660.15.	 0
Howden Schofield, Cootes & 1,200.	 0.	 0 1,302.	 5.	 0
Co
Huddersfield Dobson & Sons 3,034.10.	 1 3,000.	 0.	 0
Hirst & Sykes 3,565.	 9.11 3,540.18.	 6
Hull Pease, Harrison & Co 16,200.	 0.	 0 11,782.	 4.	 6
Knaresborough Harrison, Terrys & Co 2,400.	 0.	 0 2,350.	 2.	 0
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Yorkshire (continued)
Leeds Fields, Greenwood & 7,200. 0. 0 5,600.	 0. 0
Co
Beckett & Co 6,000. 0. 0 3,200.	 0. 0
Perfect, Hardcastle & 6,000. 0. 0 3,200.	 0. 0
Co
Nicholson, Brown & 5,400. 0. 0 3,326.	 9. 0
Co
Leyburn Hutton, Wood & Co 3,000. 0. 0 1,489.	 3. 6
Malton Bower, Duesbery & 900. 0. 0 66.	 2. 0
Co
Pease, Dunn & Pease 5,100. 0. 0 4,118.16. 0
Pontefract Perfect & Co 2,400. 0. 0 2,081.14. 0
Leathams & Co 2,400. 0. 0 2,100.	 0. 0
Richmond Hutton & Co 6,600. 0. 0 2,859.	 2. 0
Ripon Harrison, Terrys & 5,400. 0. 0 3,286.15. 6
Harrison
Coates & Co 600. 0. 0 135.	 9. 0
Rotherham Walkers, Eyre & 4,200. 0. 0 2,700.	 6. 0
Stanley
Saddleworth Buckley, Roberts & 1,200. 0. 0 949.	 1. 0
Co
Scarborough Woodall, Taylor & Co 3,000. 0. 0 1,427.	 7. 0
Lister, Moorsom & Co 2,400. 0. 0 1,200.	 0. 0
Settle Birkbecks, Alcock & 2,400. 0. 0 1,093.	 3. 6
Co
Sheffield Parker, Shores & 4,200. 0. 0 4,040.	 0. 0
Blakelock
Walkers & Co 3,600. 0. 0 3,600.	 0. 0
Remington & Younges 5,400. 0. 0 3,472.	 4. 6
Skipton Commissary T. 2,400. 0. 0 2,093.12. 0
Sedgwick
Thirsk/Ripon Bretains & Co 1,800. 0. 0 825.12. 6
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Yorkshire (continued)
Wakefield Wentworth, Chaloner 7,800. 0. 0 4,502.	 7. 0
& Co
Leathams, Jackson & 4,200. 0. 0 2,400.	 0. 0
Co
Whitby Simpson, Chapman & 1,200. 0. 0 1,163.	 7. 6
Co
J & J. Saunders 1,200. 0. 0 1,187.12. 0
Richardson, Holt & 1,200. 0. 0 1,079.	 7. 6
Co
York Wilson, Tweedy & Co 4,800. 0. 0 2,366.18. 0
Raper, Swann & Co 5,400. 0. 0 4,944.	 5. 6
Wentworth, Chaloner 7,200. 0. 0 3,591.14. 0
& Co
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Principal stations
Bank of England 415,755.	 0.	 0 415,755.	 0.	 0
Goldsmiths' Hall 25,200.	 0.	 0 9,647.10.	 0
Guildhall 14,400.	 0.	 0 12,956.	 8.	 0
South Sea House 15,000.	 0.	 0 13,783.19.	 0
Auxiliary stations
Bermondsey 4,800.	 0.	 0 4,159.	 0.	 6
Covent Garden 7,800.	 0.	 0 7,175.17.	 6
Denmark Street 8,400.	 0.	 0 7,994.	 0.	 0
Hatton Garden 7,200.	 0.	 0 6,275.	 9.	 6
Lambeth 3,000.	 0.	 0 2,671.15.	 6
New Sessions House 6,003.13	 0 5,496.	 1.	 0
Oxford Street 7,200.	 0.	 0 6,660.	 9.	 0
Picket Street 7,800	 0	 0 6,928.13.	 0
St Thomas Street 4,274.	 0.	 0
Sessions House 11,400	 0	 0 10,420.	 9.	 0
Shadwell 3,000.	 0	 0 2,704.17.	 6
Spitalfields 6,000.	 0.	 0 6,000.15.	 6
Swallow Street 9,600.	 0.	 0 9,200.	 0.	 0
Wapping 2,400	 0	 0 2,332.	 5.	 0
Whitechapel 4,000.	 0.	 0 3,900.	 0.	 0
Worship Street 6,000.	 0.	 0 5,400.	 0.	 0
London bankers and other
stations
Biddulph, Cocks & Co 200. 0	 0
Birch & Chambers 400. 0. 0
Bond & Sons _ 590.	 0.	 0
Bosanquet & Co 200.	 0.	 0
Chatteris & Co 1,790.	 0.	 0
Coutts & Co
Curries, Raikes & Co 1,200.	 0.	 0
Curtis & Co 1,200.	 0	 0
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London bankers and other
stations (continued)
Dorrien, Magens & Co
Drummond & Co
Esdaile & Co
-Fry & Chapman
General Post Office
Glyn, Mills & Co
-Goslings & Sharp
Grote & Co
Hammersley, Brooksbank &
Co
Hanbury, Taylor & Lloyds
Hankey & Co
Herries & Co
Hoare & Co
Ladbrokes & Co
Lees, Brassey & Farr
Lubbock & Co
•••Marsh & Co
Martin, Stone & Martin
Morland, Ransom & Co
W Parlett
-Paxton, Cockerel! & Co
Perring & Co
Pole & Co
Praeds, Mackworth & Co
Pryce & Co
Rogers, Towgood & Co
St Martin's Lane	 800	 0	 0
-Sansom, Postlethwaite & Co
Sikes, Snaith & Co
Smith, Payne & Co
-Snow, Sandby & Paul
Spooner, Attwoods & Co
Stephenson & Salt
_Vere, Smart & Co
Weston & Co
Williams & Co
-Willis, Percival & Co 
400.	 0.
1,000.	 0.
500.	 0.
600.	 0.
1,134.13.
700.
	 0.
446.	 5.
1,100.	 0.
526.	 0.
474.	 0.
1,183.	 6.
771.13.
1,200.	 0.
865.	 0.
518.12.
600.	 0.
600.	 0.
300.	 0.
200.	 0.
55.13.
143.	 0.
900.	 0.
1,200.	 0.
346 10.
1,000.	 0.
800.	 0.
656.	 1.
500.	 0.
1,200.	 0.
1,200.	 0.
525.	 2.
1,901.	 5.
711.11.
751.	 3.
148.	 5
1,252	 7
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
6
0
6
6
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Aberystwyth Davis, Williams & Co 3,600. 0. 0 2,554.17.	 6
Brecon Wilkins & Co 5,400. 0. 0 3,447.	 0.	 0
Caernarfon Commissary G. 7,800. 0. 0 9,249.	 3.	 0
Manville
Cardiff Wood & Co 4,800. 0. 0 3,342.	 7.	 6
Carmarthen Waters & Sons 15,000. 0. 0 15,372.	 2.	 0
Denbigh R & C Sankey 7,200. 0. 0 6,661.	 5.	 6
Dolgellau Commissary B Smith 1,800. 0. 0 2,067.17.	 0
Haverfordwest Phillips & Co 4,920. 0. 0 1,000.	 0.	 0
Commissary H. 7,179.18. 0 7,076.17.	 0
Hewetson
Holyhead Commissary C. W. 1,800. 0. 0 1,652.18.	 6
Beverley
Llandovery Jones & Co 1,800 0. 0 1,889.15.	 0
Merthyr Tydfil Pierce, Williams & Co 3,000. 0. 0 2,243.	 9.	 6
Narberth Saer, Thomas & Co 1,800. 0. 0 1,802.	 8.	 6
Neath Gronow, Eaton & 3,000. 0. 0 1,860.16.	 6
Gibbins
Newtown Tilsley, Jones & 1,200. 0. 0 1,465.17.	 0
Blayney
Pembroke Rotch, Phillips & 2,900 2 0 2,709	 3. 0
Milford Haven Starbuck
Swansea Gibbons, Gronow & 6,000. 0. 0 3,931.	 7.	 6
Eaton,
and Haynes & Son
Wrexham W & R. M Lloyd 1,200. 0. 0 1,200.	 0.	 0
J Kenrick 5,200. 0. 0 6,153.	 1	 6
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Channel Islands and Isle of Man
Town/City	 Exchange station agent New silver
coin available
for exchange
£	 s	 d
Silver coin
withdrawn
£	 s	 d
Jersey
Commissary G. Miles 2,400. 0. 0 2,385.16. 0
Guernsey
Commissary G. White 8,105. 2. 0 8,839.13. 6
Isle of Man
297.	 8. 6
Notes New silver coin includes coin received from the Mint and/or coin
transferred from other stations.
In instances where the silver coin withdrawn is higher than new
silver coin available the difference was made up with banknotes or
Bank of England tokens
The accounts of London bankers do not always indicate if
quantities of new coin were received The old coin tended to be
withdrawn and the bankers later credited with the amount by the
Mint
The aggregate figure for coin withdrawn being less than the total
quoted in Table 14 indicates that a complete record of all station
accounts has not survived
The spelling of names varies in Mint records.
Source PRO Mint 1114-68, Mint 11 73; Mint 1 54, pp. 409-11, 503-19.
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Appendix 4
Silver coin withdrawn in Scotland, 1817
Town/City	 Exchange station agent	 Silver coin withdrawn
I.	 s d
Aberdeen	 Commercial Banking Company 	 11,349. 5. 0
Aberdeen Banking Company	 21,518.13. 6
Aberdeen Commercial Banking 	 14,137.13. 6
Company
Bank of Scotland	 29,619. 6. 6
Alloa
	
J MacMillan	 1,000. 0. 0
Annan	 Commercial Banking Company	 1,575. 6. 6
Arbroath	 W Mill	 1,800. 0. 0
Ayr
	
Bank of Scotland	 4,954. 9. 0
Hunters & Co	 7,322. 7. 0
Banff	 Commercial Banking Company	 8,795.12. 6
Beith	 Commercial Bank	 2,400. 0. 0
Brechin	 A Ritchie	 2,251.16. 0
Buteshire	 A Moore	 676.16. 0
Castle Douglas J Napier	 973. 6. 6
Crieff	 Leith Bank	 599. 4. 0
Cupar	 British Linen Company	 3,348. 3. 0
Dumfries
	 Bank of Scotland	 4,242.16. 0
British Linen Company	 5,143.17. 6
Dundee	 Bank of Scotland	 3,600. 0. 0
Dundee New Bank	 2,000. 0. 0
Dundee Union Bank	 4,000. 0. 0
British Linen Company	 2,468. 0. 0
Dundee Bank	 3,634. 0. 0
Dunfermline	 Bank of Scotland
	
4,677. 8. 0
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Scotland
Town/City	 Exchange station agent	 Silver coin withdrawn
I	 s d
Dunkeld	 Commercial Bank
Duns	 British Linen Company
Edinburgh	 Royal Bank of Scotland
British Linen Company
Commercial Banking Company
Forbes & Co
Ramsays, Bonars & Co
Elgin	 British Linen Company
Falkirk	 A Ramsay
Forfar	 W Don
Forres
	
British Linen Company
Glasgow	 Royal Bank of Scotland
Glasgow Bank
Paisley Bank
Commercial Bank
Thistle Bank
J & R Watson Bank
Paisley Union Bank
Ship Bank
Bank of Scotland
Paisley Banking Company
Paisley Union Banking Company
Kilmarnock Banking Company
1,200. 0. 0
865. 5. 0
9,000. 0. 0
6,200. 0. 0
15,600. 0. 0
16,200. 0. 0
600. 0. 0
4,300. 0. 0
5,169. 0. 6
1,800. 0. 0
3,914.18. 6
7,381. 6. 0
10,200. 0. 0
2,400. 0. 0
1,800. 0. 0
660. 0. 0
2,500. 0. 0
3,600. 0. 0
4,200. 0. 0
14,216.17. 6
2,400. 0. 0
3,000. 0. 0
5,785.10. 0
Greenock	 Bank of Scotland	 10,600. 0. 0
Haddington	 Bank of Scotland	 5,256.13. 0
Hamilton	 Union Bank	 3,000. 0. 0
Hawick	 British Linen Company	 1,519 16. 0
Inverness	 Bank of Scotland	 11,524.10. 0
Perth Bank	 1,800. 0. 0
British Linen Company	 2,400. 0. 0
Irvine	 T McClelland	 2,620. 5. 6
Jedburgh	 British Linen Company	 1,527. 1. 0
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Scotland
Town/City Exchange station agent Silver coin withdrawn
£	 s	 d
Kelso Bank of Scotland 2,985.17. 0
Kirkcaldy Bank of Scotland 7,037.	 0. 0
Kirkcudbright Bank of Scotland 2,491.	 1. 6
Lanark Magistrates of Lanark 1,173.	 8. 6
Langholm Henderson & Scott 320.	 2. 0
Leith Leith Banking Company 4,447.11. 6
British Linen Company 2,400.	 0. 0
Linlithgow A Dawson 700.	 0. 0
Lockerbie Martin & Son 292.	 9. 6
Montrose Bank of Scotland 6,319.15. 6
Newton British Linen Company 1,149.11. 6
Stewart
Orkney & G Forbes 13,167.	 3. 0
Shetland
Paisley Provost of Paisley 3,600.	 0. 0
Peebles J Ker & W Brown 600.	 0. 0
Perth Bank of Scotland 5,400.	 0. 0
British Linen Company 3,000.	 0. 0
Perth Bank Company 7,200.	 0. 0
Perth Union Bank 600.	 0. 0
Peterhead Commercial Banking Company 3,986.	 1 0
Prestonpans H Riddell 195.11 0
St Andrews Bank of Scotland 2,599 15 0
Selkirk A Lang 276	 9. 6
Stirling Bank of Scotland 12,194 17. 6
Stonehaven G Guthrie 600	 0 0
Stranraer British Linen Company 652	 6 0
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Scotland
Town/City Exchange station agent Silver coin withdrawn
I	 s	 d
Tain British Linen Company 2,100. 0. 0
Commercial Banking Company 1,800. 0. 0
Thurso Commercial Banking Company 1,780. 9. 0
Wick J Mackay 2,657. 8. 0
Wigton Bank of Scotland 1,254. 5. 6
Notes Details of new silver coin available for exchange have not been included
because frequently the figures were recorded in a manner not readily
accessible
The aggregate figure for coin withdrawn being less than the total quoted
in Table 14 indicates that a complete record of all station accounts has
not survived
Source BS Unsorted Silver Coin Book (Recoinage), 1817, passim. PRO.
Mint 1 54, pp 520-22 The Edinburgh Alinanack, 1817 (Edinburgh,
1817)
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Figure 2
Wear of silver coins
1. George II shilling, 1743
Weight loss 6.04 per cent
2. Anne sixpence, 1708E
Weight loss 6.57 per cent
3. George II shilling, 1747
Weight loss 10.95 per cent
213
4. William III shilling, 1698
Weight loss 14.08 per cent
5. William III shilling
Weight loss 20.04 per cent
IP
6. William III shilling
Weight loss 23.97 per cent
214
7. William III sixpence
Weight loss 31.53 per cent
8. Sixpence [?]
Weight loss 42.73 per cent
Note: I am grateful to Spink & Son, Lloyd Bennett and especially
to Gavin Scott for making available specimens of the worn
coins illustrated.
215
(Fe
b,/
cr
o„
—00e
:iefilfAWAd
er
cr
0-
c'cp
A 
er
bo vnI
• 4:15	 7:r
3	 ps
go) 7:10 c",․)
0
cr
0
4.1
o g
c'srs
a)c.)
CG1
a)	 A,
3 v.)
crA.
A
ere
be
c'o
er)
tr)	 ir 0
csi	 Csi
216
4 6?,
""'"''''PasfeAz 	 • •
07,04.
CFI •—n
r_swegingwo
WE'
E,MTIMMISEMISEE
• 
Cl)
Ett
••-
..c
Cl)
et
0
rn
cc:
a)
0
a)
Cl)
0
cn
b0
-a
a)
0
0
Cl)
a)
0
-0
kn	 0	 kr,0	 (-4
4-4
o
(-4 (-4
0
0(-4 r-4-4
CO,
1n1
7:J
CE1
oo.s.
0 0
"0 0
1n0
0
CD
cn
1.nnnn-/
0
(4-4
0
cf-E
0
6:6
455.24
CSe.,
25ebcc,
c":"
62/
Ss'
22".
ss'
"604.1
-re>
Figure 6
Mint output of gold and silver coin, 1661-1820
24,000,000
22,000,000
20,000,000
18,000,000
16,000,000
14,000,000
12,000,000
10,000,000
8,000,000
6,000,000
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• Production of gold • Production of silver
Source: Table 7
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Figure 7
Gold and silver coins, 1816-18
1. Sovereign
2. Half-sovereign
3. Crown
220
4. Half-crown (first type)
5. Half-crown (second type)
6. Shilling
221
7. Sixpence
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Figure 12
Notice from exchange station at Boulton
iirmingr
nuuTi
Siker Coin.
-	 4- Z:04417> <MOOD*
THE OLD COIN
Will continue to be Received in Exchange for the NEW COIN
OF THE REALM, at the
COMMERCIAL I1NN 9 BOLTON,
TILL
1Plonda y, the 3(1 Marc!,, 1817.
I'. ROBERTS,
Bolton, 281A libruary, 1817.	
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Figure 13
Regional distribution of silver coin withdrawn in English counties, 1817
Up to £19,999
ri £20,000 to £39,999
II £40,000 to £69,999
• £70,000 to £99.999
III Over £100,000
Source: Table 15
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Table]
Schumpeter-Gilboy price indices, 1696-1823
(1700 = 100)
Consumer
goods
Consumer goods
other than cereals
Producer
goods
1696-99 126 118 106
1700-04 101 101 102
1705-09 95 92 98
1710-14 112 105 100
1715-19 98 97 90
1720-24 95 94 89
1725-29 100 94 93
1730-34 89 88 91
1735-39 90 85 83
1740-44 97 91 94
1745-49 92 92 88
1750-54 92 87 85
1755-59 100 92 96
1760-64 98 93 102
1765-69 106 94 97
1770-74 112 99 97
1775-79 113 101 103
1780-84 119 108 114
1785-89 119 108 110
1790-94 126 114 114
1795-99 151 134 132
1800-04 186 156 153*
1805-09 195 162
1810-14 220 182
1815-19 188 170
1820-23 139 133
*1800-01 only
Source B R Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics
(Cambridge, 1962), pp 468-69.
230
Table 2
Rates of wear of silver coin, 1700-1816
Reduction in
Denomination	 weight (%)	 Source
1712 Crowns	 1.03	 J. Conduitt, Observations upon
Half-crowns	 1.03	 the Present State of our Gold and
Shillings	 1.94	 Silver Coins, 1730, in W. A.
Sixpences	 3.75	 Shaw, Select Tracts and
Documents Illustrative of English
Monetary History, 1626 - 1730
(London, 1896), pp. 236-37.
Coins weighed at the Mint.
1728 Crowns	 2.96	 Conduitt, Observations upon our
Half-crowns	 3.67	 Gold and Silver Coins, pp. 236-
Shillings	 6.08	 37 Coins weighed at the Bank of
Sixpences	 10.57	 England.
1730 Half-crowns	3.38	 [T. Prior], Observations on coin in
Shillings	 8.50	 general with some proposals for
Sixpences	 10 87	 regulating the value of coin in
Ireland (Dublin, 1730), p. 14.
1737 Shillings
	 6-11	 W. A. Shaw, The History of
Sixpences
	 11 — 22
	
Currency, 1252 to 1894
(London [1895]), p.231.
1742
	
Shillings
Sixpences
1762
	
Shillings
8	 Vallavine, Observations on Coin
10	 of this Kingdom, p. 30.
11 42	 G. Whatley, Reflections on Coin
in general, on the coins of gold
and silver in Great Britain in
particular, etc (London, 1762),
pp. 11-12.
1786 Half-crowns	12	 C. Oman, The Coinage of
Shillings	 23	 England (Oxford, 1931), p. 356.
Sixpences	 36
1787	 Crowns	 3.12	 PRO. Mint 1/14, pp. 26-27.
Half-crowns	 8 15
Shillings	 20 61
Sixpences	 36.28
231
1798 Crowns
Half-crowns
Shillings
Sixpences
3.31	 PRO. Mint 1/15, p. 120.
9.90
24.60
38.28
1807	 Shillings	 27.54
Sixpences	 39.80
PRO. Mint 1/16, pp. 208-09.
1811	 Shillings
Sixpences
20	 P. R. Hoare, Reflections on
50	 the possible existence and
supposed expediency of
National Bankruptcy
(London, 1811), p.11.
1816
	
Shillings 29.54	 PRO. Mint 1/54, pp. 370-71.
Reduction in
Denomination	 weight (%)	 Source
Sixpences	 40.02
Notes William Jacob has estimated that at the end of the eighteenth century
the annual loss of silver from the coinage by wear was on average
about 0 3 per cent'. The aggregate rate of wear on coins withdrawn
during the silver exchange of 1817 was 26 per cent, which would mean
an annual rate of wear from 1700 to 1817 of 0.257 per cent. A figure
of 0 2 per cent for annual wear can be calculated from the estimate
referred to by Sir John Craig on the basis of his example of a reduction
in weight of 10 per cent resulting from £1,000 being lost a year on a
circulation of L500,000 over the course of fifty years.2
The accuracy of some of the estimates quoted is questionable because
they are based on observation or a general assumption of weight loss
rather than on experiments. When coins are referred to as having been
weighed at the Mint or the Bank of England, however, there is
probably a greater likelihood of the figures being reliable.
I W. Jacob, An Historical Inquiry into the Production and Consumption of the Precious
Metals (London, 1831), quoted in Horsefield, British Monetary Experiments, p. 258.
2 PRO. Mint 1 54. pp 584-85. J. Craig. The Mint, A History of the London Mint from AD287
to 1948 (Cambridge, 1953), p. xvi.
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Table 3
Mint output of silver coin, 1220-1800
Output of silver coin (£)
July 1220 - 29 Sept. 1300 3,196,416
30 Sept. 1300 - 29 Sept. 1402 1,688,290
30 Sept. 1402 - 29 Sept. 1501 866,367
30 Sept. 1501 -28 July 1601 8,228,470
29 July 1601 - 1700 22,502,379
1701 - 1800 924,229*
*Excludes the £320,372 struck at the Edinburgh Mint between 1707 and 1709.
Source C E Challis, 'Appendix 1. Mint Output, 1220-1985', NHRIvI,
pp 673-93
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Table 4
Rates of wear of silver coin by denomination, 1700-1816
Crown
Reduction in weight (%)
Half-crown
	 Shilling Sixpence
Source
1712 1.03 1.03 1.94 3.75 Conduitt1728 2.96 3.67 6.08 10.57 Conduitt1730 3.38 8.50 10.87 Prior1737 6-11 11 - 22 Shaw1742 8 10 Vallavine1762 11.42
- Whatley1786 12 23 36 Oman1787 3 12 8.15 20.61 36.28 Mint1798 331 990 24.60 38.28 Mint1807 27.54 39.80 Mint1811 20 50 Hoare1816 29.54 40.02 Mint
Note For details of the sources see Table 2.
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Table 5
Indices of wages of labourers
in London and Lancashire, 1700-96
(1700 = 100)
Cost of living
London wages
Money
	 Real
Lancashire wages
Money	 Real
1700-04 95.6 104 110 92 97
1705-09 105 2 109 107 102 100
1710-14 112 4 110 100 105 96
1715-19 964 109 113 107 111
1720-24 95 110 116 125 132
1725-29 105 109 104 120 114
1730-34 876 113 129 131 150
1735-39 95 117 124 133 141
1740-44 97 117 122 133 140
1745-49 958 118 123 131 137
1750-54 944 118 125 133 141
1755-59 109 6 118 108 124 115
1760-64 106 119 113 140 132
1765-69 116 2 121 104 174 151
1770-74 128 8 121 94 195 152
1775-79 123 8 119 96 200 162
1780-84 132 4 123 93 200 151
1785-89 130 2 123 95 219 168
1790-94 144 231 160
1795-96 166 233 141
Notes The cost-of-living index is derived mainly from contract prices, and
must be regarded as very rough. It relates principally to London and
southern England, but was nevertheless used to estimate Lancashire
real wages
All wage indices relate to the weekly wages of men in full employment.
Source Mitchell and Deane, British Historical Statistics, pp. 346-47.
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Table 6
Bank of England notes issued, 1721-1810
Notes issued (£)
1721-31 35,305,066
1731-40 45,630,426
1741-50 39,541,554
1751-60 45,037,072
1761-70 48,044,053
1771-80 66,058,797
1781-90 75,702,353
1791-1800 116,381,558
1801-10 163,935,680
Note The above figures are grouped into decades from yearly totals. Since
notes will have been continually withdrawn the figures are an indication
of the amount of notes issued rather than sum totals that will have
circulated at any one given time.
Source E M Kelly, Spanish Dollars and Silver Tokens: An account of the
is.sue.s of the Bank of England 1796-1816 (London, 1976), pp. 121-23.
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Table 7
Mint output for gold and silver coin, 1661-1820
Output of gold coin (£) Output of silver coin (£) Total (£)
1661-70 804,364 1,333,551 2,137,915
1671-80 2,214,331 1,981,771 4,196,102
1681-90 3,430,982 985,194 4,416,176
1691-1700 1,991,649 6,933,452 8,925,101
1701-10 1,729,278 232,014 1,961,292
1711-20 7,628,756 144,385 7,773,141
1721-30 2,898,727 192,414 3,091,141
1731-40 3,255,330 36,330 3,291,660
1741-50 2,447,455 167,704 2,615,159
1751-60 5,853,579 87,896 5,941,475
1761-70 7,226,443 6,223 7,232,666
1771-80 23,120,040 904 23,120,944
1781-90 16,924,033 55,724 16,979,757
1791-1800 15,500,552 635 15,501,187
1801-10 3,649,504 793 3,650,297
1811-20 8,922,787 6,933,123 15,855,910
Source Challis, 'Mint Output', NHRM, pp. 689-94.
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Table 8
Output of copper and tin coin from the Mint and Soho, Birmingham, 1661-1820
Output of tin coin (I)	 Output of copper coin (£)
1661-70
	
1671-80	 41,662
	
1681-88	 27,861
	
1689-1700	 38,153	 23,998
	
1701-10	 -
	
1711-30	 38,714
	
1731-40	 78,460
	
1741-50	 -	 60,938
	
1751-60	 -	 27,939
	
1761-70	 5,734
	
1771-80	 44,523
	
1781-1820	 685,330
Note The years 1781-1820 exclude the copper coins struck by the Mint for
Ireland The figures relate entirely to Matthew Boulton's copper coins
produced at Soho
Source Challis, 'Mint Output', NHRM, pp. 689-94. Account of the quantity of
copper coined by Mr Bouhon. Parliamentary Papers, 1819 (404).
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Table 10
Mint output of silver coin, July 1816 to December 1817
Monthly
Number of Pieces
Cumulative
1816
July 2,772,000 2,772,000
August 9,365,400 12,137,400
September 5,381,640 17,519,040
October 8,672,400 26,191,440
November 8,256,600 34,448,040
December 7,969,104 42,417,144
1817
January 7,305,408 49,722,552
February 7,262,640 56,985,192
March 975,744 57,960,936
April 738,936 58,699,872
May 2,633,400 61,333,272
June 3,393,720 64,726,992
July 958,320 65,685,312
August 3,730,320 69,415,632
September 4,062,960 73,478,592
October 4,221,360 77,699,952
November 4,950,000 82,649,952
December 1,812,888 84,462,840
Source PRO Mint 933, Accounts of silver monies coined, 13 July 1816 to 31
May 1817 and 3 June 1817 to 21 May 1818.
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Table 11
Mint output of silver coin, July 1816 to December 1817
Monthly (£) Cumulative (£)
1816
July 87,120 87,120
August 374,220 461,340
September 215,226 676,566
October 356,400 1,032,966
November 356,400 1,389,366
December 415,800 1,805,166
1817
January 475,200 2,280,366
February 415,800 2,696,166
March 49,500 2,745,666
April 84,942 2,830,608
May 247,500 3,078,108
June 198,000 3,276,108
July 49,500 3,325,608
August 198,000 3,523,608
September 222,750 3,746,358
October 222,750 3,969,108
November 198,000 4,167,108
December 74,250 4,241,358
Source PRO Mint 933 Accounts of silver monies coined, 13 July 1816 to 31
May 1817 and 3 June 1817 to 21 May 1818.
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Table 12
Mint output of silver coin by denomination, July 1816 to December 1817
Half-crown (£) Shilling (£) Sixpence (i)
1816
July 35,640 51,480
August - 280,170 94,050
September 161,370 53,856
October 279,180 77,220
November 299,970 56,430
December 114,048 250,668 51,084
1817
January 224,136 226,512 24,552
February 140,580 243,540 31,680
March 13,068 29,304 7,128
April 79,992 4,950 84,942
May 207,900 30,690 8,910
June 95,040 74,250 28,710
July 15,840 25,740 7,920
August 70,290 97,020 30,690
September 87,120 102,960 32,670
October 77,220 110,880 34,650
November - 148,500 49,500
December 396 57,222 16,632
Source PRO Mint 9 33, Accounts of silver monies coined, 13 July 1816 to 31
May 1817 and 3 June 1817 to 21 May 1818.
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Table 13
Mint output of silver coin, July 1816 to December 1817
Half-crown
Number of Pieces
Shilling Sixpence
1816
July 712,800 2,059,200
August 5,603,400 3,762,000
September 3,227,400 2,154,240
October 5,583,600 3,088,800
November 5,999,400 2,257,200
December 912,384 5,013,360 2,043,360
1817
January 1,793,088 4,530,240 982,080
February 1,124,640 4,870,800 1,267,200
March 104,544 586 080 285,120
April 639,936 99,000 738,936
May 1,663,200 613,800 356,400
June 760,320 1,485,000 1,148,400
July 126,720 514,800 316,800
August 562,320 1,940,400 1,227,600
September 696,960 2,059,200 1,306,800
October 617,760 2,217,600 1,386,000
November - 2,970,000 1,980,000
December 3,168 1,144,440 665,280
Source PRO Mint 9 33, Accounts of silver monies coined, 13 July 1816 to 31
May 1817 and 3 June 1817 to 21 May 1818.
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England and Wales, including
Guernsey and Jersey
Scotland
London stations
London bankers
Mint
Bank of England
Base coin received at rate of
standard silver
Silver coin received at the Mint
between 1 March and 31 May
1817
Total
Table 14
Summary account of the exchange
Consignment of
new coin
£	 s d
Returns in
old coin
£	 s d
1,790,505. 2. 0 1,563,268.	 4. 6
433,800. 0. 0 423,400. 2. 0
160,400. 0. 0 128,609.	 9. 6
72,000. 0. 0 30,164.	 1. 6
- 1,290.	 7. 0
415,755. 0. 0 415,755.	 0. 0
200. 0. 0 6,929.	 3. 8
30,070. 0. 0 30,070.17. 0
2,902,730. 2. 0 2,599,487.	 5. 2
Note The aggregate figures for coin withdrawn in Appendices 3 and 4 being
less than the totals listed in this table indicate that a complete record of
all station accounts has not survived.
Source PRO Mint 1114, Mint 1 54, pp. 584-85.
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Table 15
Comparison of population and silver coin withdrawn
in English counties, 1817
Silver coin withdrawn (£) Population 1811
Rutland 974 16,380
Huntingdon 5,737 42,208
Westmorland 8 ,303 45,922
Monmouthshire 11,396 62,127
Bedfordshire 9,880 70,213
Herefordshire 11,035 94,073
Cambridgeshire 22,231 101,109
Hertfordshire 14,750 111,654
Middlesex 10,343 112,126
Buckinghamshire 61 ,214
Berkshire 29,029 118,277
Oxfordshire 28,208 119,191
Dorset 26 ,1	 13 124,693
Cumberland 34 ,396 133,744
Northamptonshire 24,380 141,353
Leicestershire 31,894 150,419
Surrey 16,322 155,455
Worcestershire 31,546 160,546
Nottinghamshire 23,456 162,900
Northumberland 60,286 172,161
Durham 25,906 177,625
Derbyshire 20,592 185,487
Sussex 34,135 190,083
Wiltshire 32,952 193,828
Shropshire 30,650 194,298
Cornwall 32,871 216,667
Cheshire 25,521 227,031
Warwickshire 47,939 228,735
Suffolk 43,241 234,211
Lincolnshire 51,396 237,891
Hampshire 49,687 245,080
Essex 45,134 252,473
Gloucestershire 78,857 285,514
Norfolk 49,137 291,999
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Silver coin withdrawn (I) Population 1811
Staffordshire 34,906 295,153
Somerset 58,191 303,180
Kent 59,689 373,095
Devon 81,368 383,308
Lancashire 122,253 828,309
Yorkshire 121,131 973,113
Source: PRO. Mint 11/14-68. The Population of Great Britain in 1811.
Parliamentary Papers, 1812, (316), p. 427.
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Table 17
Mint output of silver coin, 1816-50
Output of silver coin (£) Output of silver coin (£)
1816 1,805,251 1833 145
1817 2,436,297 1834 432,775
1818 576,279 1835 146,665
1819 1,267,272 1836 497,719
1820 847,717 1837 75,385
1821 433,686 1838 174,042
1822 31,430 1839 390,654
1823 285,271 1840 207,900
1824 282,070 1841 89,641
1825 417,535 1842 192,852
1826 608,605 1843 239,580
1827 33,019 1844 610,632
1828 16,288 1845 647,658
1829 108,259 1846 559,548
1830 151 1847 125,730
1831 33,696 1848 35,442
1832 145 1849 119,592
1850 129,096
Source Challis, 'Mint Output', NHRAI, pp. 694-95.
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